Autism research is increasingly moving to a view centred around sensorimotor atypicalities instead of traditional, ethically problematical, views predicated on social-cognitive deficits. We explore how an enactivist approach to autism illuminates how social differences, stereotypically associated with autism, arise from such sensorimotor atypicalities. Indeed, in a state space description, this can be taken as a skewing of sensorimotor variables that influences social interaction and so also enculturation and habituation. We argue that this construal leads to autism being treated on a (...) par with other sensorimotor atypicalities such as blindness or atypical height. This leads to our conclusion that, insofar there is an ethical call to inclusion in our public sphere regardless of contingent bodily difference, an enactivist take on autism naturally leads to extending such inclusion to autism. Moreover, our analysis suggests a concrete way forward to achieve inclusion of autistics: by being more attentive to autistic sensorimotor specifics. (shrink)

Recent research has drawn attention to the prevalence of self-reported autism within online communities of involuntary celibates (incels). These studies suggest that some individuals with autism may be particularly vulnerable to the impact of incel forums and the hopelessness they generate. However, a more precise description of the experiential connection between inceldom, self-reported autism, and hopelessness has remained unarticulated. Therefore, this article combines empirical studies on the incel community with phenomenological and embodiment approaches to autism, hopelessness, and online affectivity. We (...) analyze three interrelated aspects of online interactions in incel communities – worldview, bodily self-relation, and mutual dismissals – and examine how these elements contribute to the consolidation of the loss of significant life possibilities. By investigating the potential negative influence of specific online environments on affective dispositions, our approach contributes to the debate on current challenges to “situate” phenomenological psychopathology. (shrink)

Diversity is an undeniable fact of nature, and there is now evidence that nature did not stop generating diversity just before “designing” the human brain :15,468–15,473. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509654112, 2015). If neurodiversity is a fact of nature, what about neurodivergence? Although the terms “neurodiversity” and “neurodivergence” are sometimes used interchangeably, this is, we believe, a mistake: “neurodiversity” is a term of inclusion whereas “neurodivergence” is a term of exclusion. To make the difference clear, note that everyone can be said to be neurodiverse, (...) but that it is almost impossible for everyone to be neurodivergent. Neurodivergence is, we claim here, a fact of society. Neurodivergent individuals are those whose cognitive profile diverges from an established cognitive norm, a norm that is not an objective statistical fact of human neurological functioning but a standard established and maintained by socio-political processes. In this paper, we describe the socio-political mechanisms that build neurodivergence out of neurodiversity which, inspired by Mihai :395–416. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-017-0186-z, 2018), we call “epistemic and cognitive marginalization”. First, we extend the traditional concept of neurodiversity, which we believe too closely tied to a neuroreductionist conception of cognition, to that of “extended neurodiversity,” thereby viewing neurodiversity through the lens of 4E cognition. Considering that human cognition depends on epistemic resources, both for their construction and their online dynamic expression, we hypothesize that the differential access to epistemic resources in society, a form of epistemic injustice, is an overlooked mechanism that turns neurodiversity into neurodivergence. In doing so, we shed light on a type of epistemic injustice that might be missing from the epistemic injustice literature: cognitive injustices. (shrink)

Within the growing developmental literature on children's testimonial learning, the emphasis placed on children's evaluations of testimonial evidence has shielded from view some of the more collaborative dimensions of testimonial learning. Drawing on recent philosophical work on testimony and interpersonal trust, we argue for an alternative way of conceptualizing the social nature of testimonial learning. On this alternative, some testimonial learning is the result of a jointly collaborative epistemic activity, an activity that aims at the epistemic goal of true belief, (...) but that does so by means of an irreducibly social process. (shrink)

Pragmatic difficulties are considered a hallmark of autism spectrum conditions (ASC), but remain poorly understood. We discuss and evaluate existing hypotheses regarding the literalism of ASC individuals, that is, their tendency for literal interpretations of non‐literal communicative intentions. We present evidence that reveals a developmental stage at which neurotypical children also have a tendency for literalism and suggest an explanation for such behaviour that links it to other behavioural, rule‐following, patterns typical of that age. We discuss evidence showing that strict (...) adherence to rules is also widespread in ASC, and suggest that literalism might be linked to such rule‐following behaviour. (shrink)

This paper examines the appeal, made by some philosophers, to Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect-blindness in order to better understand autistic perception and social cognition. I articulate and assess different ways of understanding what it means to say that autists are aspect-blind. While more attention to the perceptual dimensions of autism is a welcome development in philosophical explorations of the condition, I argue that there are significant problems with attributing aspect-blindness to autists. The empirical basis for the attribution of aspect-blindness to (...) autists is questionable, but, even if it turns out that future empirical work on autistic perception and social cognition decisively supports the attribution of some forms of aspect-blindness to autists, the descriptive and explanatory fruitfulness of the notion of aspect-blindness is limited in important ways. To better capture autistic experience, we should broaden our framework to include conceptualizing autists as engaging in forms of aspect-perception. (shrink)

