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The Unity of a Tractarian Fact

Synthese 156 (2):231-251 (2007)

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  1. La teoría del juicio de Wittgenstein en el Tractatus.Javier Vidal - 2024 - Critica 56 (166):51-80.
    El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una interpretación, en parte novedosa, del pasaje 5.54-5.5423 del Tractatus en el que Wittgenstein examina las proposiciones que representan relaciones intencionales como el juicio. La idea fundamental será que estas proposiciones se consideran como proposiciones que tratan de complejos y, en consecuencia, deberían analizarse de conformidad con el parágrafo 2.0201, lo que me llevará a desarrollar paso a paso el análisis propuesto. Adicionalmente, argumentaré que la teoría de Wittgenstein así entendida excluye la posibilidad (...)
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  • The Tractatus On Unity.José L. Zalabardo - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):250-271.
    ABSTRACT I argue that some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be seen as addressing the twin problems of semantic unity and...
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  • Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's challenge, Frege's answer.Mark Textor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
    Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
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  • Priority and Unity in Frege and Wittgenstein.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (5).
    In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...)
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  • Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (2).
    I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect (...)
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  • Of Facts and Things.Gary S. Rosenkrantz - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):679-700.
    ABSTRACTThis paper examines the ontological status of individual substances; intuitive examples of such entities include particles and living organisms. My aim is to assess the ontological status of individual substances in the light of arguments for an ontology of [concrete] facts, often called states of affairs. Advocates of a fact ontology have argued that these factive entities are the ontologically fundamental beings. I will address the salient question of whether individual substances are reducible to, or eliminable in favor of, facts. (...)
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  • Nominalism and Realism. How Not to Read the Tractatus' Conception of a Name.Daniele Mezzadri - 2013 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (3):208-227.
    This paper focuses on a central aspect of the “picture theory” in the Tractatus – the “identity requirement” – namely the idea that a proposition represents elements in reality as combined in the same way as its elements are combined. After introducing the Tractatus' views on the nature of the proposition, I engage with a “nominalist” interpretation, according to which the Tractatus holds that relations are not named in propositions. I claim that the nominalist account can only be maintained by (...)
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  • Bradley’s Regress.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807.
    Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized.
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  • Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Daniele Mezzadri - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis discusses some central aspects of Wittgenstein's conception of language and logic in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and brings them into relation with the philosophies of Frege and Russell. The main contention is that a fruitful way of understanding the Tractatus is to see it as responding to tensions in Frege's conception of logic and Russell's theory of judgement. In the thesis the philosophy of the Tractatus is presented as developing from these two strands of criticism and thus as the (...)
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  • Types, Forms and Unity. Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment.Daniele Mezzadri - 2014 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2):177-193.
    This paper investigates Wittgenstein's "notorious" criticism of Russell's theory of judgment. Instead of advancing a further new interpretation of it, though, I analyze and discuss some of the most promising readings of the Russell/Wittgenstein dispute put forward in the secondary literature; I aim to show that, despite their alleged reciprocal opposition, they cohere with each other because they are, at bottom, different ways of highlighting the same question. I then connect Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell to the account of the nature (...)
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  • The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.
    Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to deal with both (...)
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  • Grammar, Ontology, and the Unity of Meaning.Ulrich Reichard - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Durham
    Words have meaning. Sentences also have meaning, but their meaning is different in kind from any collection of the meanings of the words they contain. I discuss two puzzles related to this difference. The first is how the meanings of the parts of a sentence combine to give rise to a unified sentential meaning, as opposed to a mere collection of disparate meanings (UP1). The second is why the formal ontology of linguistic meaning changes when grammatical structure is built up (...)
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