Despite regulatory reforms aimed at inhibiting aggressive financial reporting, earnings management persists and continues to concern practitioners, regulators, and standard setters. To provide insight into this practice and how to mitigate it, we conduct an experiment to examine the impact of two independent variables on CFOs’ discretionary expense accruals. One independent variable, incentive conflict, is manipulated at two levels —i.e., the presence or absence of a personal financial incentive that conflicts with a corporate financial incentive. The other independent variable is (...) CFOs’ earnings management ethics, measured as their assessment of the ethicalness of key earnings management motivations. We find that incentive conflict and EM-Ethics interact to determine CFOs’ discretionary accruals such that in the presence of incentive conflict, CFOs with low EM-Ethics tend to give into the personal incentive by booking higher expense accruals; and in the absence of an incentive conflict, CFOs with low EM-Ethics tend to give into the corporate incentive by booking lower expense accruals. We also find support for a mediated-moderation model in which CFOs’ level of EM-Ethics influences their moral disengagement tendencies which, in turn, differentially affect their discretionary accruals, depending on the presence or absence of incentive conflict. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

This paper investigates the moderating role of industry regulation on the effectiveness of audit committees in restricting earnings management. Using comprehensive panel data of S&P 1500 firms between 2003 and 2007, we find that the proportion of CEO directors on an audit committee is positively associated with earnings management in unregulated industries, while this association is significantly weaker in regulated industries. Further, the proportion of financial experts on an audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management. Our results also indicate (...) that the average board tenure of audit committee members is negatively related to earnings management in regulated industries, but positively affects earnings management in unregulated industries. Finally, audit committee members’ average directorship increases earnings management in regulated industries, but reduces earnings management in unregulated industries. Overall, our results suggest that the effectiveness of audit committees in reducing earnings management and improving financial reporting quality is influenced by industry regulation. (shrink)

The present global financial crisis has revived the notion that competitive markets may lead some directors and executives to behave in opportunistic ways considered unethical and even illegal, through the pursuit of self-interest. This article proposes and tests an integrated model that offers new insights into the relationship between board structure, independence and firm value. By incorporating the proportion of independent directors on the board as a moderating factor in this relationship, this study contributes to a better understanding of the (...) entrenchment and convergence-of-interests hypotheses. Using empirical data obtained from 114 Spanish listed companies in a context of economic crisis, from 2007 to 2010, we conclude that having a board with a greater proportion of independent directors reduces the negative association existing between firm value and a large board size and significant board share ownership. (shrink)

Accountants preparing information are in a position to manipulate the view of economic reality presented in such information to interested parties. These manipulations can be regarded as morally reprehensible because they are not fair to users, they involve in an unjust exercise of power, and they tend to weaken the authority of accounting regulators. This paper develops a model for detecting earnings manipulators using financial statements’ ratios in a sample of Spanish listed companies. Our results provide evidence that accounting data (...) can be extremely useful in detecting manipulators. This approach can be used by a large category of users of accounting information among which we can cite stock exchange supervisors or investing professionals. (shrink)

We investigate whether air pollution harms business ethics from the perspective of earnings manipulation, which exerts a real effect on the economy and social welfare. Using a large sample and a comprehensive air quality index in China, we find that firms located in cities with more severe air pollution exhibit higher levels of discretionary accruals and are more likely to restate their financial statements, consistent with exposure to air pollution leading to more earnings manipulation. We further provide causal evidence using (...) propensity score matching and a discontinuity regression design exploiting the Qinling Mountain–Huai River Heating Policy Line, which exogenously leads to more air pollution to cities located immediately north of the Line but not those in the south. Our findings are robust to controlling for weather conditions and alternative samples and measures of air pollution and earnings manipulation. Overall, this study unveils how the ecological environment shapes business ethics. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between corporate commitment to business ethics and financial reporting quality. We posit that companies with a higher level of ethical commitment exhibit better quality financial reporting than those with a lower level of ethical commitment. Consistent with our prediction, we find that companies with a higher level of ethical commitment are engaged in less earnings management, report earnings more conservatively, and predict future cash flows more accurately than those with a lower level of ethical commitment. (...) We also find that corporate commitment to business ethics has perpetuating effects on future financial reporting quality. (shrink)

This study examines the role of codes of ethics in reducing the extent to which managers act opportunistically in reporting earnings. Corporate codes of ethics, by clarifying the boundaries of ethical corporate behaviors and making relevant social norms more salient, have the potential to deter managers from engaging in opportunistic financial reporting practices. In a sample of international companies, we find that the quality of corporate codes of ethics is associated with higher earnings quality, i.e., lower discretionary accruals. Our results (...) are confirmed for a subsample of firms more likely to be engaging in opportunistic reporting behavior, i.e., firms that just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Further, codes of ethics play a greater role in reducing earnings management for firms in countries with weaker investor protection mechanisms. Our results suggest that corporate codes of ethics can be a viable alternative to country-level investor protection mechanisms in curbing aggressive reporting behaviors. (shrink)