We model infinite regress structures — not arguments — by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.

We model infinite regress structures -not arguments- by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.

Kevin Mulligan a introduit la distinction entre les descriptions épaisses et minces dans la philosophie des relations. Cette distinction lui a permis d’affirmer les thèses suivantes : toutes les relations sont « minces » et internes, et aucune n’est « épaisse » et externe. J’accepte et j’utilise la distinction de Mulligan entre mince et épais afin de soutenir que ce ne sont pas toutes les relations internes qui sont minces. Il existe également des relations internes épaisses, et celles-ci abondent en (...) physique mathématique. Je soutiens en outre qu’il peut y avoir des relations externes minces. Cependant, en introduisant une distinction entre relations fortement et faiblement internes, je suis d’accord pour affirmer avec Mulligan que toutes les relations fortement internes sont des relations minces.Kevin Mulligan has brought the distinction between thick and thin descriptions into the philosophy of relations, and with its help he has put forward the theses that all relations are “thin” and internal, and that none is “thick” and external. Accepting and using Mulligan’s thin — thick distinction, I argue that not all internal relations are thin. There are thick internal relations, too ; and they abound in mathematical physics. Also, I claim that there might be thin external relations. However, introducing a distinction between strongly and weakly internal relations, I agree with Mulligan that all strongly internal relations are thin relations. (shrink)

Traditionally, nature has often been thought to be structured by essential forms providing the generic features of natural things and thus the foundations for scientific explanations. In contrast, human history and the social domain have been thought to be the realm of ever-changing appearances, where contingency prevails. The paper argues that the existence of essential forms is compatible with the contingent, mind-dependent and historical character of the social world, and that essential forms can also be found in the social domain. (...) Two categories of entities are discussed that suggest themselves to be identified as social forms, namely social kinds and social identities. To this end, it is shown that standard arguments for the existence of essential forms also apply to the social domain, and objections to the existence of social forms are rebutted. Particular attention is paid to the explanatory appeal of social forms. The paper concludes by suggesting that, far from being oppressive, essential social forms are presupposed by liberating social practices. (shrink)

This paper argues that, assuming properties exist and must be located in spacetime, the prevailing view that they are exactly located where their instances are is false. Instead a property is singularly located at just one region, namely the union of its instance's locations. This bears not just on issues in the metaphysics of properties, but also on the debate over whether multi-location is conceivable and/or possible.

One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those (...) who have grappled with it in print. There are various criticisms by commentators: that it is rendered absurd by the transitivity of identity, that it makes instantiation necessary instead of contingent, that it is unclear what counts are, that aspects are simply tropes, that my view does not capture multiple location, that I make an unclear reference to a theory of composition as identity, that the account suffers from problems with polyadicity, and that it is not a realist account of universals after all. I give responses to these objections. (shrink)

Ce numéro thématique de la revue Philosophiques est consacré aux Conférences Hugues Leblanc qui ont eu lieu du 1er au 3 avril 2010 au Département de philosophie de l'Université du Québec à Montréal. À cette occasion, le conférencier invité était Kevin Mulligan, titulaire de la chaire de philosophie analytique au Département de philosophie de l'Université de Genève, qui a prononcé trois conférences sous le titre " Wittgenstein vs ses prédécesseurs austro-allemands ", publiées dans ce numéro. Mulligan y développe un de (...) ses thèmes historiques de prédilection, à savoir la dette de Wittgenstein, dans ses travaux sur l'esprit et le langage, à l'endroit de ses prédécesseurs austro-allemands. Comme le veut la formule des conférences Hugues Leblanc, nous avons réuni quelques collègues afin de discuter de quelques-uns des aspects des travaux du conférencier invité et nous avons ajouté, pour compléter ce numéro de Philosophiques, quelques articles originaux portant également sur d'autres aspects des travaux de Mulligan. On peut regrouper l'ensemble de ces contributions sous quatre des grands thèmes exploités par Mulligan en philosophie : le domaine de l'ontologie (incluant les relations, les tropes, les états de choses et les vérifacteurs), le domaine de la philosophie de l'esprit, celui des émotions et des valeurs, et enfin le thème historique de la philosophie austro-allemande, de Bolzano à Wittgenstein en passant par M. Scheler et la phénoménologie de Munich. Faute de pouvoir rendre compte dans cette préface de l'ensemble de ces riches contributions à ce numéro de Philosophiques, je me contenterai de renvoyer le lecteur aux résumés, préparés par les auteurs de ces contributions, qui précèdent chacun des articles. (shrink)

G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...) fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us. (shrink)