This paper discusses the connection between the actual history of mathematics and Lakatos's philosophy of mathematics, in three parts. The first points to studies by Lakatos and others which support his conception of mathematics and its history. In the second I suggest that the apparent poverty of Lakatosian examples may be due to the way in which the history of mathematics is usually written. The third part argues that Lakatos is right to hold philosophy accountable to history, even if Lakatos's (...) own view of mathematics fails that test. (shrink)

. Heuristic is a central concept of Lakatos' philosophy both in his early works and in his later work, the methodology of scientific research programs. The term itself, however, went through significant change of meaning. In this paper I study this change and the ‘metaphysical’ commitments behind it. In order to do so, I turn to his mathematical heuristic elaborated in Proofs and Refutations. I aim to show the dialogical character of mathematical knowledge in his account, which can open a (...) door to hermeneutic studies of mathematical practice. (shrink)