Switch to: References

Citations of:

Logic and How It Gets That Way

Routledge (2008)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Some monkey devours every raisin.Dale Jacquette - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (2):201-209.
    An elementary exercise in symbolizing an existential to universal relation reveals expressive limitations in standard first-order predicate-quantificational logic. Alternative translations of a sample some-every sentence are considered and rejected after criticism, leaving as the best choice a particular structure that demonstrably does not serve for all predicates available to the ordinary language to which the sample sentence belongs. We explain the difficulties encountered in trying to arrive at an adequate translation of the sentence in classical logic, as background to examining (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts.Dale Jacquette - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.
    John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I proposein ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and itsexpression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to show that on the contrary my analysis is correct, and that Barker does not properly grasp what (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation.Dale Jacquette - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):15-35.
    If conceptual analysis is possible for finite thinkers, then there must ultimately be a distinction between complex and primitive or irreducible and unanalyzable concepts, by which complex concepts are analyzed as relations among primitive concepts. This investigation considers the advantages of categorizing intentionality as a primitive rather than analyzable concept, in both a historical Brentanian context and in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. Arguments in support of intentionality as a primitive relation are evaluated relative to objections, especially a recent (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • How Do We Know Things with Signs? A Model of Semiotic Intentionality.Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2017 - IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 10 (4):3683-3704.
    Intentionality may be dealt with in two different ways: either ontologically, as an ordinary relation to some extraordinary objects, or epistemologically, as an extraordinary relation to some ordinary objects. This paper endorses the epistemological view in order to provide a model of semiotic intentionality defined as the meaning-and-cognizing process that constitutes to power of the mind to be about something on the basis of a semiotic system. After a short introduction that presents the components of semiotic intentionality (viz. sign, act, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • About Nothing.Dale Jacquette - 2013 - Humana Mente 6 (25).
    The possibilities are explored of considering nothing as the intended object of thoughts that are literally about the concept of nothing first, and thereby of nothing. Nothing, on the proposed analysis, turns out to be nothing other than the property of being an intendable object. There are propositions that look to be both true and to be about nothing in the sense of being about the concept and ultimate intended object of what is here formally defined and designated as N-nothing. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations