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  1. What is explained in science?Barbara Tuchańska - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):102-119.
    The fundamental problem of what is explained in science should be considered and clarified since it determines the way of solving the problem of how something is explained as well as the entire view of explanation. In the first section after the introduction, Hempel's models of explanation are criticized for their narrow concern with logical reconstruction. In the next section a broader epistemological approach to explanation is presented, and in the last section an historical example of Newtonian explanation as epistemic (...)
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  • Explanation, subjunctives and statistical theories.Del Ratzsch - 1988 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):80-96.
    (1988). Explanation, subjunctives and statistical theories. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 80-96. doi: 10.1080/02698598808573326.
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  • Linking causal and explanatory asymmetry.Daniel M. Hausman - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (3):435-451.
    This essay defends two theses that jointly establish a link between causal and explanatory asymmetry. The first thesis is that statements specifying facts about effects, unlike statements specifying facts about causes, are not "independently variable". The second thesis is that independent variability among purportedly explanatory factors is a necessary condition on scientific explanations.
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  • The Context of Explanation.Martin Bunzl - 1993 - Springer Verlag.
    In this book Martin Bunzl considers the prospects for a general and comprehensive account of explanation, given the variety of interests that prompt explanations in science. Bunzl argues that any successful account of explanation must deal with two very different contexts - one static and one dynamic. Traditionally, theories of explanation have been built for the former of these two contexts. That is to say, they are designed to show how it is that a 'finished' body of scientific knowledge can (...)
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