This contribution focuses on what type of question “Are mental disorders brain disorders?” is and what task Anneli Jefferson performs in her book with the same title. I distinguish between conceptual engineering and conceptual choice, the former involving the individuation of an adequate concept for a specific goal, and the latter involving the normative problem of whether we should employ the concept at hand. I contend that Anneli Jefferson’s book is a work of conceptual engineering, which is valuable in and (...) of itself, but that this is insufficient to answer an equally essential version of the question, “Are mental disorders brain disorders?”, namely, whether we should adopt the newly engineered concept or not, considering a broader range of goals for mental health research and practice. (shrink)

In an important and timely book, Anneli Jefferson outlines a view according to which a given mental disorder is a brain disorder if it is a (harmful) mental dysfunction realised by a brain dysfunction. Prima facie, Jefferson’s book is a study in the metaphysics of dysfunction: how does mental dysfunction relate to brain dysfunction, and what does this imply for the status of mental disorders and brain disorders? In what follows, I shall argue that Jefferson’s contribution to this debate is (...) better understood as a conceptual explication of how psychiatrists, some philosophers, scientists and clinicians in the field (broadly construed) think of the label ‘brain disorder’. I infer this on the basis that Jefferson’s thesis would not follow from any serious, well-worked out theory of proper function. Despite initial appearances, Jefferson’s book about brain dysfunction is not about function at all. (shrink)

In her book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?” (2022), Anneli Jefferson proposes that brain processes that always realize mental dysfunctions are brain dysfunctions. This paper explores possible interpretations of two underdeveloped aspects of this thesis. First, it argues that “realization” should be interpreted as partial rather than full realization. Second, it argues that the “always” should only quantify over biologically normal situations. Taken together, these changes can account for the fact that some psychological dysfunctions are partially realized by functional mechanisms, (...) for the existence of psychological dysfunctions due to mismatches rather than brain dysfunctions, and for the fact that brain dysfunctions do not cease to be brain dysfunctions just because they can be compensated. (shrink)

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called (...) hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. (shrink)