This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the (...) history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one and the personal one. If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology. (shrink)

Hegel´s social and political thought has been often been interpreted as a defense of authoritarian statism against modern individualism. In this paper I claim, on the contrary, that the value and dignity of the individual is the conclusion of Hegel´s philosophical anthropology and, thus, the principle and foundation of his entire political philosophy. The value and dignity of the individual rely, more precisely, on her freedom of selfdetermination. The different forms of personal interaction that Hegel develops in his philosophy of (...) Right are thus those that offer the condition of possibility for the exercise of the freedom of self-determination of each individual. Freedom as the capacity to determine oneself does not imply, however, that the goal of human action should be that each individual does whatever she wants. Common good is not the necessary result of the sum of all the actions of the individuals in order to obtain their private well-being; precisely because that is not the case, the common good must be a goal in itself and there must exist a specific organization that takes it as its own goal, namely the State. Indeed, the whole meaning of the State is for Hegel to guarantee that all individuals in society become effectively autonomous agents and can exert their capacity of selfdetermination. (shrink)

The Communist Manifesto’s salient point was set out in Critics of the Gotha Program as “From Each According to Their Abilities, to Each According to Their Needs”. The demise of communism in the former Soviet Union has caused its critics to claim that ‘revolutionary’ political theory has no basis for legal or philosophical development. The contention of those who oppose radical socialism achieved by the levelling of the classes proclaim that this is an unattainable goal. They argue that a ‘withering (...) of the state’ is not possible for the implementation of Marx’s theory because of the centralisation that is inevitable in socialism which leads to an aggregate of relationships that redistributes power at the apex of the hierarchy. However, this appraisal has to be viewed with reference to the adoption by Marxists of socio legal theory as an analytical tool that has spawned arguments based on legal realism. This article examines the construction of these arguments within the sociology of law and looks at the inception of critical race theory which projects historical injustices towards a racial minority and seeks to transform society by exposing law as an instrument of oppression. (shrink)