ABSTRACTIn this paper, we present a generalisation of proof simulation procedures for Frege systems by Bonet and Buss to some logics for which the deduction theorem does not hold. In particular, we study the case of finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. To this end, we provide proof systems and which augment Avron's Frege system HŁuk with nested and general versions of the disjunction elimination rule, respectively. For these systems, we provide upper bounds on speed-ups w.r.t. both the number of steps in proofs (...) and the length of proofs. We also consider Tamminga's natural deduction and Avron's hypersequent calculus GŁuk for 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic and generalise our results considering the disjunction elimination rule to all finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics. (shrink)

We investigate the substitution Frege () proof system and its relationship to extended Frege () in the context of modal and superintuitionistic propositional logics. We show that is p-equivalent to tree-like , and we develop a “normal form” for -proofs. We establish connections between for a logic L, and for certain bimodal expansions of L.We then turn attention to specific families of modal and si logics. We prove p-equivalence of and for all extensions of , all tabular logics, all logics (...) of finite depth and width, and typical examples of logics of finite width and infinite depth. In most cases, we actually show an equivalence with the usual system for classical logic with respect to a naturally defined translation.On the other hand, we establish exponential speed-up of over for all modal and si logics of infinite branching, extending recent lower bounds by P. Hrubeš. We develop a model-theoretical characterization of maximal logics of infinite branching to prove this result. (shrink)

We give proofs of the effective monotone interpolation property for the system of modal logic K, and others, and the system IL of intuitionistic propositional logic. Hence we obtain exponential lower bounds on the number of proof-lines in those systems. The main results have been given in [P. Hrubeš, Lower bounds for modal logics, Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 941–958; P. Hrubeš, A lower bound for intuitionistic logic, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 146 72–90]; here, we give considerably simplified (...) proofs, as well as some generalisations. (shrink)

Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?