We know that Helmuth Plessner complained about his anthropological magnum opus, published in 1928, being overshadowed by Heidegger from the beginning. When the latter, in turn, responded to Plessner, for example to his preface toStufen, it was always anonymously; Heidegger never actually mentioned Plessner in any publication. Plessner on the other hand emphasized that he had developed his concept without any knowledge ofSein und Zeit, even though since 1924, he had shown strong interest in the yet-unknown colleague’s work. Thus, it (...) appeared to the public that they philosophised independently of one another.In fact, the situation is much more complicated. This paper tries, above all, to identify the sources of the peculiar discomfort caused on both sides by the work of the respective other, as well as to delineate the philosophical effects. Notably in Heidegger’s case, not enough is known about this. Heidegger starts out, in the 1920’s, cultivating a strong anti-anthropological affect; however, after his triumphal success, both with his publication and in the institutional field, in 1927/1928, he finds himself in an orientation crisis; it is from this point onwards that traces of Plessner’s anthropology can be found in his thinking. Ultimately, Plessner will prove a serious source of irritation as well as of inspiration for Heidegger.Additionally, from a systematic point of view, the present text retraces the main points of Plessner’s critique (subjectivity, disembodiedness of fundamental ontology). The investigation makes use of a broader corpus of text than was available to Plessner and Heidegger’s contemporaries, and concentrates on two questions: Did Plessner understand his opponent? Is he able to raise valid objections? It becomes obvious that Plessner is right in complaining about disembodiedness (even though his ownLeibphilosophy remains conceptually diffuse), while some differentiation is advisable concerning the subjectivism charge. (shrink)

In the Sophist, Plato claims that the philosopher is always engaged through reasonings with the idea tou ontos (254a4–b1). I argue that, contrary to appearances and to what various commentators believe, this phrase does not refer to the Kind Being singled out in the Sophist as one of the so-called ‘greatest’ or ‘most important’ Kinds, but to the whole intelligible realm. The proposed reading better accounts for Plato’s exact wording at Sophist 254a4–b1 and preserves the consistency of Plato’s view on (...) the object of philosophical knowledge. I conclude with some broader considerations on the relationship between this passage, Platonic dialectic and Aristotle’s conception of a science of being qua being. (shrink)