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  1. Hume, Goodman and Radical Inductive Skepticism.Bredo Johnsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2791-2813.
    Goodman concurs in Hume’s contention that no theory has any probability relative to any set of data, and offers two accounts, compatible with that contention, of how some inductive inferences are nevertheless justified. The first, framed in terms of rules of inductive inference, is well known, significantly flawed, and enmeshed in Goodman’s unfortunate entrenchment theory and view of the mind as hypothesizing at random. The second, framed in terms of characteristics of inferred theories rather than rules of inference, is less (...)
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  • Does Information Inform Confirmation?Colin Howson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2307-2321.
    In a recent survey of the literature on the relation between information and confirmation, Crupi and Tentori claim that the former is a fruitful source of insight into the latter, with two well-known measures of confirmation being definable purely information-theoretically. I argue that of the two explicata of semantic information which are considered by the authors, the one generating a popular Bayesian confirmation measure is a defective measure of information, while the other, although an admissible measure of information, generates a (...)
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