Historically contingent concepts like human dignity do not allow for the exclusion of historical considerations from their analysis. In order to demonstrate this, the present essay compares the positions of Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Blumenberg. While Glock deals with the convergence of analytic philosophy and historical approaches, Blumenberg highlights the importance of historical constants. Glock argues for a pragmatic historicism according to which historical inquiry is useful but not indispensable. Through comparison with Blumenberg’s position, it is shown that this assessment (...) is incomplete. It is then argued that there is a more fitting position, according to which historical inquiry is essential for some, though not all, concepts. This position is illustrated by the concept of human dignity, which cannot be adequately grasped without reference to its genesis. Blumenberg’s approach can thus help precisely where the connection between analytical philosophy and historical investigation in Glock’s sense falters. (shrink)

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings (...) of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry – namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the “genuine dialogue” or shape “the pluralistic attitude” Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations. (shrink)