Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Twardowski i przygodna przyszłość. Prawdopodobieństwo kontra Cienka Czerwona Linia.Jakub Węgrecki - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (4):83-101.
    One of the most widely discussed philosophical issues is the problem of future contingents. Basically, the challenge is to create an adequate semantic theory of future-tensed sentences. Twardowski (1900) suggests that future contingent statements should be analyzed using the concept of probability. The aim of this paper is to show that (1) such an analysis is not appropriate and (2) that Twardowski’s main theses imply the Thin Red Line Theory. I discuss three potential arguments against my proposal and sketch the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Freedom and the open future.Yishai Cohen - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):228-255.
    I draw upon Helen Steward's concept of agential settling to argue that freedom requires an ability to change the truth‐value of tenseless future contingents over time from false to true and that this ability requires a metaphysically open future.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Back to the actual future.Jacek Wawer & Alex Malpass - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2193-2213.
    The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • An introduction to real possibilities, indeterminism, and free will: three contingencies of the debate.Thomas Müller, Antje Rumberg & Verena Wagner - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):1-10.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations