This paper presents a reading of Metaphysics Z.10–11 according to which both chapters outline two main definienda: forms and material substances or compounds, each of which is governed by its own peculiar constraints. Forms include formal parts alone; furthermore, they are the main definable items and enjoy the strictest possible unity. However, this does not preclude Aristotle from upgrading material compounds to the status of definable items in their own right. Z.10 explains this contention by making the compound’s sensible functional (...) matter dependent on its form. This dependence affords the resulting compound an unusually tight form-matter relationship, strong enough to ensure its definability, despite falling short of the highest kind of unity that only forms display. (shrink)

La place qu’occupe la matière dans la définition de la substance sensible évolue au cours des livres Z et H de la Métaphysique : là où les chapitres 10 et 11 du livre Z affirment que la matière doit être exclue du definiens de la substance sensible, le chapitre 2 du livre H affirme, au contraire, qu’il se doit de l’inclure. Le présent article montrera que cette différence de doctrine est issue d’un approfondissement de la manière dont la priorité causale (...) de la forme est exprimée dans la définition. Elle l’est d’abord, dans le livre Z, au moyen d’une réduction des termes du definiens aux seules « parties de la forme », réduction qui est d’emblée jugée superflue et insatisfaisante. Elle le sera ensuite, dans le livre H, par la position de prédicat de la matière qu’elle occupe et qui a précisément vocation à exprimer sa priorité. En ce sens, les deux ensembles de textes ne constituent pas une volte-face théorique de la part d’Aristote, mais l’approfondissement d’un seul et unique modèle de définition visant à exprimer la priorité de la forme. (shrink)

Whether Aristotle wrote the treatises of Metaphysics with different conceptions of the science of Being in mind has long puzzled scholars. The particular question that causes them unease is whether Aristotle’s enterprise in establishing the science of Being through the several treatises of Metaphysics is marked by a general science of Being, studying all departments of Being whatsoever, or whether his investigation of this science reflects an attitude towards a special metaphysics seeking knowledge of a special department of Being, in (...) this case, God, and therefore should be regarded as a science that is eminently theological. In this thesis, I aim to show that Aristotle’s enterprise in Metaphysics does not necessarily hinder reconciliation between the universal and the theological dimensions of the science of Being and that although Aristotle's conception of the science of Being is eminently theological it does not conflict with its also being universal. Furthermore, I aim to show that had the conception of the science of Being in Aristotle’s mind not been theological, it would not be universal either. (shrink)