Hobbes' concern when he writes about laughter is a nameless passion, one of the possible responses we can have to somebody's perceived inferiority when they have acted in a way calculated to dishonour us. 'Of great minds, one of the proper works, is to help and free others from scorn', so great minds will not be given to much of such laughter. It is not the laughter that is of concern to Hobbes, but the passion that the laughter expresses; that (...) passion is not one that contributes to fitting man for peace and for obedience. That nameless passion is but one possible reaction to the perceived calamity of another. Even when the other has been attempting to dishonour one, it is possible (and, on Hobbes' account, desirable) to ignore it; a great mind will pay no attention, not glory in its superiority, and compare itself only with other great minds. And another possible reaction is pity or compassion. Nothing in this shows that Hobbes takes human nature to be essentially egotistical. (shrink)

Laughter is a significant topic for Renaissance and seventeenth‐century philosophers. Still, the latter rarely approved of laughter but endorsed it as useful mockery for theological or philosophical purposes. Benedict Spinoza’s view of laughter stands out as an exception to this attitude as well as to previous and later ones. Spinoza differentiates between mockery and laughter, denounces the former as evil, and characterizes the latter as “pure joy”: laughter is about oneself rather than another and originates in noticing something good, rather (...) than base or ugly. In contrast to melancholy, cheerfulness is “always good” and is a precondition of our liberation as it furthers the use of reason. Not only is Spinoza’s view original, but it is an important source of the eighteenth‐century notions of good‐natured laughter and good humor through a more than probable influence on their proponent, the Earl of Shaftesbury. Whilst Spinoza’s view of cheerfulness is briefly addressed in recent studies, his view of laughter goes unnoticed in most commentaries and is misrepresented in humor studies. Contrary to what is assumed in the philosophy of laughter, I argue that the most important defense of laughter comes not from a British Enlightenment thinker, but from the Dutch Jewish seventeenth‐century philosopher. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes contends that a wise sovereign would censor books and limit verbal discourse for the majority of citizens. But this article contends that it is consistent with Hobbes’s philosophy to claim that a wise sovereign would allow a small number of citizens – those individuals who engage in scientific discourse and who are magnanimous and just – to disagree freely amongst themselves, engaging in discourse on controversial topics. This article reflects on Hobbes’s contention that these individuals can tolerate one (...) another’s differences and engage in verbal disagreement without any risk to the commonwealth. By engaging in open discourse, these individuals can better create valuable technology and provide counsel to the sovereign that is necessary to maintain peace. (shrink)