- Generalizing the Problem of Humean Undermining.Heather Demarest & Elizabeth Miller - 2023 - In Christian Loew, Siegfried Jaag & Michael Townsen Hicks (eds.), Humean Laws for Human Agents. Oxford: Oxford UP.details
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Naturalism, Functionalism and Chance: Not a Best Fit for the Humean.Alison Fernandes - 2023 - In Christian Loew, Siegfried Jaag & Michael Townsen Hicks (eds.), Humean Laws for Human Agents. Oxford: Oxford UP.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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"Click!" Bait for Causalists.Huw Price & Yang Liu - 2018 - In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160-179.details
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The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.details
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Measure theoretic analysis of consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.details
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A deference model of epistemic authority.Sofia Ellinor Bokros - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12041-12069.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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Direct inference and probabilistic accounts of induction.Jon Williamson - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):451-472.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368-382.details
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Finite Frequentism in a Big World.Nick Tosh - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):169-213.details
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Chance in the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance, by Carl Hoefer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xvii + 247. [REVIEW]Mauricio Suárez - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Chance in the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance, by Carl Hoefer.Mauricio Suárez - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):997-1006.details
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One world is (probably) just as good as many.Jer Steeger - 2022 - Synthese 200 (97):1-32.details
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No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.details
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Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological.Aaron Segal - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):905-925.details
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Subjunctive Conditional Probability.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):47-66.details
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It is the Business of Laws to Govern.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):577-588.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Counterfactual Probability.Ginger Schultheis - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):581-614.details
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Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence.Huw Price - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):483-538.details
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What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not Be.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):177-196.details
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What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not Be.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Noûs 49 (1):177-196.details
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The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.details
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Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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Geometric Pooling: A User's Guide.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
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Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
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Correcting credences with chances.Ilho Park - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):509-536.details
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On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):479-493.details
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A puzzle about experts, evidential screening-off and conditionalization.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):64-72.details
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On background: using two-argument chance.Kevin Nelson - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):165-186.details
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Three proposals regarding a theory of chance.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):281–307.details
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Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.details
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Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary - Part I: The Indifference Approach.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1116-1126.details
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Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.details
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Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle?Marc Lange - 2017 - The Monist 100 (3):422-436.details
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Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization.Namjoong Kim - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):295-312.details
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Sleeping beauty and the current chance evidential immodest dominance axiom.Namjoong Kim - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-27.details
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VIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James M. Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):187-206.details
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Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206.details
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The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance.Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):549-596.details
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Objective chance: not propensity, maybe determinism.Carl Hoefer - 2016 - Lato Sensu, Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 3 (1):31-42.details
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Non‐Humean theories of natural necessity.Tyler Hildebrand - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (5):e12662.details
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Dynamic Humeanism.Michael Townsen Hicks - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):983-1007.details
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Understandings of Logic Sublated by the Dialectic.Paul M. Healey - 2014 - Philosophy Study 4 (1).details
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Past Probabilities.Sven Ove Hansson - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (2):207-223.details
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