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  1. Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.
    This paper concerns a specific epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation - that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions - has centred largely around mental (...)
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  • Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.
    Uncontroversially, individuals exercise agency in acting; can we say the same about believing? This paper argues that subjects do indeed exercise agency over their beliefs and provides an account by which this is possible. On my picture, self-awareness is fundamental to the nature of doxastic agency. Drawing on work in the philosophy of action, I argue that subjects exercise agency in performing mental actions that form and sustain their beliefs, where they are aware of these actions as part of reasoning (...)
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