Two critical theories—both contemporaneous and complementary—in Western philosophy of education spanning the 1960s to the 1980s will first be explicated, and then their significant intellectual values will be discussed on the basis of such a comparative account. These two critical models are the practical theory of education in the Anglophone world and the critical theory of education in the Continental Germany. I will introduce them—namely, analytic practical educational theory and German critical pädagogik—one after another, by focusing on their complementary differences, (...) involving characteristic rationalities, typical forms of criticism, corresponding ways of exercising criticalities, and frames of reference regarding the sources of their criticalities. Based on such distinctions and contrasts, I will in the final section argue for their inherent value of coexistence, their practical value in illustrating the unique construction of academic educational studies which has respectively developed in the Anglo-American world and in the Continental world. As an additional point about their epistemic value to understand educational knowledge and scholarship accumulated in the West, I will further argue that these two philosophical–critical theories of education in parallel constitute peak academic experiences. This is mainly because they are compelling evidence, demonstrating how differently yet legitimately the two camps of Western educational scholarships deal with the same issue of criticality in contrasting yet complementary ways. (shrink)

Two critical theories—both contemporaneous and complementary—in Western philosophy of education spanning the 1960s to the 1980s will first be explicated, and then their significant intellectual values will be discussed on the basis of such a comparative account. These two critical models are the practical theory of education in the Anglophone world and the critical theory of education in the Continental Germany. I will introduce them—namely, analytic practical educational theory and German critical pädagogik—one after another, by focusing on their complementary differences, (...) involving characteristic rationalities, typical forms of criticism, corresponding ways of exercising criticalities, and frames of reference regarding the sources of their criticalities. Based on such distinctions and contrasts, I will in the final section argue for their inherent value of coexistence, their practical value in illustrating the unique construction of academic educational studies which has respectively developed in the Anglo-American world and in the Continental world. As an additional point about their epistemic value to understand educational knowledge and scholarship accumulated in the West, I will further argue that these two philosophical–critical theories of education in parallel constitute peak academic experiences. This is mainly because they are compelling evidence, demonstrating how differently yet legitimately the two camps of Western educational scholarships deal with the same issue of criticality in contrasting yet complementary ways. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current paradigm of educational theory as‘emergent in practice’ might sooner have provoked, and here does provoke, an analysis of the distinctive profile of educational practice. This practice is shown to be (inter alia) ‘philosophical’ by virtue of its integral quest for a coherent view of life. A theory that is adequate to this practice will be a‘cluster’ of four interconnected ‘discourses’ (each already in use within mature practice itselfl, not only deliberative and evaluative discourses but also utopian and (...) scientific ones. The curriculum of teacher education, too, should extend to all of these discourses. (shrink)

Paul Standish; Knowledge, Practice, Truth Beyond Liberal Education: essays in honour of Paul H. Hirst, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 28, Issue 2, 3.

I argue that, after Dewey, Peters was the first modern philosopher of education to write material (in English) that was both philosophically respectable and relevant to the day-to-day concerns of teachers. Since then, some philosophers of education have remained (more or less) relevant but not really respectable while others have ?taken off into the skies? learning acclaim from the philosophical community but ceasing to produce anything which would be of any relevance to teachers in their work. I suggest that Peters (...) might again point the way towards a form of academic philosophy of education that is both relevant and reasonably respectable. (shrink)

(2004). Is There a History of Educational Philosophy? John White vs the historical evidence. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 35-56.

This paper points out the way in which ‘educational’ and ‘communicative action’ are to be related. It is shown that earlier attempts to put Habermas’ ideas to use have led to a dead end because they do not realize clearly that the new basic notion introduced by Habermas, namely ‘communicative action’, is the expression of a ‘communicative turn’. It is argued that Habermas' concept expresses a radical new attempt to grasp the intersubjective character of social action. Next implications of this (...) communicative turn for the concept of education as a social praxis are indicated. Education can be conceived of as a praxis responding to the vulnerability of a communicative self. (shrink)

This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's ‘Philosophy and Education’(Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1), where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with ‘practical philosophy’ rather than ‘theoretical philosophy’. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and (...) their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of ‘practical philosophy’ is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own ‘prejudices’ into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this ‘theoretical philosophy’ approach must be replaced by that of a new ‘practical philosophy’. (shrink)

Suzanne de Castell; On Writing of Theory and Practice, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 39–49, https://doi.org/10.1111.

Charles Clark; Why Teachers Need Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 241–252, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

In 1964, Richard Peters examined the place of philosophy in the training of teachers. He considered three things: Why should philosophy of education be included in the training of teachers; What portion of philosophy of education should be included; How should philosophy be taught to those training to be teachers. This article explores the context of the time when Peters set out his views, describes philosophy of education at the London Institute of Education at one period in Peters? time there, (...) and then discusses the current state of philosophy of education, using New Zealand as an example of opportunities and challenges. Finally, asking whether Peters was nearly right about the place of philosophy in the training of teachers, it is concluded that he was right about its importance but got it wrong about his conception of philosophy. (shrink)

Professor Whitty has endorsed the consensus that research into education is empirical social science, distinguishing ‘educational research’ which seeks directly to influence practice, and ‘education research’ that has substantive value but no necessary practical application.The status of the science here is problematic. The positivist approach is incoherent and so supports neither option. Critical educational science is virtually policy-inert. The interpretive approach is empirically sound but, because of the value component in education, does not support education research either, or account for (...) this component.A solution to the latter problem is sought in the debate between Carr and Hirst on the relationship between philosophy and education. This shows Carr making claims that rely on a conception of philosophy that he rejects, while Hirst insists on this conception, uses it to justify practical claims, but denies that this is possible.To achieve a practically relevant analysis of educational research, both need to include second-order, normative, conceptual enquiry into the philosophies that drive educational policy-making and partly regulate teaching methodology. Deweyan, first-order, ‘reflective practice’ needs, then, to be supplemented with second-order reflection.Educational research is philosophy- not science-driven, and is value-led. Consequently, it has the status not of scientific discovery but of practical recommendation. (shrink)

Suzanne de Castell; On Writing of Theory and Practice, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 39–49, https://doi.org/10.1111.

Wilfred Carr; What is an Educational Practice?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 163–175, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14.

Wilfred Carr; Theories of Theory and Practice, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 177–186, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

Perhaps the most pressing issue concerning teacher education and training since the end of the Second World War has been that of the role of theory—or principled reflection—in professional expertise. Here, although the main post-war architects of a new educational professionalism clearly envisaged a key role for theory—considering such disciplines as psychology, sociology and philosophy as indispensable for reflective practice—there are nevertheless well-rehearsed difficulties about crediting such disciplines with quite the (applied) role in educational practice of (say) physiology or anatomy (...) in medical practice. This paper argues that while recent developments in professional teacher education and training may have moved on from erstwhile instrumentalist and/or applied science (competence and other) perspectives, there may yet be a case for further progress towards a rather more sophisticated philosophical psychology of teacher knowledge and expertise. (shrink)

This paper proceeds through four stages. First, it provides an account of the origins and evolution of the concept of educational theory. Second, it uses this historical narrative to show how what we now call 'educational theory' is deeply rooted in the foundationalist discourse of late nineteenth and early twentieth century modernity. Third, it outlines and defends a postfoundationalist critique of the foundationalist epistemological assumptions on which our understanding of educational theory has been erected. Finally, it argues that the only (...) conclusion to draw from this postfoundationalist critique is that educational theory has run its course and should now be brought to a dignified end. (shrink)

Wilfred Carr; Critical Theory and Educational Studies, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 287–295, https://doi.org/10.11.