PurposeAlthough there is much public talk about privacy, it seems that there is no definite answer; rather, ambiguous concepts of what privacy is and what indeed privacy in peril is. The overall aim of this paper is to clarify how privacy is defined in the academic literature, what the different concepts of privacy have in common, what distinguish them from one another, and what advantages and disadvantages such definitions have in order to clarify if there is a gap in the (...) existing literature.Design/methodology/approachThis contribution constructs theoretically founded typologies in order to systemize the existing literature of privacy studies and to analyse examples of privacy (threats). Therefore, it mainly is a theoretical approach combined with illustrative examples.FindingsThis paper contains a systematic discussion of the state of the art of privacy studies by establishing a typology of existing privacy definitions and discussing commonalties and differences. In this paper, it is argued that the existing literature is insufficient for studying privacy. Therefore, a critical contribution to privacy studies is needed.Originality/valueA critical contribution to privacy studies avoids pitfalls of the existing literature and strives for the development of theoretical and empirical research methods in order to focus on privacy in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, resource control, social struggles, and exploitation. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that critical theory needs to make its socio-ontological commitments explicit, whilst on the other hand I will posit that contemporary social ontology needs to amend its formalistic approach by embodying a critical theory perspective. In the first part of my paper I will discuss how the question was posed in Horkheimer’s essays of the 1930s, which leave open two options: (1) a constructive inclusion of social ontology within social philosophy, or else (2) a program (...) of social philosophy that excludes social ontology. Option (2) corresponds to Adorno’s position, which I argue is forced to recur to a hidden social ontology. Following option (1), I first develop a metacritical analysis of Searle, arguing that his social ontology presupposes a notion of 'recognition' which it cannot account for. Furthermore, by means of a critical reading of Honneth, I argue that critical theory could incorporate a socioontological approach, giving value to the constitutive socio-ontological role of recognition and to the socio-ontological role of objectification. I will finish with a proposal for a socio-ontological characterization of reification which involves that the basic occurrence of recognition is to be grasped at the level of background practices. (shrink)

A concepção de filosofia formulada por Adorno foi impulsionada principalmente pela sua reação crítica a sistemas com pretensões totalitárias: nazismo, stalinismo e a sociedade produtora de mercadorias. A filosofia representa um refúgio para a liberdade diante dessas estruturas: ela dá voz ao não-idêntico. A capacidade de subverter os ordenamentos conceituais e sociais é implícita ao próprio pensamento, que se articula na forma de constelações em devir. A aproximação da dialética com o materialismo, concebido enquanto primazia do objeto, fortalece a filosofia (...) na sua potencialidade crítica, na sua proximidade com a realidade e com a liberdade. Resulta daí uma filosofia renovada, simultaneamente aberta e comprometida com a verdade. A proposta deste artigo é apresentar a interdependência desses conceitos e apontar para a relevância da concepção de filosofia que deles emerge. (shrink)

La justificación del ejercicio de la crítica como un derecho fundamental en todo ordenamiento democrático viene despertando mayor interés en los últimos tiempos. El presente trabajo se propone analizar este tema desde la democracia deliberativa de J. Habermas, mostrando algunas similitudes, pero también señalando las diferencias conceptuales con la teoría crítica. La idea es identificar el alcance de la herencia conceptual de la Escuela de Frankfurt en la política deliberativa habermasiana, una conexión que en esta teoría siempre resulta solo implícita (...) pero no explícitamente reconocida como condición de validez y legitimidad democrática del ordenamiento político. (shrink)

This article was written on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, where the Frankfurt School was founded and continues to evolve. From philosophical and interdisciplinary perspectives, the article focuses on the trichotomic characteristics of critical theory, specifically: critique, explanation, and normativity. It looks first at the founding of the Institute for Social Research; second, at the emergence of critical theory at the Institute; and third, at how these ideas evolved. It (...) identifies trichotomy underpinning Horkheimer’s approach to critical theory. In the conclusion, the revisions made to critical theory in the later stages of development are considered. (shrink)

O presente artigo, analisando a hermenêutica de Gadamer e a teoria crítica de Horkheimer e Marcuse, procura mostrar que, se se concebe a sociedade moderna do ponto de vista do político, é possível elaborar uma teoria da modernidade em que ambas, em vez de se oporem, sejam complementares.This paper analyses Gadamer's hermeneutics and the critical theory of Horkheimer and Marcuse. It tries to show that, if modern society is conceived as political, then it is possible to elaborate a theory of (...) modernity where hermeneutics and critical theory, instead of opposing, complement each other. (shrink)

The critique of capitalism is the bedrock on which rests the reputation of Frankfurt School critical theory. Though critical theory has often been heralded – or criticized and rejected – as a reformulation of Marxian theory for our times, its relation with the critique of political economy, and in particular the economic treatises, has barely been studied. Friedrich Pollock, who was Max Horkheimer’s lifelong friend and close associate at the Institute for Social Research, was responsible for all administrative and financial (...) questions, but he wrote few theoretical essays and Wiggershaus calls him ‘the last unknown member of the Frankfurt School’. Nevertheless this article asks whether not only has his influence on early critical theory been sorely underestimated, but also his impact on the late philosophies of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 3 Seiten: 456-469.

In recent years, the works of György Márkus – a member of what has been dubbed the ‘Budapest School’ – have begun to generate an increasingly sophisticated and vibrant discussion. The present essay seeks to contribute to this burgeoning body of critical literature by offering a summary account and evaluation of the evolution of Márkus’s thought from the critique of alienation developed during the 1960s through to his post-Marxist philosophy of culture in the latter decades of the 20th century. It (...) does so with the intention of answering what is arguably the question confronting the contemporary reception of Márkus’s body of work: in what relation do Márkus’s later works stand to the aspirations and ideals of his early, more explicitly Marxist writings? (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

O artigo procura mostrar como alguns dos principais motivos da filosofia de Adorno, tais como a crítica ao sistema e ao pensamento discursivo, a superação do conceito pelo próprio conceito, o resgate do não-idêntico e a configuração do nome, constituem a “constelação de música e palavra”, característica da já clássica apologia adorniana da forma ensaio, da qual também resultam suas debilidades.