Switch to: References

Citations of:

Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality

Utilitas 7 (2):315 (1995)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reasons for action: Agent-neutral vs. Agent-relative.Michael Ridge - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly modified version of the historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid most if not all of these vices (Section 4). The distinction (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Agent-Relativity and the Status of Deontological Restrictions.Jamie Buckland - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (2):233-255.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Review of Skorupski's Ethical Explorations. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):113.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Neutral versus Relative: A Reply to Broome, and McNaughton and Rawling: John Skorupski.John Skorupski - 1996 - Utilitas 8 (2):235-248.
  • Normative reasons and the agent-neutral/relative dichotomy.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Punishment, Consent, Value and Respect.Matías Parmigiani - 2022 - Análisis Filosófico 42 (1):171-189.
    The present paper constitutes a critique of David Alm’s article “Punishment, Consent and Value”, in which it is argued that the consensual theory of punishment defended by C. S. Nino is false. Whilst Alm believes that this theory is grounded on an inadequate model of normative relations, here I will defend the hypothesis that such an assessment derives from an insufficient conception of human value and respect.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent-neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I then (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Skorupski and Broome on the Agent-Neutral/Relative Distinction.Jamie Buckland - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):59-82.
    I have two aims in this article. The first is to break the deadlocked exchange between John Skorupski and John Broome concerning how best to understand Thomas Nagel's distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for action. The second is to provide a reformulation of the distinction which captures an uncontroversial distinction between those reason-giving considerations which encapsulate an indexical relationship between an agent and an object of moral concern, and those which do not. The resolution of this exchange, and subsequent (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory.Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Dissertation, Australian National University