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  1. Hume and the Perception of Spatial Magnitude.Edward Slowik - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):355 - 373.
    This paper investigates Hume's theory of the perception of spatial magnitude or size as developed in the _Treatise<D>, as well as its relation to his concepts of space and geometry. The central focus of the discussion is Hume's espousal of the 'composite' hypothesis, which holds that perceptions of spatial magnitude are composed of indivisible sensible points, such that the total magnitude of a visible figure is a derived by-product of its component parts. Overall, it will be argued that a straightforward (...)
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  • Hume on space, geometry, and diagrammatic reasoning.Graciela De Pierris - 2012 - Synthese 186 (1):169-189.
    Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...)
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  • Causal Powers, Hume’s Early German Critics, and Kant’s Response to Hume.Brian A. Chance - 2013 - Kant Studien 104 (2):213-236.
    Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that Kant’s account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume, (2) that textual evidence from the “Disciple of Pure Reason” suggests Kant conceived of his account of causation as such (...)
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  • Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments against the Senses in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.Jani Hakkarainen - 2007 - Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere.
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment (...)
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  • Inferences, External Objects, and the Principle of Contradiction: Hume's Adequacy Principle in Part II of the Treatise.Wilson Underkuffler - 2016 - Florida Philosophical Review 16 (1):23-40.
    This paper considers whether elements of T 1.2 Of the Ideas of Space and Time in Hume’s Treatise is inconsistent with skepticism regarding the external world in T 1.4.2 Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses. This apparent tension vexes commentators, and efforts to resolve it drives the recent scholarship on this section of Hume’s Treatise. To highlight this tension I juxtapose Hume’s “Adequacy Principle” with what I call his “skeptical causal argument” in T 1.4.2. The Adequacy Principle appears to (...)
     
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  • Hume against the Geometers.Dan Kervick -
    In the Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume mounts a spirited assault on the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, and he defends in its place the contrary claim that extension is everywhere only finitely divisible. Despite this major departure from the more conventional conceptions of space embodied in traditional geometry, Hume does not endorse any radical reform of geometry. Instead Hume espouses a more conservative approach, claiming that geometry fails only “in this single point” – in its purported (...)
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