Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. How to Make an Effort: A Reply to E. J. Coffman.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):23-33.
    Abstract In ?On Making an Effort? E. J. Coffman develops what he takes to be a fairly serious problem for Robert Kane's positive theory of free choice, where the concept of efforts of will is pivotal.1 Coffman argues that the plausibility of Kane's libertarian account of free choice ?is inversely proportional to the plausibility of a certain principle of agency? (p. 12). And since the latter is quite plausible, the former is therefore ?at best fairly implausible? (p. 12). In what (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Subliminal priming of intentional inhibition.Jim Parkinson & Patrick Haggard - 2014 - Cognition 130 (2):255-265.
  • The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessaryfor free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) thatmy being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary forfree will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimateself-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USCLibertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, nometaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception ofultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivatingthe USC Libertarian is ultimately (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation.Stefaan E. Cuypers Ishtiyaque Haji - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):221-239.
    An agent who is the victim of covert and nonconstraining control is unaware of being controlled and controllers get their way by manipulating the victims so that they willingly do what the controllers desire. Our primary objective is to argue that if cases of CNC manipulation undermine compatibilist accounts of the sort of control required for moral responsibility, they also undermine various agent‐causal and non‐agent‐causal libertarian accounts as well.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Libertarian free will and CNC manipulation.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):221-238.
  • Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
    I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations