The catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma is an argumentative figure familiar to any reader of Buddhist philosophical literature. Roughly speaking it consists of the enumeration of four alternatives: that some propositions holds, that it fails to hold, that it both holds and fails to hold, that it neither holds nor fails to hold. The tetralemma also constitutes one of the more puzzling features of Buddhist philosophy as the use to which it is put in arguments is not immediately obvious and certainly not (...) uniform: sometimes one of the four possibilities is selected as ‘the right one’, sometimes all four are rejected, sometimes all four are affirmed. It seems that this confusion is only exacerbated by the plethora of treatments we find in the modern commentarial literature, many of which try to analyze the tetralemma by recourse to notions of modern logic. Despite some important work done during the last decades a comprehensive study of the origin and development of the catuṣkoṭi from its use in the earliest Buddhist literature up to its later employment in the Buddhist philosophical works of Tibet, China, and Japan remains yet to be written. The present paper is obviously not intended to fill this gap, but has the specific objective of giving an interpretation of Nāgārrjuna’s employment of the tetralemma which makes both logical sense and is in accordance with his general philosophical position. (shrink)

The paper discusses the issue of the confrontation of the Bhagavadgītā with some aspects of the early Buddhist doctrine as presented in the Pāli canon. The confrontation points to the Bhagavadgītā as being a poem of the orthodox current of Indian religious thought, which also contains some polemical elements, these mostly addressed to the most powerful heterodox religious current in the first centuries B.C.. Several parts of the famous Sanskrit poem are compared and confronted with the respective parts of the (...) Pāli canon in order to demonstrate, firstly, the different approaches of both currents, mostly in ethics and metaphysics, and secondly, the Bhagavadgītā’s reaction to particular elements of early Buddhism. The first six chapters of the Sanskrit poem have been subjected to analysis in this respect. (shrink)

Suffering, alongside the feeling of sanctity of life, pervades human experience, generating primal anxiety, which humans learn to shore up with social solidarity and with the practice of communication in religious rituals. The roots of social belonging spring from the primordial sentiments toward ethnicity, race, language, religion, customs and traditions, and region. Self–identity, mediated by mental formations derived from social relations, is composed of thinking and values. Daily experience reveals that cultural differences produce blind spots in thinking and barriers in (...) values—‐governing areas of activity, social relations, the world, and identity of being—‐that impedes cross—‐cultural understanding. (shrink)

Unknown to most Western psychologists, ancient Indian scriptures contain very rich, empirically derived psychological theories that are, however, intertwined with religious and philosophical content. This article represents our attempt to extract the psychological theory of cognition and consciousness from a prominent ancient Indian thought system: Samkhya-Yoga. We derive rather broad hypotheses from this approach that may complement and extend Western mainstream theorizing. These hypotheses address an ancient personality theory, the effects of practicing the applied part of Samkhya-Yoga on normal and (...) extraordinary cognition, as well as different ways of perceiving reality. We summarize empirical evidence collected in diverse fields of research that allows for making judgments about the hypotheses, and suggest more specific hypotheses to be examined in future research. We conclude that the existing evidence for the hypotheses is substantial but that there are still considerable gaps in theory and research to be filled. Theories of cognition contained in the ancient Indian systems have the potential to modify and complement existing Western mainstream accounts of cognition. In particular, they might serve as a basis for arriving at more comprehensive theories for several research areas that, so far, lack strong theoretical grounding, such as meditation research or research on aspects of consciousness. (shrink)

This article seeks to broaden contemporary scholarship on the Lotus Sūtra by arguing that it is a philosophically critical, self-reflective text struggling with problems of truth in Buddhist discourse. While all Lotus Sūtra scholars agree that the doctrine of skillful means is a central teaching in the text, there is a common tendency to frame skillful means as a passive vehicle (or ‘means’) for expressing truth rather than an active philosophical critique of truth. This article argues that the Lotus Sūtra (...) uses skillful means as a distinct form of criticism within a larger debate over the nature and efficacy of Buddhist practice, and that it raises important issues about truth that are shared by other important Buddhist thinkers and texts such as Nāgārjuna, Lin-chi and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. It analyzes key passages and parables without reducing the ethical teachings of the Lotus Sūtra to simplistic versions of utilitarianism, paternalism, or relativism, and without dissolving the critical elements that make the Lotus Sūtra a genuinely philosophically interesting text. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that in the Pāli Canon there was a tradition of Buddhist logic, but this tradition was weak, and the proto-logic we can reconstruct on the basis of the early Pāli texts can be evaluated as a predecessor of the Hindu logic. According to the textual analysis of the Pāli texts, we can claim that at the time of the closing of the Pāli Canon there did not exist the Nyāya philosophy known by the Nyāya Sūtra. (...) Meanwhile, we can assume that the Milindapañha, the best logical source of early Pāli literature, was written under influences of the Gandhāran Buddhists and this text preceded the Nyāya philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I look at the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions in light of the dynamics of ancient Indian debate. Doing so foregrounds a dimension of the Buddha's interaction with his interlocutors that is central for understanding the problem of what are known as the Undetermined or Unanswered Questions: namely, the Buddha's knowledge and authority vis-à-vis rival teachers.

As propositions, Anatmavāda and Ātmavāda are simply negations of one another. Thus whatever serves as a criterion for truth of the one must serve as a criterion for the other. When we treat them both as a priori propositions, I claim that we are unable to determine their truth value. But if we treat them both as a posteriori propositions, I argue, we are only able to determine their truth value if we attain unqualified omniscience. Because the Hindu account of (...) knowing is far more conducive to the idea of unqualified omniscience, we might be tempted to assert that the empirical verification of these doctrines taken as propositions is far more likely in the Hindu tradition than the early Buddhist one. However, 'empirical omniscience' carries us very far from received views, thus I conclude that it makes no sense to treat these doctrines as truth-valued propositions. (shrink)

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem (...) remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 147 - 172 The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu has seldom been considered in conjunction with the problem of external-world skepticism despite the fact that his text, _Twenty Verses_, presents arguments from ignorance based on dreams. In this article, an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation of Vasubandhu is supported in opposition to a metaphysical idealist interpretation. On either interpretation, Vasubandhu gives an invitation to the problem of external-world skepticism, although his final conclusion is closer to skepticism (...) on the epistemological phenomenalist interpretation. The article ends with reflections on what light Vasubandhu might shed on the issue of whether skepticism is a natural problem in epistemology as well as why, despite Vasubandhu, the skeptical problem was not a central issue in the later Indian tradition. (shrink)

Naturalists seek continuity between epistemology and science. Critics argue this illegitimately expands science into epistemology and commits the fallacy of scientism. Must naturalists commit this fallacy? I defend a conception of naturalized epistemology which upholds the non-identity of epistemic ends, norms, and concepts with scientific evidential ends, norms, and concepts. I argue it enables naturalists to avoid three leading scientistic fallacies: dogmatism, one dimensionalism, and granting science an epistemic monopoly.

With the naturalist worldview having become widely accepted, the trend of naturalistic Buddhism has likewise become popular in both academic and religious circles. In this article, I preliminarily reflect on this naturalized approach to Buddhism in two main sections. In section 1, I point out that the Buddha rejects theistic beliefs that claim absolute power over our destiny, opting instead to encourage us to inquire intellectually and behave morally. The distinguishing characteristics of naturalism such as a humanistic approach, rational enquiry, (...) empirical observation, as well as a pragmatic and realistic outlook can all be seen in the Buddha’s teachings. In section 2, however, I advance arguments to show that while the Buddha is opposed to theistic doctrines, his views are not entirely in accordance with the presuppositions of naturalism. Firstly, the Buddha’s foremost concern is not purely intellectual in nature—the purpose of his teachings is to realize a soteriological goal through spiritual practice. Secondly, naturalism tends to subscribe to ‘self-being,’ while the Buddha holds all things to exist conditionally and impermanently. Because of the dependent nature of all things, it is not possible to discover their essence through reduction. Thirdly, naturalized philosophy would be a kind of belief-habit that follows from certain preconditioned assumptions. But the Buddha encourages us to re-examine our conceptual proliferation leading to biased views, as that ultimately leads to suffering. I conclude by proposing a broader naturalist outlook that would allow for a more inclusive conception of the natural world that would take the axiological dimension of human transcendence into account and increase an overall understanding of human potentiality. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non-attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way (...) of conceiving of them, in terms of which their conventional existence becomes apparent. After the distinction and the arguments that depend on it are shown to be problematic, the paper concludes with some reflections on the doctrine of skillful means and its applicability to Buddhist philosophical argument. (shrink)

