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Definition of the problemQuality of care also includes a professional approach to ethical challenges. This involves the moral interpretation of an issue and the management of intra- and interpersonal reflection processes. Combining both is the central task of clinical ethics consultation (CEC). Despite its importance only a few studies have dealt with the appropriate methods for steering reflection processes.ArgumentsCEC requires a theory-based and methodological approach. The argumentation shows the effects that systems theory and systemic methods have on the effectiveness of (...) No categories |
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Our aim in this article is to bring some clarity to the clinical ethics expertise debate by critiquing and replacing the taxonomy offered by the Core Competencies report. The orienting question for our taxonomy is: Can clinical ethicists offer justified, normative recommendations for active patient cases? Views that answer “no” are characterized as a “negative” view of clinical ethics expertise and are further differentiated based on (a) why they think ethicists cannot give justified normative recommendations and (b) what they think (...) |
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BackgroundThe theory and practice of ethics consultations (ECs) in health care are still characterized by many controversies, including, for example, the practice of giving recommendations. These controversies are complicated by an astonishing lack of evidence in the whole field. It is not clear how often a recommendation is issued in ethics consultations and when and why this step is taken. Especially in a facilitation model in which giving recommendations is optional, more data would be helpful to evaluate daily practice, ensure (...) No categories |
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Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 82-84. |
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In recent years, there have been growing calls for nurses to have a formal advanced practice role as nurse ethicists in hospital contexts. Initially proposed in the cultural context of the USA where nurse ethicists have long been recognised, the idea is being advocated in other judications outside of the USA such as the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Such calls are not without controversy, however. Underpinning this controversy are ongoing debates about the theoretical, methodological and political dimensions of clinical ethics (...) |
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“Outsiders” addressing ethical issues in medicine—Strangers at the Bedside —became “bioethicists.” Bioethicists providing research ethics consultation have been described as “stranger... No categories |
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The nature, possibility, and implications of ethics expertise in general and of bioethics expertise in particular has been the focus of extensive debate for over thirty years. What is ethics expertise and what does it enable experts to do? Knowing what ethics expertise is can help answer another important question: What, if anything, makes a claim of expertise legitimate? In other words, how does someone earn the appellation “ethics expert?” There remains deep disagreement on whether ethics expertise is possible, and (...) |
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Questions concerning the role (or lack thereof) of God in morality are implicitly or explicitly important in Western philosophical ethics. I describe some of the different ways philosophers treat (or ignore) God and the foundations of morality more generally, and I highlight some of the implications of these approaches for bioethics. I demonstrate that the starting points we choose for morality set the course for fundamentally different accounts of what is permissible and impermissible, good and bad, and right and wrong. |
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Research ethics committees in Germany usually don’t have philosophers as members and if so, only contingently, not provided for by statute. This is interesting from a philosophical perspective, assuming that ethics is a discipline of philosophy. It prompts the question what role philosophers play in those committees they can be found in. Eight qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore the self-perception of philosophers regarding their contribution to research ethics committees. The results show that the participants generally don’t view themselves (...) |
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Janet Malek (91–102, 2019) argues that a “clinical ethics consultant’s religious worldview has no place in developing ethical recommendations or communicating about them with patients, surrogates, and clinicians.” She offers five types of arguments in support of this thesis: arguments from consensus, clarity, availability, consistency, and autonomy. This essay shows that there are serious problems for each of Malek’s arguments. None of them is sufficient to motivate her thesis. Thus, if it is true that the religious worldview of clinical ethics (...) |
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Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) are not moral authorities. Standardization of CECs’ professional role does not confer upon them moral authority. Certification of particular CECs does not confer upon them moral authority (nor does it reflect such authority). Or, so we will argue. This article offers a distinctly Orthodox Christian response to those who claim that CECs—or any other academically trained bioethicist—retain moral authority (i.e., an authority to know and recommend the right course of action). This article proceeds in three parts. (...) |
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Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel to non-experts. Moral experts would not be moral (...) |
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Scholars, policymakers and organizations in the EU, especially at the level of the European Commission, have turned their attention to the ethics of (trustworthy and human-centric) Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, there has been little reflexivity on (1) the history of the ethics of AI as an institutionalized phenomenon and (2) the comparison to similar episodes of “ethification” in other fields, to highlight common (unresolved) challenges.Contrary to some mainstream narratives, which stress how the increasing attention to ethical aspects of AI is (...) |
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In a recent issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, several scholars wrote on the topic of ethics expertise in clinical ethics consultation. The articles in this issue exemplified what we consider to be two troubling trends in the quest to articulate a unique expertise for clinical ethicists. The first trend, exemplified in the work of Lisa Rasmussen, is an attempt to define a role for clinical ethicists that denies they have ethics expertise. Rasmussen cites the dependence of ethical (...) |
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In this paper we reflect on the looming question of what constitutes expertise in ethics. Based on an empirical program that involved qualitative and quantitative as well as participatory research... |
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