Georges Florovsky, in 1936, called for a revival of the teaching of the Church Fathers. At the same time, Fr. Joseph Bocheński formulated the program for the renewal of Thomism by means of formal logic. In this paper, I propose to integrate these two projects. Analytic Patristics aims at expressing and developing patristic thought with the tools of analytic philosophy. The broad program of the logic of religion formulated by Bocheński included semiotics, methodology, and the formal logic of religion. I (...) present here three examples of the integration of analytic philosophy and patristics in these three areas. I discuss first Basil Lourié’s paraconsistent interpretation of Dionysius the Areopagite’s theory of the divine names, then Richard Swinburne’s efforts to revive Orthodox natural theology, and finally Beau Branson’s reconstruction of Gregory of Nyssa’s metaphysics of the Trinity. These examples perfectly illustrate how analytic philosophy can contribute to the development of patristics, and how the tradition of the Church Fathers can inspire contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This is the introductory essay to a collection commemorating the 100th anniversary of the publication in Mind of Bertrand Russell’s paper ‘On Denoting’.

In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3. I challenge a number of established views (including those of Myles Burnyeat, Gareth Matthews, and Christopher Kirwan) concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of Augustine’s response to scepticism (including his semantic response to (...) external world scepticism) and several important elements of Augustine’s thought concerning signification, cognition, and object-directed thought. I argue that once we properly understand Augustine’s views about these issues, his arguments in defence of knowledge are more interesting and more successful than usually thought. (shrink)