It is simply a fact that it is not in the same intention that Dewey relates to Hegel in a programmatic article such as “The Present position of Logical Theory,” in his Lectures on Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, in his Lectures on the Logic of Hegel, and in the articles collected in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. Dewey’s references to Hegel differ in status and functions, and these differences have to be made explicit if one wants to elaborate a (...) consistent account of Dewey’s relation to Hegel. The article proceeds in four steps. It distinguishes between what relates to Dewey’s reading of Hegel, to Dewey’s use of Hegel, and to Dewey’s reconstruction of Hegel. In a last and concluding step, it deals with the methodological originality of Dewey’s project of actualizing Hegel. (shrink)

Critics have charged Dewey with a failure to recognize the tragic dimension of human existence. Randolph Bourne argued that Dewey's pragmatism "has never been confronted with the pathless and the inexorable". For Bourne, Dewey's support of America's entry into World War I "subordinates idea to technique" in service of undemocratic ends. Raymond Boisvert accuses Dewey of a hubristic Baconian scientism in thinking that technical intelligence could solve all social problems. Cornel West claims that Dewey "has not come to terms with (...) the sense of the tragic" in failing to "confront candidly individual and collective experiences of evil". As we can see from this selection of... (shrink)

I resolve several pressing and recalcitrant problems in contemporary philosophy of science using resources from John Dewey's philosophy of science. I begin by looking at Dewey's epistemological and logical writings in their historical context, in order to understand better how Dewey's philosophy disappeared from the limelight, and I provide a reconstruction of his views. Then, I use that reconstruction to address problems of evidence, the social dimensions of science, and pluralism. Generally, mainstream philosophers of science with an interest in Dewey (...) pay little attention to the body of scholarship on Dewey and tend to misinterpret or miss important features of his work, while Dewey scholars generally do not connect his work to the nuanced problems of the contemporary scene (with some notable exceptions). My dissertation helps to fill this important gap and correct common interpretive mistakes by reconstructing and clarifying Dewey's philosophy of science and using it to resolve several contemporary problems. Though his is the road less traveled, Dewey's views provide a good starting place for addressing current concerns. He worked towards a model of science that is both fully naturalistic and fundamentally oriented towards human practice, demands that have been strongly argued for but poorly assimilated by most mainstream philosophers of science. He treats scientific practice, and human thinking generally, as not only embodied but also socially and technologically embedded, and thus can be used to open up a dialogue with much of the social studies of science. He has an anti- foundationalist but structured epistemology, and he offers a way to navigate the narrow paths between an immodest and simplistic realism and the pessimistic extremes of anti-realism and social constructivism, a pursuit of interest to many major philosophers of science at present. Philosophy of science took a different path in the twentieth century, beginning with the "received view'' of logical positivism that left many of the nuances of the original movement by the wayside. No aspect of that starting point has avoided disrepute in recent decades. I show that Dewey avoided the wrong turns of mid- century philosophy of science which are now blocking the way forward. (shrink)