As the ecological crisis becomes increasingly pressing, the relation of environmentalism and democracy is spotlighted with new instancy. On one hand, the capability of present democratic governments to take adequate political action is seriously questioned. On the other hand, environmentalism is charged of being anti-democratic. This paper, in a first step, examines the “green” criticism of and sometimes actual departures from democracy. Drawing on that analysis as well as a pragmatist concept of democracy, the elements of an “ecological democracy” will (...) be outlined in a second step. Democracy, then, is not only a way of collective-problem solving, but also a form of life that has an intrinsic value, even in the face of unresolvable problems and failure. Striving for transformation and the best possible scenario nevertheless, finally, demands an attitude of ecological meliorism, which will be briefly outlined. (shrink)

The founding pragmatists were meliorists, arguing for the possibility of improvement in the human condition. At the same time, they did not think that progress was something inevitable. It was constrained by a tragic order that would prevent any movement toward a utopian ideal and could always lead to regress. Because they could not abide the notion of an absolute, pre-determined sense of the good, they did not subscribe to a moral perfectionism as well. Instead, Peirce, James and Dewey argued (...) in different ways that progress was made through the correction of error and the solution of problems as they presented in the experiments of life. Thinkers sympathetic to this understanding of the pragmatist tradition, such as James Wallace, Frederick Will, Larry Laudan and Philip Kitcher, build on these insights. The aim of this article is to show how the work of these thinkers provides the basis for a problem-based ethic that can assist in determining what changes to the practices and institutions of practical life can count as progressive or regressive. (shrink)

El artículo muestra cómo J. Dewey entiende “lo religioso”, no como experiencia sepa-rada, sino como intensidad de cada vivencia que realza y expande su cualidad estética. La vida cotidiana constituye el reino del hombre sobre la naturaleza que exige recobrar la relación originaria con esta y, desde allí, con Dios. Esto implica vivir de primera mano toda experiencia individual, toda vez que conlleva ser interpelado por las si-tuaciones problemáticas. Se explica la forma de dicho movimiento de la experiencia.

From the back cover: "Un repaso de las publicaciones que han abordado las relaciones e intercambios entre los Estados Unidos de América y España, arroja un saldo positivo en los ámbitos sociológico, político y cultural; no así en el estricto campo de la filosofía, necesitado todavía de mayores estudios. Los once trabajos que integran Estados Unidos/España: Diálogos filosóficosrepresentan un esmerado aporte en esta dirección: el de paliar el citado desequilibrio mediante la reflexión en torno al influjo del pensamiento estadounidense en (...) España y a la recepción de la filosofía española —a través de Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset y Julián Marías— en la patria de Walt Whitman.“Es muy deseable que este activo diálogo filosófico entre los Estados Unidos y España se desarrolle todavía más en los próximos años” (cit. Jaime Nubiola). Esta ha sido la principal aspiración de esta obra: ensanchar este intercambio, esclarecer sus múltiples direcciones y abrir nuevos caminos de investigación.". (shrink)

At some point during the 1950s, mainstream American philosophy of science began increasingly to avoid questions about the role of non-cognitive values in science and, accordingly, increasingly to avoid active engagement with social, political and moral concerns. Such questions and engagement eventually ceased to be part of the mainstream. Here we show that the eventual dominance of 'value-free' philosophy of science can be attributed, at least in part, to the policies of the U.S. National Science Foundation's "History and Philosophy of (...) Science" sub-program. In turn, the sub-program's policies were set by logical empiricists who espoused value-free philosophy of science; these philosophers' actions, we also point out, fit a broad pattern, one in which analytic philosophers used institutional control to marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. We go on to draw on existing knowledge of this pattern to suggest two further, similar, contributors to the withdrawal from value-laden philosophy of science, namely decisions by the editors of Philosophy of Science and by the editors of The Journal of Philosophy. Political climate was, we argue, at most an indirect contributor to the withdrawal and was neither a factor that decided whether it occurred nor one that was sufficient to bring it about. Moreover, we argue that the actions at the National Science Foundation went beyond what was required by its senior administrators and are better viewed as part of what drove, rather than as what was being driven by, the adoption of logical empiricism by the philosophy of science community. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate the possibility of a dialogue between Dewey and Heidegger, in particular on the role art plays in establishing horizons of meaning. After a brief introduction where the possibility and appropriateness of such a dialogue is justified, the first chapter investigates Heidegger and Dewey’s interpretation of the difference between the aesthetic experience of the ancient world and the modern world: while in the modern world art is locked up in museums and excluded from the affairs of (...) life, in the ancient world it was at the center of the experience of meaning. In the following section, the ability to create horizons of meaning is identified as the possibility for art to become central again in the modern world. To argue this, the two key terms of horizon and meaning are investigated, showing the many points of convergence between Dewey and Heidegger’s theories. In conclusion, the argument is drawn to a close, showing both the important similarities and some fundamental differences between the two aesthetic theories of Heidegger and Dewey. (shrink)