This paper evaluates several recent efforts to interpret the work of Nāgārjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic. An attempt is made to uncover the premises that justify the use of symbolic logic for this purpose. This is accomplished through a discussion of (1) the historical origins of those premises in the Indian and Tibetan traditions, and (2) how such assumptions prejudice our understanding of Nāgā rjuna’s insistence that he has no “proposition” (pratijñā). Finally, the paper sets forth an (...) alternative interpretation that takes into account the literary dimensions of Nāgārjuna’s writing. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna, the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ (...) and the no-thesis view: ‘No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone’. In this essay, I adopt Gricean pragmatics to explain the positive and negative catuṣkoṭi and the no-thesis view proposed by Nāgārjuna in a way that does not violate classical logic. For Nāgārjuna, all statements are false as long as the hearer understands them within a reified conceptual scheme, according to which substance is a basic categorical concept; substances have svabhāva, and names and sentences have svabhāva. (shrink)

Philosophers have tended to discuss theistic proofs largely in abstraction from their specific roles within the religious traditions in which those proofs were cultivated and in which, until modern times, they flourished. As a result, the traditional theistic proofs of the West are generally presented in the philosophical literature as no more than attempts to demonstrate or within tolerable limits to establish the probability of the existence of at least one god. Whatever the history of philosophy may suggest, the history (...) of religions shows that theistic proofs have been developed from a variety of motives and have been employed to a variety of ends, only one of which is to persuade someone not already so inclined to believe that god/s exist. Indeed, this latter purpose is fairly subsidiary in the history of religions. A survey of the place and roles of theistic proofs and disproofs within a range of religious traditions, Eastern as well as Western, suggests that in the main they were used to serve intra-traditional ends. Their principal function seems to have been more nearly explanatory than justificatory . Even when they aimed them outside the tradition and used them to apologetic ends, purveyors of the proofs tended to assume prior belief in god/s on the part of their intended audience. (shrink)

A number of different kinds of negation and negation of negation are developed in Indian thought, from ancient religious texts to classical philosophy. The paper explores the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Jaina and Buddhist theorizing on the various forms and permutations of negation, denial, nullity, nothing and nothingness, or emptiness. The main thesis argued for is that in the broad Indic tradition, negation cannot be viewed as a mere classical operator turning the true into the false, nor reduced to the mainstream Boolean (...) dichotomy: 1 versus 0. Special attention is given to how contradiction is handled in Jaina and Buddhist logic. (shrink)

