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Aggregation and two moral methods

Utilitas 17 (1):1-23 (2005)

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  1. The Many, the Few, and the Nature of Value.Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    John Taurek argues that, in a choice between saving the many or the few, the numbers should not count. Some object that this view clashes with the transitivity of ‘better than’; others insist the clash can be avoided. I defend a middle ground: Taurek cannot have transitivity, but that doesn’t doom his view, given a suitable conception of value. I then formalize and explore two conceptions: one context-sensitive, one multidimensional.
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  • Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals.Michael Otsuka - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):109–135.
    Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (2006): 109-35.
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  • Taurek's No Worse Claim.Weyma Lübbe - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (1):69–85.
  • Justice criteria for the allocation of scarce medical resources in pandemic situations.Alejandro Miranda - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 49:55-70.
    Resumen En este trabajo se exponen veintiuna tesis sobre la asignación de recursos escasos en tiempos de pandemia o crisis sanitaria. El autor parte de la base de que nunca se justifica tratar a una persona como un mero medio. A partir de este principio fundamental, y de otras exigencias de justicia, procura determinar cuáles son los límites a las consideraciones, por lo demás legítimas, de eficiencia o de utilidad. Esto le permite discernir qué criterios de distribución son moral mente (...)
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  • The Aggregation Problem for Scanlonian Contractualism: An Exploration of the Relevance View, Mixed Solutions, and Why Scanlonian Contractualists Could Be, and Perhaps Should Be, Restricted Prioritarians.Aart Van Gils - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Reading
    In this thesis, I discuss the aggregation problem for T. M. Scanlon’s “contractualism”. I argue that Scanlonian contractualists have the following two options when it comes to the aggregation problem. First, they can choose to limit aggregation directly via a specific version of the Relevance View, “Sequential Claims-Matching”. Second, Scanlonian contractualists can adopt a so-called “mixed solution” of which I propose a specific version. My mixed solution does not limit aggregation. Rather, it either avoids some of the counterintuitive results in (...)
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  • The Disrespectfulness of Weighted Survival Lotteries.Joseph Adams - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):395-404.
    If we can save the lives of only one of multiple groups of people, we might be inclined simply to save whichever group is largest. We may worry, though, that automatically saving the largest group fails to take each saveable individual sufficiently into account, offering some of these individuals no chance at all of being rescued. Still wanting to give larger groups higher chances of survival, we may then say that we ought to employ a proportionally weighted lottery to determine (...)
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  • Regan’s Lifeboat Case and the Additive Assumption.Daniel Kary - 2020 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 33 (1):127-143.
    In the Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan considers a scenario where one must choose between killing either a human being or any number of dogs by throwing them from a lifeboat. Regan chooses the human being. His justification for this prescription is that the human being will suffer a greater harm from death than any of the dogs would. This prescription has met opposition on the grounds that the combined intrinsic value of the dogs’ experiences outweighs those of a (...)
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  • What Is Wrong With Kamm's and Scanlon's Arguments Against Taurek.Tyler Doggett - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3):1-16.
    I distinguish several arguments Kamm and Scanlon make against Taurek's claim that it is permissible to save smaller groups of people rather than larger. I then argue that none succeeds. This is a companion to my "Saving the Few.".
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  • Don’T Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting.Yishai Cohen - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):245-261.
    Suppose you can save only one of two groups of people from harm, with one person in one group, and five persons in the other group. Are you obligated to save the greater number? While common sense seems to say ‘yes’, the numbers skeptic says ‘no’. Numbers Skepticism has been partly motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. However, even many non-consequentialists think that Numbers Skepticism (...)
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  • Intransitive Ethics.Alex Friedman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):277-297.
    This article addresses the question of whether the relation of moral preference is transitive. I argue, following Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels, that any ethical theory complex enough to be even minimally plausible allows us to generate intransitive sets of preferences. Even act utilitarianism cannot avoid this predicament unless we accept its least plausible version. We must reevaluate the assumption that an ethical theory must be transitive in order to be rational. This problem amounts to a foundational crisis in ethics. (...)
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  • How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?Alex Voorhoeve - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):64-87.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
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  • Contractualism.Elizabeth Ashford - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The New Problem of Numbers in Morality.Fiona Woollard - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):631-641.
    Discussion of the “problem of numbers” in morality has focused almost exclusively on the moral significance of numbers in whom-to-rescue cases: when you can save either of two groups of people, but not both, does the number of people in each group matter morally? I suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to the moral significance of numbers in other types of case. According to common-sense morality, numbers make a difference in cases, like the famous Trolley Case, where we must (...)
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  • Who Is Afraid of Numbers?: S. Matthew Liao.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):447-461.
    In recent years, many non-consequentialists such as Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have been puzzling over what has come to be known as the Number Problem, which is how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many, a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness of persons. In this article, I argue that these non-consequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary, because (...)
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  • Pairwise Comparison and Numbers Skepticism.Nien-hê Hsieh, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (4):487-504.
    In this article, we defend pairwise comparison as a method to resolve conflicting claims from different people that cannot be jointly satisfied because of a scarcity of resources. We consider Michael Otsuka's recent challenge that pairwise comparison leads to intransitive choices for the (someone who believes the numbers should not count in forced choices among lives) and Frances Kamm's responses to Otsuka's challenge. We argue that Kamm's responses do not succeed, but that the threat they are designed to meet is (...)
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