- Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
|
|
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.details
|
|
Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
|
|
How to Read a Representor.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Ergo.details
|
|
Epistemic modals and credal disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.details
|
|
Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (16):473-495.details
|
|
No Being Sure of Myself.Derek Lam - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Second-Order Confidence in Supervaluationism.Jonas Karge - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (1):43-58.details
|
|
Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing.Dan Zeman - 2018 - In Rob Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern & Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Semantics Archives. pp. 1353-1370.details
|
|
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 211-230.details
|
|
Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
A Gentle Approach to Imprecise Probabilities.Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - In Thomas Augustin, Fabio Gagliardi Cozman & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld. Springer. pp. 37-67.details
|
|
Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach–Tarski Paradox.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3525-3540.details
|
|
Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: A Reply to Beisbart.Luke Glynn, Radin Dardashti, Karim P. Y. Thebault & Mathias Frisch - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 531-542.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
|
|
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.details
|
|
The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114.details
|
|
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
|
|
Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
|
|
The Chances of Choices.Reuben Stern - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
|
|
Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
|
|
An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.details
|
|
On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities.Gregory Wheeler & Fabio G. Cozman - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3761-3782.details
|
|
Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule.John R. Welch - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2051-2072.details
|
|
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
|
|
A probabilistic epistemology of perceptual belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.details
|
|
The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
|
|
The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
|
|
Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.details
|
|
Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content.Rafael Ventura - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2803-2820.details
|
|
Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle.Brett Topey - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):478-488.details
|
|
Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.details
|
|
A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
|
|
What conceptual spaces can do for Carnap's late inductive logic.Marta Sznajder - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:62-71.details
|
|
A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.details
|
|
Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
|
|
Problems of Precision in Fuzzy Theories of Vagueness and Bayesian Epistemology.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2019 - In Richard Dietz (ed.), Vagueness and Rationality in Language Use and Cognition. Springer Verlag. pp. 31-48.details
|
|
Acting on belief functions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2023 - Theory and Decision 95 (4):575-621.details
|
|
Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.details
|
|
Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
|
|
Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
|
|
The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
|
|
The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
|
|
Decision making in the face of parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|