- Is Evidential Support the Same as Increase-in-Probability?Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):135–158.details
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Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.details
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Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice).Harjit Bhogal - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):1005-1027.details
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Critical review: Horwich on the ravens, projectability and induction. [REVIEW]James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (3):409 - 428.details
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Bayesianism and diverse evidence.Andrew Wayne - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.details
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Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation.Barry Ward - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):360-377.details
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Bayesian representation of a prolonged archaeological debate.Efraim Wallach - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):401-431.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.details
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Fine-tuning, multiple universes, and the "this universe" objection.Neil A. Manson & Michael J. Thrush - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):67–83.details
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Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.details
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Inductive reasoning and chance discovery.Ahmed Y. Tawfik - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (4):441-451.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248.details
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Robustness, discordance, and relevance.Jacob Stegenga - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):650-661.details
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Bayesianism and the Value of Diverse Evidence.Daniel Steel - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):666-674.details
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Hypothetico‐Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.details
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Probability and proximity in surprise.Tomoji Shogenji - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10939-10957.details
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Credibility, confirmation and explanation.William Seager - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):301-317.details
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Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements.Michael Schippers & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (2):299-329.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Popper's severity of test as an intuitive probabilistic model of hypothesis testing.Fenna H. Poletiek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):99-100.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance.Robert T. Pennock - 2004 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.details
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Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference.Barbara Osimani & Jürgen Landes - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):117-170.details
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Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):119-140.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.details
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A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.details
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Deontic Reasoning, Modules and Innateness: A Second Look.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):191-202.details
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Conditional Probability and the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning.Nick Chater Mike Oaksford - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):359-379.details
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In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means. [REVIEW]Amy McLaughlin - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):353-371.details
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Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis.Lydia McGrew - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):801-828.details
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On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation.Lydia McGrew - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):491-505.details
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Moral Confirmation vs. Moral Explanation: A Tale of Two Challenges.Sarah McGrath - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):1-21.details
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Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
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Bayesianism and irrelevant conjunction.Patrick Maher - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):515-520.details
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Hitchcock and Sober on Weak Predictivism.Wang-Yen Lee - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):553-562.details
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Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.details
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The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):1-31.details
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For Crying Out Loud.Marc Lange - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):604-616.details
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Coincidence and Common Cause.Tamar Lando - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):132-151.details
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Measurement perspective, process, and the pandemic.Vadim Keyser & Hannah Howland - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-26.details
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Experimental effects and causal representations.Vadim Keyser - 2017 - Synthese:1-32.details
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Experimental effects and causal representations.Vadim Keyser - 2017 - Synthese 198 (S21):5145-5176.details
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Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955.details
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In defense of modest probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.details
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Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.details
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