Мета. У цій статті передбачено провести морфологічне дослідження життя Григорія Сковороди як самоконструювання філософа порівняно з життям таких філософів, як Іммануїл Кант, Фрідріх Ніцше, Мартін Гайдеґґер і Генрі Торо. Теоретичний базис. В основі дослідження лежить застосування монадологічного підходу до історії у сполученні з біографічним методом. Ідеї класичних філософських систем Ґотфріда Ляйбніца та Освальда Шпенглера застосовано з урахуванням їхнього переосмислення українськими філософами Іваном Бойченком та Вадимом Менжуліним. Завдяки цьому життя українського філософа Григорія Сковороди розглянуто як монаду, яка невпинно здійснює власне смислове (...) саморозгортання. Наукова новизна. Наскрізну парадоксальність філософії Григорія Сковороди, яку приписують йому, виходячи з інших філософських систем, повністю знімає перформативна послідовність його життя як філософа, що показують системні порівняння основних характеристик його життя з життям інших видатних філософів, які підпорядкували свої дії своїй філософській концепції. Висновки. Філософія Григорія Сковороди є монадою, тобто таким першофеноменом, який неможливо пояснити з інших феноменів: порівняння з іншими монадами є лише приводом для виявлення власних характеристик досліджуваної монади, які поступово розкриваються як прояв її самобутності й неповторності. Оригінальність філософської концептуалізації життя Сковороди варто здійснювати в поетапному порівнянні зі свідомим життям інших філософів, і таке порівняння потребує продовження, постійного здійснення. Особливістю цього дослідження є спроба надати методологічне обґрунтування такому компаративному морфологічно-біографічному філософському дослідженню. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 89-103 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Philosophical AestheticsDonald Phillip VereneIs there an aesthetics of philosophy? Does philosophical discourse have a foundation in sense and sensibility? If the answer to these questions is affirmative and there is in some sense a philosophical aesthetics, what conclusions might be drawn for philosophical education?Put another way: Does philosophy require the power of the imagination and the product (...) of this power-image? Or is philosophy the product of the pure concept, the rational idea? Does philosophical reason rest upon a logic that resides in thought alone that is expressed essentially in principles and arguments disconnected from images and sentiment?The Philosophical ImaginaryThe French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff says:Whether one looks for a characterization of philosophical discourse to Plato, to Hegel or to Bréhier, one always meets with a reference to the rational, the concept, the argued, the logical, the abstract. Even when a certain coyness leads some authorities to pretend that they do not know what philosophy is, no agnosticism remains about what philosophy is not. Philosophy is not a story, not a pictorial description, not a work of pure literature. Philosophical discourse is inscribed and declares its status as philosophy through a break with myth, fable, the poetic, the domain of the image. 1Le Doeuff continues:If, however, one goes looking for this philosophy in the texts which are meant to embody it, the least that can be said is that it is not to be found there in a pure state. We shall also find statues that breathe the scent of roses, comedies, tragedies, architects, foundations, dwellings, [End Page 89] doors and windows, sand, navigators, various musical instruments, islands, clocks, horses, donkeys and even a lion, representatives of every craft and trade, scenes of sea and storm, forests and trees: in short, a whole pictorial world sufficient to decorate even the dryest "History of Philosophy." 2Le Doeuff points to Hegel's work as an example of the claim that the sole form of philosophy is thought. Yet the works of Hegel, like those of Plato, are full of images. Plato and Hegel are masters of metaphor. One can say of them what Aristotle says in the Poetics, that "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others and it is a sign of genius. For the right use of metaphor requires an eye for similarities in dissimilars." 3 Despite his mastery of metaphor, in the Republic Plato uses his doctrine of eidos to criticize the power of eikon to present truth. Hegel, in the Phenomenology, uses his doctrine of the Begriff to claim that the Bild cannot produce the science of the absolute. Plato and Hegel say one thing in their texts, but in the texts themselves they do another. Plato's dialogues are filled with metaphors and likely stories from the Ring of Gyges to the metaphor of the Sun to the tale of Atlantis, as are Hegel's works, from the "night in which all cows are black" to the phrenological skull to the owl of Minerva that flies only at the falling of dusk.How are we to comprehend the extremes of philosophical doctrine on the one hand and the discourse that expresses it on the other? Is the discourse simply the outer shell of the doctrine, inessential to its truth, or does the doctrine itself require for its truth all that is needed for its proper statement?I wish to seek the answer to this by connecting Plato to Hegel, using Vico as an intermediary, in particular Vico's conception of la sapienza poetica (poetic wisdom) and his conception of the universale fantastico (imaginative universal). My claim is that philosophical discourse, as well as philosophy itself, depends upon an aesthetic that cannot be overcome by reason, that there is a philosophical imaginary that necessarily accompanies philosophical rationality. The concept, the idea, always has a shadow, a doppelgänger through which... (shrink)

Throughout his life, Hegel showed great interest in physics and mathematics. His most sustained, surviving treatment of Euclidean geometry is his early work ‘Geometrische Studien’, which he completed while he was a private tutor [Hoffmeister] in Frankfurt, shortly before leaving for Jena to join Schelling.GSis not easy reading, but despite that, it seems to me that Hegel presents in it a remarkably erudite as well as interesting and insightful critique of geometry. He investigates some of the themes from the foundations (...) of geometry, in particular from the first book of theElements of Euclid. Like the mathematical philosophies of Kant and Frege, Hegel's understanding of geometry is conceptually based, but unlike them, it is also grounded in the classical Greek philosophy of mathematics, which achieved its definitive expression in Proclus's great commentary onEuclid 1. Much of this classical philosophy of geometry is forgotten nowadays, under the influence of the great modern mathematical philosophers. In my view, it well deserves reconsideration, especially since, as illustrated by Gödel's incompleteness theorems, modern mathematical philosophy has failed in its attempt to ground mathematics within the framework of formal systems.Much ofGShas not survived, and what remains is condensed and fragmentary. It seems that originally, Hegel covered all of the propositions ofEuclid 1rather than just the 14 propositions that are covered in what remains of the originalGS. I have given detailed treatment ofGStogether with related material in Hegel's Jena dissertation elsewhere. The objective of the present paper is to introduce the translation ofGS. (shrink)

The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical ac-ceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might (...) have ex- pected. (shrink)

A response to critics, Douglas Patterson and Mark Textor, on Künne's modest theory of truth in *Conceptions of Truth*.

