A new formulation of the cusp catastrophe is used to model the fundamental biological functions of predation and reproduction. This new representation lies on the decomposition of the overall cusp potential in two component potentials individualising the conflicting pregnances. It results in a more accurate and less problematic description than the original proposition by R. Thom, mostly due to the use of parameters with strong physical and evocative power. For instance, it gives a very suggestive account for such biologically significant (...) processes as digestion and assimilation, or pregnancy and delivery. Two couples of parameters are used in the new representation of the cusp: one defines the exact shape of the conflicting attractors which symbolises genetic coding, the other controls the deformation of -and interaction between- the two attractors and represent hormonal effects. This new description strikingly echoes Heidegger's philosophical thought on ontological difference, by giving a representation of the distinct concepts of entity and Being. It thus precludes a previous criticism concerning the impossibility for catastrophic models to depict the entity level. Such a type of representation might be useful in translating syntactical-semantic models of catastrophe theory into computer language. (shrink)

Catastrophe theory has been sharply criticized because it does not seem to have practical applications nor does it seem to allow us to increase our power over Nature. I want to rehabilitate the theory by foregoing the controversy raised by scientists about its practical efficiency. After a short exposition of the theory's mathematical formalism and a detailed analysis of the main objections that have been raised against it, I argue that theory is not only to be judged on its practical (...) results, which are in fact limited, but also on its epistemological and philosophical implications. Catastrophe theory indeed represents a real revolution in science: it announces the coming of a more theoretical, less practical, science, having more to do with understanding reality than with acting on it, and, from that point of view, it may be considered as the modern philosophy of Nature. (shrink)

It has gone largely unnoticed that when Deleuze opposes the “private thinker” to the “public professor,” he is invoking the existential thought of Lev Shestov. The public professor defends established values and preaches submission to the demands of reason and the State; the private thinker opposes thought to reason, “idiocy” to common sense, a people to come to what exists. Private thinkers are solitary, singular and untimely, forced to think against consensus and “the crowd.” Deleuze takes from Shestov and Kierkegaard (...) the idea that genuine thinking manifests itself in a thinking which rebels against rational necessity, a theme central to Shestov’s leading French interpreter, Benjamin Fondane. Although Deleuze at first expresses doubts as to whether Shestov’s critique of reason can overcome the legislative reason of Kant, or whether it is entirely free of ressentiment, I argue that Shestov and Fondane’s anti-rationalism is more radical than Deleuze sometimes admits, and show how Deleuze’s attitude toward Shestov became more unreservedly positive over the years. On the other hand, against Shestov and Fondane, I agree with Deleuze that the private thinker is in solidarity with the “strange powers” which can remake the world, and thus with “the people to come.” Nonetheless, I argue that Deleuze’s philosophy cannot form the basis of a politics of egalitarian consensus, but that “the people to come” can only be a “broken chain” of untimely and singular exceptions. (shrink)