Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind:fzab031.
    We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural way (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conglomerability, Disintegrability and the Comparative Principle.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):479-488.
    Our aim here is to present a result that connects some approaches to justifying countable additivity. This result allows us to better understand the force of a recent argument for countable additivity due to Easwaran. We have two main points. First, Easwaran’s argument in favour of countable additivity should have little persuasive force on those permissive probabilists who have already made their peace with violations of conglomerability. As our result shows, Easwaran’s main premiss – the comparative principle – is strictly (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Gradation Puzzle of Intellectual Assurance.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):488-496.
    The Cartesian thesis that some justifications are infallible faces a gradation puzzle. On the one hand, infallible justification tolerates absolutely no possibility for error. On the other hand, infallible justifications can vary in evidential force: e.g. two persons can both be infallible regarding their pains while the one with stronger pain is nevertheless more justified. However, if a type of justification is gradable in strength, why can it always be absolute? This paper explores the potential of this gradation challenge by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark