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  1. Akrasía inversa genuina de la primera persona.Ignasi Llobera Trias - 2017 - Pensamiento 73 (275):61-75.
    Tradicionalmente se considera que un acto akrático es moralmente peor que el acto que el agente decidió realizar en primer término. Contra esto, Arpaly acuña la expresión «akrasía inversa» para referirse a los actos akráticos que son moralmente mejores que el acto que elagente había decidido realizar previamente. El análisis del concepto de akrasía inversa hecho por Arpaly resulta insuficiente; lo desarrolla mayormente a través de ejemplos tan célebres como el de Huckleberry Finn. Aquí se analizan las razones por las (...)
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  • Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.
    Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of (...)
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  • A Kantian take on fallible principles and fallible judgments.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2014 - American Dialectic 4 (1):1-27.
    According to Kant, if an agent acts according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that s/he ought as far as morality is concerned. But Kant thinks that agents can be mistaken in their subjective determinations of their duties. That is, Kant thinks it is possible for an agent to believe that some action X is right even though it is an objective truth that X is not right; according to Kant, agents do not have infallible knowledge of right (...)
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