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Rights

In Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press (2002)

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  1. II- What's Wrong with Being Lonely? Justice, Beneficence, and Meaningful Relatopnships.Laura Valentini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):49-69.
    A life without liberty and material resources is not a good life. Equally, a life devoid of meaningful social relationships—such as friendships, family attachments, and romances—is not a good life. From this it is tempting to conclude that just as individuals have rights to liberty and material resources, they also have rights to access meaningful social relationships. I argue that this conclusion can be defended only in a narrow set of cases. ‘Pure’ social relationship deprivation—that is, deprivation that is not (...)
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  • Associative Duties and Immigration.Javier Hidalgo - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6):697-722.
    This paper evaluates an argument for immigration restrictions that appeals to the costs that immigration imposes on the citizens of a recipient state. According to this argument, citizens have associative duties to protect each other’s interests, immigration can damage these interests in certain cases, and the associative duties between compatriots justify immigration restrictions in these cases. Call this: the partiality argument for immigration restrictions. I argue that the partiality argument is unsound. Immigration restrictions violate negative duties to refrain from interfering (...)
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  • What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice.Michael Thompson - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press. pp. 333-384.
    This will be the best way of explaining ‘Paris is the lover of Helen’, that is, ‘Paris loves, and by that very fact [et eo ipso] Helen is loved’. Here, therefore, two propositions have been brought together and abbreviated as one. Or, ‘Paris is a lover, and by that very fact Helen is a loved one’.
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