O objetivo deste artigo consiste em responder à questão de saber se, na filosofia de Hume, o padrão para determinar o valor de verdade dos proferimentos sobre valores morais e estéticos pode ser considerado genuinamente objetivo. Para tal, começo por esclareço três posições que se pode adotar sobre a questão de saber se este padrão é ou não genuinamente objetivo, a saber, subjetivismo, intersubjetivismo e objetivismo. Em seguida, explico a pertinência da interpretação cognitivista e por que razão a interpretação realista (...) de David Norton falha. Por fim, e à luz de uma distinção entre objetividade no sentido forte e fraco, concluo que na filosofia de Hume, o padrão para os proferimentos sobre valores é quasi-objetivo. (shrink)

During the history of philosophy, morals and beauty, and finding a diagnostic criterion for them, was a very important problem for philosophers. Most of the philosophers maintained that such criterion rooted in reason, but Hume presented a noble idea and said that moral sense based on feeling and sentiment. Everything which through its utility or beauty, leads to pleaser is virtuous. Sometimes directly and sometimes through the beauty and appearing beautiful, the utility leads to pleaser. Also, according to Hume, beauty (...) is a subjective thing measured by the criterion of the pleaser. Thus, pleaser and pain are the criteria of taste and sentiment to the diagnosis of virtue and vice, as well as, the beauty and value of art. In this paper, after comparing and monitoring morals and beauty from four aspects, through brief surveying of certain commentators of Hume, we attempt to explain the relationship between beauty, utility, and pleaser. Finally, we assert that the beauty is very important components in Hume’s explain of Morals, but at the same time aesthetics has no superiority to morals; and thus, we defend the originality of morals to aesthetics. (shrink)