- The View from the Armchair.Anthony Bryson & David Alexander - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):162-182.details
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Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.details
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Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity.Matthew Braddock - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):91-113.details
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Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.details
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Moral intuitionism and disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.details
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Externalist justification and the role of seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.details
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How philosophers use intuition and ‘intuition’.John Bengson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):555-576.details
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Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity.Jeff Behrends - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):159-178.details
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Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.details
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Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.details
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Intuitive non-naturalism meets cosmic coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.details
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A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?Matthew S. Bedke - 1027–1042 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042.details
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Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.Alex Barber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience.Brian Scott Ballard - 2021 - Emotion Review 13 (2):113-124.details
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Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.details
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The moral relevance of biological ties in the parental relationship.Fernando Arancibia-Collao & Camila Martínez-Villavicencio - 2022 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 51:83-108.details
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Prospects for Moral Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):172-181.details
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Deep Disagreement and the Problem of the Criterion.Scott F. Aikin - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1017-1024.details
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Mental Privacy, Cognitive Liberty, and Hog-tying.Parker Crutchfield - forthcoming - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
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Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.details
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No Coincidence?Matthew S. Bedke - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:102-125.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Vegetarianism and Veganism from a Moral Point of View.Francesco Allegri - 2022 - Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism 10 (1):85-91.details
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Aesthetic Non-Naturalism.Daan Evers - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.details
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The Scope and Limits of Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Shang Long Yeo - 2020 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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The Disagreement Challenge to Contextualism.Justin Khoo - forthcoming - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism.details
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Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.details
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A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Walesdetails
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Moore's moral philosophy.Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism. Oxford University Press.details
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A Dilemma for Theistic Non-Naturalism.StJohn Lambert - 2023 - Religions 14 (9):1–9.details
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Attributivism.Casey Sean Elliott - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Dynamik und Stabilität der Tugend in Platons Nomoi.Jakub Jinek - 2016 - Aithér 8:66-89.details
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References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.details
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A Priorism in Moral Epistemology.Amelia Hicks & Michael R. DePaul - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Theory.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
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Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol 7. pp. 205.details
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Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.details
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The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, volume 18. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.details
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Value, Fittingness and Partiality : On the Partiality Problem for Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value.Nils Sylvan - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Objectivity and Evaluation.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics.details
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Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.Ole Koksvik - manuscriptdetails
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On the Objectivity of Welfare.Alexander F. Sarch - unknowndetails
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Metaethical Contextualism Defended.Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):7-36.details
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Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Coloradodetails
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