While several scholars have argued that the rise of the internet has allowed an autistic culture to emerge over the past two decades, the question of whether people with autism or, as some members of this group refer to themselves, ‘autists’, are legally entitled to their own cultural rights has not been investigated. This article fills part of this lacuna by considering whether such entitlements exist from the perspective of human rights law. I start by showing that, insofar as autists (...) have their own culture, they are likely to be entitled to cultural rights under existing human rights treaties, before arguing that the absence of evidence that their beliefs, values, and behaviors are significantly shaped by distinct social norms renders it unclear whether they do in fact have their own culture. However, I end by arguing that, in terms of autists’ entitlements from a human rights perspective, little seems to depend on this. (shrink)

The human capacity for intersubjective engagement is present, even when one is limited in speaking, pointing, and coordinating gaze. This paper examines the everyday social interactions of two differently-disposed actors—a non-speaking autistic child and his speaking, neurotypical mother—who participate in shared attention through dialogic turn-taking. In the collaborative pursuit of activities, the participants coordinate across multiple turns, producing multi-turn constructions that accomplish specific goals. The paper asks two questions about these collaborative constructions: 1) What are their linguistic and discursive structures? (...) 2) How do embodied actions contribute to these constructions? Findings show that the parent and child repeatedly co-produced multi-turn constructions that had consistent structures, implying a sophisticated ability to anticipate the completion of action trajectories. Examining the embodied actions of interactants revealed that the child often accommodated to the parent’s demands for participation. Nonetheless, the child occasionally pursued his own goals by improvising with and within multi-turn constructions. He launched constructions to redirect parental attention, and otherwise produced surprising actions within the turn-taking structure of these constructions. The paper concludes that multi-turn constructions in the midst of activities are a primordial site in which to begin observing the competencies of non-speaking autistic children for intersubjective engagement. (shrink)

The double empathy problem theory posits that autistic social difficulties emerge from an interpersonal misalignment in social experiences and expectations between autistic and non-autistic people. Supporting this, emerging research reveals better social outcomes in interactions within than across neurotypes among autistic and non-autistic people, emphasizing the need to examine the role of the interpersonal context in autistic social outcomes. However, research on peer relationships among autistic youth primarily focuses on individual characteristics in isolation from the interpersonal context. To address this, (...) this preliminary study explored the effects of student-peer neurotype match on peer relationships among autistic and non-autistic youth in an integrated educational setting. We plotted the peer relationship networks among youth in a school club based on systematic observations of peer interactions over eight 45-min sessions. Descriptive network statistics showed that both autistic and non-autistic youth had more and stronger peer relationships with their same- than cross-neurotype peers. Assortativity coefficients revealed a tendency for youth to connect with peers of the same neurotype, rather than with peers with similar social popularity or activity. We further modeled the effects of student-peer neurotype match on peer relationships using exponential random graph models. The findings suggested that student-peer neurotype match predicted the total strength of peer relationships above and beyond the effects of student neurotype, individual heterogeneity in social popularity and activity, and the tendency of mutuality in social relationships. We discussed the strengths and limitations of this study and the implications for future research and inclusion practice. (shrink)

The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in (...) neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people. (shrink)

Autistic students are more likely to drop out of university, while facing both challenges and opportunities within university environments. This study compared the experiences of autistic and non-autistic current United Kingdom students, in terms of thoughts about dropping out, burnout, mental health and coping, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Burnout was of particular interest as this is a relatively unexamined phenomenon for autistic students. Seventy autistic and 315 non-autistic students, completed a mixed methods questionnaire with standardized measures of burnout, mental health, (...) and coping styles. We also included qualitative questions about dropping out and COVID-19 experiences. We found autistic participants experienced higher rates of burnout and mental health symptoms and were more likely to have thought about dropping out. Reasons given for thinking about dropping out, for both groups, focused on poor mental well-being, doubts about university, and academic challenges. For autistic participants, further analyses did not identify specific predictors of thinking about dropping out, but for non-autistic participants, this was predicted by maladaptive coping styles and academic burnout. Academic and personal burnout predicted one another for autistic students, and age, maladaptive coping, autistic characteristics, stress, and anxiety additionally predicted burnout for non-autistic students. Similarities in experiences during the pandemic were noted, with both groups experiencing negative social implications, difficulties adjusting to emergency online learning, and poorer psychological well-being. Moving forward from COVID-19, universities must find ways to enhance both academic and social support, to enable equal opportunity within Higher Education for autistic students. (shrink)

What does it take to see how autistic people participate in social interactions? And what does it take to support and invite more participation? Western medicine and cognitive science tend to think of autism mainly in terms of social and communicative deficits. But research shows that autistic people can interact with a skill and sophistication that are hard to see when starting from a deficit idea. Research also shows that not only autistic people, but also their non-autistic interaction partners can (...) have difficulties interacting with each other. To do justice to these findings, we need a different approach to autistic interactions—one that helps everyone see, invite, and support better participation. I introduce such an approach, based on the enactive theory of participatory sense-making and supported by insights from indigenous epistemologies. This approach helps counteract the homogenising tendencies of the “global mental health” movement, which attempts to erase rather than recognise difference, and often precludes respectful engagements. Based in the lived experiences of people in their socio-cultural-material and interactive contexts, I put forward an engaged—even engaging—epistemology for understanding how we interact across difference. From this perspective, we see participatory sense-making at work across the scientific, diagnostic, therapeutic, and everyday interactions of autistic and non-autistic people, and how everyone can invite and support more of it. (shrink)