Why do bad things happen, why is there suffering in the world? The problem of evil poses a serious threat to the idea of God as an omnipotent, omniscient and absolutely good being since it had been first articulated. The existence of horrible natural disasters and moral abominations continues to be one of the strongest arguments for atheism. Consequently, attempts of absolving God of the charge are legion: theodicies belong to the essential repertoire of traditional Christian theology and phi...

After summarizing what I take to be the main contribution of Norton’s book––his proposal for a new vocabulary for public discourse as it pertains to environmental stability––I attempt to locate his work among some of the current debates regarding sustainability and public policy. I detail some of the ways in which this work constitutes a further development of themes he presented in 1991 in Toward unity Among Environmentalists. I discuss his prescriptions for defusing confrontations regarding environmental policy by functionalizing issues (...) in ways that cut across historically entrenched interest groups. From the standpoint of method, I␣argue that Norton has stacked a Habermas- type proceduralism on top of a pragmatic experimentalist platform (and I add that if he had constructed his method the other way around it would not have worked.) In all this I find Norton’s proposals both imaginative and full of promise. (shrink)

Much of the ethical theory posit the moral value in the action and believe in the rational systematization of morality. However, these theories are not able to deal with one of the most interesting and relevant questions in our moral lives, namely, moral dilemmas. They argue that moral dilemmas are not possible since they cannot be integrated into an ethical system without accepting inconsistence. On the contrary, moral theories that deny the possibility of systematization recognize the importance of moral dilemmas (...) for ethics and our lives. This relationship between ethics and our moral lives replaces the centrality of the action with the self. One of the philosophers that made this connection between the self and morality was John Dewey. This paper argues that rational moral theories suffer from an existential deficit and that Dewey’s approach acknowledges how humans change themselves through their moral action, and that moral choices are, in some sense, existential choices. (shrink)

While both Isaiah Berlin and William James are widely seen as pluralists, this paper contends that neither is a pluralist tout court. Berlin certainly is a pluralist when it comes to morality and politics, but he is a monist when it comes to nature. And James is, paradoxically, both a pluralist and a monist as regards all of reality. These claims are advanced by showing how both thinkers’ approaches contrast with those of monists, not least Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche. They (...) are also shown to be associated with different narrative genres: tragedy in Berlin’s case, and tragicomedy in James’. The paper then concludes with a brief discussion of an alternative approach, one that treads a path in between monism and pluralism and, because of this, favours a particular form of comedy. (shrink)

The views of John Dewey and Kurt Vonnegut are often criticized for opposite reasons: Dewey’s philosophy is said to be naively optimistic while Vonnegut’s work is read as cynical. The standard debates over the views of the two thinkers cause readers to overlook the similarities in the way each approaches tragic experience. This paper examines Dewey’s philosophic account of time and meaning and Vonnegut’s use of time travel in his autobiographical novel Slaughterhouse-Five to illustrate these similarities. This essay demonstrates how (...) both Dewey and Vonnegut embrace the ameliorative possibilities of art for preserving individuality and meaning in the face of tragic experience. (shrink)