Agnes Heller's Theory of Morals was to be composed of three parts: General Ethics, Moral Philosophy, and a Theory of Proper Behaviour. The first two were born; the third, however, before it was written, was rebaptized by the author who could not resist her inner compulsion to do so. It bears the title Ethics of Personality. This author does not conceal his one-sided preference for this last part of Heller's Theory of Morals which has only one imperative: `Be yourself! Follow (...) your own destiny!'. At the same time he raises the question whether an ethics of personality does not contradict so much a general ethics (that simply describes the functioning of the moral) but a moral philosophy that tries to prescribe how people should behave. The author concludes that the only possibility of ethics in our age is an ethics of personality. (shrink)

In this essay, I reconstruct Heller’s philosophy of history, arguing both that Heller’s position presents a serious intervention into modern theorizing about historical patternicity and that Heller’s position should be understood as a valuable hybrid, uniting her existential, ethical, and pragmatic bodies of work. For Heller, history is implicated indissolubly in the personal and ethical decision-making of individual actors. I conclude that Heller undermines postmodern claims about the relativism of history and scientific progress, notwithstanding initial appearances to the contrary.

Examining the nature of Václav Havel's 'postmodernism,' we suggest that his use of this ambiguous label can be best understood if interpreted outside the conventional binary framework of modern/postmodern philosophy, which does not sufficiently answer to the lingering crisis of foundational certainty in political theory. In our view, the Czech playwright-turned-politician offers not merely a less confining sense of what it means to be 'postmodern,' but his commitment to moral political action also lends itself to overcoming some of the limitations (...) of contemporary postmodern theorizing by reentering the depreciated terrain of ontology. Specifically, we argue that an assessment of Havel's brand of postmodernism yields a rich interpretive harvest when read through ontological lenses. Indeed, Havel's theoretical posture serves as an instructive example of what political theorist Stephen K. White has called a 'felicitous weak ontology.'. (shrink)

The article tracks the development of Agnes Heller”s political philosophy as it evolves through the Marxism and reform communism of her years as a dissent Hungarian intellectual, followed by the period of her encounters with the Western Left and with the currents of postmodern liberalism.

From the point of view of reflected postmodernity, Ágnes Heller constructs her own discourse of aesthetics on the basis of György Lukács’s contribution. She locates aesthetics in her social philosophy, philosophy of history, and ethics, transforming aesthetics from a ‘Marxist Renaissance’ to a ‘post-Marxist’ position, and points out that the paradoxes of modern culture can be avoided by a personality that is autonomous and moral in action. The notion of the beautiful character in everyday life is a symbol of the (...) ideal type of society and of the good life in contrast to the God-forsaken world of modern dilemmas and the domination of the sublime in postmodernism. It is the expression of freedom and democracy in the contemporary age. Heller’s neo-humanist aesthetics is in essence the presentation of her cultural politics as a Great Republic. (shrink)

This paper situates the critical attitude undergirding Ágnes Heller’s theory of modernity by elucidating her conceptualization of its ‘undialectical dialectics’ relative to the dialectical philosophies of Kant and Hegel. For Heller, the methodological commitments orienting a philosopher’s decision on how to conceptualize the dynamics of modernity are not merely theoretical but also ethico-practical, for they attempt to overcome the duality of life and spirit in the singular personality. For the denizens of contemporary modernity – who recognize contingency inhering in their (...) institutions – and for philosophers – who recognize the fallibility of their theoretical claims – a form of skepticism is warranted. By engaging with the work of György Márkus, Heller attempts to evince a notion of ‘normative skepticism’ that may exhibit both a critical attitude appropriate to conceiving modernity as ‘undialectical dialectics’ and to attenuate for the threat of ‘existential failure’ in the choice of oneself as a philosopher. (shrink)

This was the address given on the occasion of the award of the Goethe Institute’s Goethe Medal to the Hungarian philosopher Ágnes Heller in 2010. Other recipients of the Medal have included Bruno Bettelheim, György Ligeti, Ernst Gombrich, Karl Popper, and Lars Gustafsson.

The question ‘How does a person make an ethical decision?’ becomes all the more compelling and problematic when trying to behave ethically during, as A ́ gnes Heller puts it, ‘the total breakdown of ‘‘normal’’ ethical worlds’. In her philosophical work Heller pieces together a moral compass internal to individual subjectivity to employ during such times. Kierkegaard’s model of existential choice has played a formative role in Heller’s solution to the problem. In my article I describe Heller’s Kierkegaardian framework of (...) choosing oneself as an ethical being and consider a recent critique of Heller’s Kierke- gaardian ethics of personality by Richard J. Bernstein, continuing the substantively pro- ductive tension between the irrational and rational forces that determine our ethical actions. In the process, I show common ground between Bernstein and Heller through an appropriation of Arendtian judgment. I turn to Heller’s most recent work in The Concept of the Beautiful in order to make this common ground tangible. (shrink)

This article reads Carlyle as a reader of Goethe to recover why he proclaimed Goethe as the `benignant spiritual revolutionist' of modernity and `first of the moderns'. As Goethe's first major English translator, Thomas Carlyle was also arguably the first to grasp the nature and purpose of Goethe's project to interpret modernity as a revolutionary epoch involving changes in consciousness, culture and material development. For Carlyle, Goethe's Faust presents modern consciousness and culture from the side of elegy - as the (...) search by an old man for eternal youth and an infinite world without constraints involving tragic loss. Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, by contrast, presents the same processes from the side of romantic quest, that is, from the perspective of a youth growing into adulthood, as looking into the future with infinite hope. Finally in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Carlyle discerns that the radical form of this novel as a discontinuous narrative that embodies movement, change and incompletion enables Goethe to represent the social conditions of moderns as a spiritual challenge and historic achievement. Carlyle's critical perspicacity is evident not least in his choice of Goethe's works to translate as much as his own essays on Goethe's place in modern European letters. In his close reading of Goethe, Carlyle captures the symbolic form of modernity as incorporating three levels of revolutionary transformation of individual consciousness, of culture and of modernity as mythic condition consisting of tragic development, creative destruction and perpetual movement and change. Moderns then are challenged to become authors of their own texts and lives. Carlyle contrasts Goethe's achievement against other primary candidates for the title of modern spiritual revolutionist in ironically Goethean terms: Napoleon (Prometheus), Byron (Faust and Young Werther) and Voltaire (Mephistopheles). Thereafter, the older Carlyle puts aside his critical readings of Goethe to become his own Goethean authority on the modern condition, most notably in his most famous books, Sartor Resartus, The French Revolution, Chartism, On Heroes, and Past and Present. By reading Carlyle as a reader of Goethe we can begin to discern that Carlyle was not only an historian, biographer and political commentator of his own place and times but a critical theorist seeking to interpret the modern epoch, with and beyond Goethe. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the meaning of historicity in the light of Ágnes Heller’s interpretation of history as ‘being-in-common’. By touching on the problem of the modern world’s axiological pluralism, the issue of the legitimation of moral theories and the dilemma of morals, the paper analyses Heller’s conception of human goodness as an incontrovertible, inexplicable and mysterious ‘fact’ that is able to illuminate the path of human life and determine the opening of the individual onto the world with the (...) same wonder that marks the beginning of any philosophical attitude. (shrink)

By dovetailing the classical concepts of virtue, beauty, harmony and happiness with the cardinal values of modern imagination, life and freedom, Agnes Heller galvanizes modernity's anthropological reflexivity and hints at the prospect of a classicism pertinent to the present. Beyond nostalgia for an ancient past or apology for a contemporary present, her moral anthropology is approached via a dialectical elucidation of aspects of epicurean theory attuned to modernity's complexity. Under the contemporary condition of waning postmodern challenges, escalating confusion and cynicism, (...) moral anthropology's task is as one of probing modernity's destiny for a non-predatory humanism that combines the existential wisdom of ancient theory with modern values. (shrink)