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This article aims to provide some insight into the nature and content of the theory of associative political obligation. It does this by first locating the view in the wider debate on political obligation, analyzing the view in terms of four central elements that are shared by many of its versions, and then discussing important criticisms that have been made of each of these, as well as some rejoinders by defenders of the theory.

‘There is a moral right to secede.’It is not, perhaps, always entirely clear what Buchanan means with his reference to a right to secede, and that is a matter we shall have to deal with in due course, but, anyway, the claim that there is a moral right to secede is a good deal more complex than is apparent from Buchanan's ground-breaking work and involves a number of assumptions that need to be gone into if Buchanan's work is to be (...) built on. Many other people, too, seem to assume such a right, especially in the context of discussions of an alleged right to self-determination. My main concern in this paper is with the self that might be self-determining and with what it must be like if it is to have a right. My conclusion is that, though there are many important questions to raise about secession, they are not, outside the case of federations, questions about a right to secede; a right to secede has bearing only in the least interesting cases. (shrink)

The secession issue appears to many contemporary thinkers to reveal a fatal flaw in the idea of national self-determination. The question is whether national minorities who come to want to be politically self determining should be allowed to separate from the parent state and form one of their own. Here the idea of national self-determination may lead us in one of two opposing directions. If the minority group in question regards itself as a separate nation, then the principle seems to (...) support its claims: if the Québécois or the Catalans come to think of themselves as having national identities distinct from those of the Canadians or the Spanish, and to seek political independence on that basis, then if we are committed to national self-determination we should support their claims. But we then face the challenge that once national identities begin to proliferate there is no feasible way of satisfying all such claims, given elementary facts of geography and population spread. (shrink)

RésuméLes analogies peuvent être des outils précieux d'argumentation lors-qu'elles sont bonnes, mais quand elles sont mauvaises, elles faussent inévitablement la question qu'elles sont censées élucider. Tel est le cas de la comparaison entre la sécession et le divorce, qu'il s'agisse du divorce sous conditions ou du divorce sans égard à la faute. L'objectif de cet article est de montrer que la sécession se distingue empiriquement d'un divorce par trois différences significatives: entre personnes et peuple, entre manage et union politique, et (...) entre divorce et sécession. Cela révèle que les deux versions de l'analogie du divorce sont inadéquates. Même si, cependant, ces écarts pouvaient être comblés et que l'analogie du divorce sous condition puisse être sauvée, je conteste le caractère approprie de l'autre version en montrant qu'aborder la sécession comme un divorce civil entraînerait des implications normatives contre-intuitives qui enlèveraient tout attrait à l'analogie du divorce sans égard à la faute, ou qui amèneraient ceux qui l'emploient à promouvoir des modifications irréalistes aux institutions légales internationales. (shrink)

There are nationalisms and nationalisms, and as nationalisms vary from barbarous and murderous to benign and, all things considered, perhaps desirable, so theories of nationalism vary from irrational or turgid metaphysical accounts to reasonable and carefully articulated and argued theories of nationalism. André Van de Putte has well described some of the former while David Miller, Yael Tamir, Geneviève Nootens, Ross Poole, and Robert X. Ware have carefully argued for some modest forms of nationalism, sometimes explicitly and sometimes only by (...) implication. But there are also, as the reader will have seen, forcefully argued and systematic theories setting themselves against even the most sophisticated and plausible defences of nationalism. The articles of Harry Brighouse, Omar Dahbour, and Andrew Levine fall explicitly into that category and, we would argue, so does Allen Buchanan's carefully wrought article, though implicitly and by implication but not by programmatic intent. (shrink)

Résumé: Les analogies peuvent être des outils précieux d’argumentation lors-qu’elles sont bonnes, mais quand elles sont mauvaises, elles faussent inévitablement la question qu’elles sont censées élucider. Tel est le cas de la comparaison entre la sécession et le divorce, qu’il s’agisse du divorce sous conditions ou du divorce sans égard à la faute. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que la sécession se distingue empirique ment d’un divorce par trois différences significatives: entre personnes et peuple, entre mariage et union (...) politique, et entre divorce et sécession. Cela révèle que les deux versions de l’analogie du divorce sont inadéquates. Même si, cependant, ces écarts pou vaient être comblés et que l’analogie du divorce sous condition puisse être sauvée, je conteste le caractère approprié de l’autre version en montrant qu’aborder la sécession comme un divorce civil entraînerait des implications normatives contre-intuitives qui enlèveraient tout attrait à l’analogie du divorce sans égard à la faute, ou qui amèneraient ceux qui l’emploient à promouvoir des modifications irréalistes aux institutions légales internationales. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether there can be a right to secede from a liberal state by examining the concept of a liberal state and the different forms of liberalism that may be appealed to in order to justify secession. It argues that where the foundations of the state’s legitimacy are conceived in terms of a non-derivative right to self-determination, then secession from a liberal state may be a justified form of action for different types of groups including (...) ‘illiberal’ ones. If, however, a broader definition of political legitimacy is adopted – one that is predicated upon the liberal notions of individual moral autonomy and equality – then the right to independent statehood will generally not include a right to secede from a state that already upholds these principles. Consequently, liberal theorists of secession are forced to choose between particularizing a right of independent statehood to groups trapped in illiberal states, or acknowledging that the right to secede includes a right to establish an ‘illiberal’ state that bestows upon its citizens unequal rights and entitlements other than a right of exit. (shrink)