ABSTRACT 'The Duologue of King/Governor Pāyāsi' has long been recognised as a source for the proto-materialism current at the time of the Buddha. What needs to be stressed is the significance of the text as a pointer to the development of Logic in India. Perception, which is an accepted method of experimental enquiry, and reasoning from analogy, which can lead at best to a probable conclusion - these two are the only means employed to settle the dispute concerning the existence (...) of the other-world. The Jain version of the same duologue-cum-parable, though varying in minor details regarding the name and identity of the monk refuting the king/governor, contains the same contrast, namely, perception versus analogical reasoning. There can be little doubt that the original parable was conceived with a view to asserting the existence of the other-world. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, an earlier Brahmanical text, however, instead of argument by analogy, verbal testimony was invoked to settle the same point. Naciketas is assailed by doubt about the existence of a person after his or her death. The authority of Yama, the Pluto of Indian mythology, is invoked to convince him that the other-world does exist. Thus, the three parables taken together exhibit three means of knowledge in operation: verbal testimony and argument by analogy pitted against perception. RESUMO 'O duólogo do rei/governador Pāyāsi' há muito tempo é reconhecido como uma fonte da corrente protomaterialista da época do Buda. O que é necessário ressaltar é o significado desse texto como um indicador do desenvolvimento da lógica na Índia. Percepção, aceita como método de investigação experimental, e raciocínio por analogia, que no máximo pode conduzir a uma conclusão provável - apenas esses dois são os meios utilizados para dirimir a disputa que diz respeito à existência do outro-mundo. A versão jaina do mesmo duólogo-cum-parábola, mesmo com variações que concernem ao nome e à identidade do monge que se opõe ao rei/governador, contém o mesmo contraste, a dizer, percepção contra raciocínio por analogia. Não há muita dúvida de que a parábola original foi concebida com o intuito de afirmar a existência do outro-mundo. Entretanto, na Kaṭha Upaniṣad, um texto bramânico mais antigo, em vez do argumento por analogia, o testemunho verbal foi invocado para resolver o mesmo ponto. Naciketas é tomado pela dúvida sobre a existência da pessoa depois da sua morte. A autoridade de Yama, o Plutão da mitologia indiana, é invocada para convencê-lo que o outro-mundo existe. Portanto, as três parábolas juntas exibem três meios de conhecimento em função: testemunho verbal e argumento por analogia opostos à percepção. (shrink)

For Jizang (549−623), a prominent philosophical exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. Given anything X, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to X in the sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein. This philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his notion of the Way (dao), which seems to indicate a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition as a conscious (...) state of freedom from any attachment and definite understanding whatsoever. The issue then becomes pressing as to how we are to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actually a skilful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? How is this issue related to Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy? In this book chapter, I examine Jizang's key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position. (shrink)

This dissertation addresses the problem of determining the epistemic worth of mystical based insights. Appropriating the widely accepted justified true belief theory of knowledge, it can be easily demonstrated that mystical knowledge does not satisfy the conditions of the JTB account. The question can be raised as to whether the failure of liberative knowing to qualify as "knowledge" is due to a nonepistemic character of liberation itself, or is it due to an overly stringent, inac-curate set of criteria given in (...) the JTB theory. ;The strategy adopted to answer this question is to determine the adequacy of the JTB theory. One way to judge the adequacy of a theory is to ascertain whether it adequately describes the phenom-enon it is formulated to give an account of. Here, one must determine whether the JTB theory is consonant with common usage of what constitutes "knowledge." It was determined that there are a number of modes of knowing, e.g., moral, aesthetic, intuitive, religious, which appear to be outlawed by the JTB account, yet are commonly recognized as constituting knowledge. ;On the basis of this determination, an overhaul of the JTB theory of knowledge was begun. The principal feature of this new account was to recognize that there exist numerous distinct modes of know-ing, and each mode contains its own distinct conditions that define it. Any account of knowledge must then take on a piecemeal approach which attempts to outline the various modes of knowing. There are obviously overlapping characteristics, but they do not constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. This stance opens the way to a consideration of whether a mystical based knowledge is possible. Ultimately, the question of acceptance or rejection of liber-ative knowing comes down to the particular epistemological hierarchy of knowing modalities each individual adopts. One needs to consider the assorted factors or grounds that leads one to adopt or dismiss liberative knowing into one's hierarchy of knowing modalities. But one cannot attempt to dismiss one mode, such as liberative knowing, on the basis of not satisfying the criteria applicable for another mode, such as factual knowing. In the past, arguments rejecting the epis-temic content of liberative knowing have violated this prohibition. (shrink)