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Fallibilism

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005)

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  1. The Redundancy Problem: From Knowledge-Infallibilism to Knowledge-Minimalism.Stephen Hetherington - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4683-4702.
    Among the epistemological ideas commonly associated with the Descartes of the Meditations, at any rate, is a knowledge-infallibilism. Such an idea was seemingly a vital element in Descartes’s search for truth within that investigative setting: only a true belief gained infallibly could be knowledge, as the Meditations conceived of this. Contemporary epistemologists are less likely than Descartes was to advocate our ever seeking knowledge-infallibility, if only because most are doubtful as to its ever being available. Still, they would agree—in a (...)
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  • Fallible Reasons on Behalf of Fallibilism.David Alexander - 2017 - Synthese 198 (5):3979-3998.
    In this paper I introduce a problem regarding whether there are good reasons to accept fallibilism about justified belief. According to this species of fallibilism, one can be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of reasons that do not justify certainty. Call such reasons “fallible reasons.” The problem is this: can one justifiably believe fallibilism on the basis of fallible reasons? To do so would seem to beg the question. If you are undecided as to whether you should (...)
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  • Knowing Fallibly and It's Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Implications: Fallibilism Revisited.Chrysogonus M. Okwenna - 2021 - Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities 7 (3):73-90.
    This paper revisits the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism and discusses its overarching consequences to the whole structure of human knowledge and its extended applications. Fallibilism claims that we can never have absolute certainty to justify our knowledge claims. That means, knowledge needs not have an absolute, definitive warrants. Consequently, using the discursive method of enquiry, the paper argues that, if fallibilism is true, then, the concept of knowledge is redefined. Hence, knowledge would no longer mean the preclusion of error but (...)
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  • Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation.Michael Hannon - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.
    This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
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  • Understanding Fallible Warrant and Fallible Knowledge: Three Proposals.Stephen Hetherington - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):270-282.
    One of contemporary epistemology's more important conceptual challenges is that of understanding the nature of fallibility. Part of why this matters is that it would contribute to our understanding the natures of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. This article evaluates two candidates – and describes a shared form of failing. Each is concealedly infallibilist. This failing is all-too-representative of the difficulty of doing justice to the notion of fallibility within the notions of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. The article ends (...)
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  • Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.
    The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude. More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of (...)
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  • The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
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  • Some Fallibilist Knowledge: Questioning Knowledge-Attributions and Open Knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2083-2099.
    We may usefully distinguish between one’s having fallible knowledge and having a fallibilist stance on some of one’s knowledge. A fallibilist stance could include a concessive knowledge-attribution. But it might also include a questioning knowledge-attribution. Attending to the idea of a QKA leads to a distinction between what we may call closed knowledge that p and open knowledge that p. All of this moves us beyond Elgin’s classic tale of the epistemic capacities of Holmes and of Watson, and towards a (...)
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  • El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (1):243-259.
    El objeto de este artículo es analizar el problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico y ofrecer una solución basada en un tipo de justificación deflacionaria no-evidencialista a partir de la noción de habilitación de T. Burge y la de _garantía racional_ de C. Wright. El problema, en el caso del conocimiento básico lógico, es que justificar las reglas lógicas inferencialmente supone utilizar principios lógicos, con lo cual se genera un círculo vicioso. Examinamos la viabilidad del enfoque no-inferencialista de Wright (...)
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  • Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge.Anne Newstead - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. pp. 183.
    A fallibilist theory of knowledge is employed to make sense of the idea that agents know what they are doing 'without observation' (as on Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge).
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  • A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation.Sven Bernecker - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as “false memory” and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and wellgrounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of (...)
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  • The Extended Knower.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):207 - 218.
    Might there be extended cognition and thereby extended minds? Rightly, that possibility is being investigated at present by philosophers of mind. Should epistemologists share that spirit, by inquiring into the possibility of extended knowing and thereby of extended knowers? Indeed so, I argue. The key to this shift of emphasis will be an epistemologically improved understanding of the implications of epistemic externalism.
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  • Re-Enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):201-224.
    In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing (...)
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  • Scepticism.Michael Hall - manuscript
    Abstract: Scepticism has only two moves to make and each is indefensible.
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  • In Defence of Epistemic Relativism: The Concept of Truth in Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money.Johannes Steizinger - 2015 - Proceedings of the 38th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium:300−302.
    As one of the first modern philosophers, Georg Simmel systematically developed a “relativistic world view” (Simmel 2004, VI). In this paper I attempt to examine Simmel’s relativistic answer to the question of truth. I trace his main arguments regarding the concept of truth and present his justification of epistemic relativism. In doing so, I also want to show that some of Simmel’s claims are surprisingly timely. Simmel’s relativistic concept of truth is supported by an evolutionary argument. The first part of (...)
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