It is a commonplace among certain recent philosophers that there is no such thing as theessenceof anything. Nietzsche, for example, asserts that things have no essence of their own, because they are nothing but ceaselessly changing ways of acting on, and reacting to, other things. Wittgenstein, famously, rejects the idea that there is an essence to language and thought — at least if we mean by that somea priorilogical structure underlying our everyday utterances. Finally, Richard Rorty urges that we “abandon (...) […] the notion of ‘essence’ altogether”, along with “the notion that man's essence is to be a knower of essences”.It would be wrong to maintain that these writers understand the concept of essence in precisely the same way, or that they are all working towards the same philosophical goal. Nevertheless, they do share one aim in common: to undermine the idea that there is some deeper reality or identityunderlyingandgroundingwhat we encounter in the world, what we say and what we do. That is to say, they may all be described asanti-foundationalistthinkers — thinkers who want us to attend to the specific processes and practices of nature and humanity without understanding them to be the product of some fundamental essence or “absolute”. (shrink)

The fragmentary nature ofGSmakes it difficult to read as it stands, and for this reason, I have rearranged the material slightly so that it falls into four primary, reasonably coherent, parts. Their titles are: ‘The nature of mathematical objects’, ‘Thirteen propositions of Euclid 1’, ‘The philosophy of parallel lines’ and ‘On the algebra of geometrical figures’.GSactually starts with ‘Thirteen propositions of Euclid 1’. The justification for the reversal of order in the translation is to have Hegel's philosophical basis for geometry (...) available first, to provide a context for his detailed discussion of geometrical propositions. The reader can easily reconstruct the original order ofGSas follows. Interchange the first and second parts and also the third and fourth parts. Next, move the passages marked a …. a', b …. b',c….c'to the places in the text markeda-a',b-b'andc-c'. For the reader wishing to locate the original German passages inDok., the page and paragraph for each of these passages are given at the start of that passage.In addition, subtitles for sections in these parts have been added which do not appear in the original. They are included in the translation to help orient the reader. I have inserted in some places words not in the original in order to clarify the meaning of the text. These insertions as well as my comments on the text are also enclosed within square brackets. Further clarifications can be found in the appended endnotes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Almost all philosophers recognize the fundamental importance of the Phenomenology of Spirit. But Hegel's way of thinking and speaking—which he names, “speculative”—needs explaining. The example of “the speculative sentence” is helpful—for here, speculating means implying, that is, neither bringing meaning to presence nor keeping it in absence; but rather, speaking and thinking by implication. If the history of philosophy, however, overlooks what is implied, then it cannot grasp what is, and what is thought and said in the speculative sentence. (...) Luckily, there is another way: implying that which can neither be said nor left unsaid, neither thought nor unthought. Reinterpreting Hegel's speculative sentence, therefore, for implication, for what is implied—and neither present nor absent—Haas demonstrates how to think and speak speculatively about thinking and speaking, substance and subject, being and becoming, whether in philosophy or not, even if we implicate ourselves thereby. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est d’interroger la transition Kant-Fichte sur le double plan de la systématicité et du primat de la raison pratique. S’il est admis que Kant voyait dans l’exercice critique l’occasion de renouveler, plutôt que de supprimer, la possibilité d’une métaphysique positive, il est aujourd’hui convenu de rapporter son ébauche de «système» au seul héritage de laSchulmetaphysik. A contrario, on cherche ici à prendre à la lettre l’exigence kantienne d’un système qui attend du «pratique» une nouvelle et absolue (...) «fondation», plutôt qu’il ne devrait être complété en l’état. La perspective fichtéenne impose alors son fil rouge.In this article, I examine two aspects of the transition from Kant to Fichte: systematicity and the primacy of practical reason. It is commonly agreed that Kant saw the critical exercise as an occasion to renew, rather than supress, the possibility of a positive metaphysics; however, most scholars now consider the “system” he sketched to be the sole heritage ofSchulmetaphysik. However, I take literally Kant’s demand for a system that expects from the “practical” a new and absolute “foundation,” rather than a system that must be completed. Here, Fichte’s perspective gives us the common thread. (shrink)

This paper investigates Hegel’s thesis that we are, in our practical relation to the world, inherently committed to certain aspects of idealistic metaphysics. For Hegel, our practical attitude is fundamentally at odds with a naïve realism that would take the world to consist ultimately of self-contained, self-sufficient individuals whose relations to one another are fundamentally external to their identities. Hegel contends that our practical attitude is premised upon an overcoming of this mutual externality, and especially the externality which is supposed (...) to hold between individual agent and world. It is shown that his argument hinges on conceiving of external things as inadequately individuated, as compared to living agents, and that it is precisely this ontological deficiency that conditions and motivates our action. Hegel’s discussions of morality and property ownership are appealed to in order to illustrate how we might better understand the nature and practical role of this purported deficiency. (shrink)

This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment. The second part explicates transcendental (...) subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self-referential and constitutes objects, in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel's absolute subject. Rather than delineating the differences between neo-Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti-psychologist and non-metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity. (shrink)