This essay takes issue with two possible stances in comparative and intercultural philosophy. First, there is the idea of ascertaining a method or conditions of possibility before engaging in intercultural comparison. This amounts to contemplating a form prior to any content. Second, there is the idea that a plurality of given philosophical traditions exist that do not have to be held together by a notion of what philosophy is. This is equivalent to asserting a diversity of content without giving it (...) a form. In both cases, the disunity of form and content subverts comprehension of universality. After problematizing both stances, I will seek to retrieve a notion of universality, drawing from Hegel’s insights into the peculiar character of philosophy. For Hegel, philosophy has the character of life, which does not allow for the isolation of form or content. Philosophy thus conceived does not apply any methods but is its own method. (shrink)

I shall situate Hume's scepticism within a broader philosophical and historical context. Firstly, I shall consider the place of Hume's thought within the early modern break with the almost millennium long metaphysical tradition, a break initiated by Descartes. The framework of being structured by a universal order was replaced by the individual human mind that broke free from any higher authority and became an autonomous cognitive agent. Subsequently, the ontological self-evidence of the world or the possibility of adequate knowledge came (...) under sceptical attack. Hume firmly belongs to this discourse and can be seen as the most consistent exponent of this early modern sceptical line. In this light, the ‘New Hume’ claim that Hume was an ontological realist will be shown to be misplaced in principle. Secondly, the strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume's philosophy will be considered, together with his concept of mitigated scepticism. The Pyrrhonian legacy is especially noticeable in Hume's acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the instructive role of philosophy – instead of attempting to make it the foundation of science it becomes a guide to a balanced, happy life. In this respect, Hume stands outside the early modern mainstream in philosophy. (shrink)

Examines Hegel’s unique understanding and assessment of capitalism as an economic, social, and cultural phenomenon.

The history of philosophy risks a self-opacity whereby we overestimate or underestimate our proximity to prior modes of thinking. This risk is relevant to assessing Hegel’s appropriation by McDowell and Priest. McDowell enlists Hegel for a quietist answer to the problem with assuming that concepts and reality belong to different orders, viz., how concepts are answerable to the world. If we accept Hegel’s absolute idealist view that the conceptual is boundless, this problem allegedly dissolves. Priest enlists Hegel for a dialetheist (...) answer to the problem with assuming that truth and falsity are mutually exclusive, viz., how certain sentences are both true and false. If we accept Hegel’s dialectical view that certain contradictions are necessary, this problem allegedly dissolves. For both McDowell and Priest, we find a true friend in Hegel. I argue that McDowell’s and Priest’s appropriations of Hegel overestimate Hegel’s affinity with quietism and dialetheism. McDowell reads Hegel as a quietist who silences metaphysical claims and the skeptical questions they raise against commonsense, but neglects Hegel’s adaptation of ancient skepticism against commonsense. Priest reads Hegel as a dialetheist who subordinates formal logic to dialectical logic by affirming the truth of certain contradictions, but neglects Hegel’s commitment to resolving contradictions for the sake of truth qua whole. I diagnose their misreadings in terms of what Hegel regards as the three moments of logic and argue that while McDowell jumps to its third moment, Priest stalls at its second moment. According to Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, logic has three “moments”: the abstractive moment of the understanding, which “stops short” at fixed categories; the negative moment of dialectic, which discovers the “genuine nature” of the categories, viz., that each “passes over, of itself, into its opposite”; and the positive moment of speculation, which grasps the “unity” of categories through the “dissolution” of their inner opposition. Hegel warns that if these moments are “kept separate from each other […] they are not considered in their truth”. I suggest that quietist and dialetheist readings of Hegel fail to consider truthfully the unified moments of his logic. In his quietist critique of metaphysics, McDowell enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of concept and reality. But McDowell helps himself directly to the third moment of logic, where the unity of the categories, and hence the boundlessness of the conceptual, would be fully articulated. Since he arrives at the third moment prematurely, ignoring its prior moments, he obscures its truth (§1). In his dialetheist critique of formal logic, Priest enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of truth and falsity. But Priest restricts himself gratuitously to the second moment of logic, where contradictions within the categories are not yet resolved. Since he stalls at the second moment, severed from its final moment, he obscures its truth (§2). I argue we can extricate Hegel from quietist and dialetheist misreadings only if we grasp the truth of the three moments of logic. (shrink)

To explain Paulin J. Hountondji’s intellectual trajectory, I offer a critical account of his conception of the relationship between science and philosophy. Mapping the shift from his well-known critical writings on ethnophilosophy to his later work on scientific dependency is possible only if we recognize that Hountondji conceives of philosophy as essentially a theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre). Adequately characterizing Hountondji’s metaphilosophical orientation, however, requires greater specificity. The two most influential philosophers on Hountondji’s conception of the relationship between science and philosophy, (...) Edmund Husserl and Louis Althusser, would both have assented to the claim that philosophy is fundamentally a Wissenschaftslehre. However, they each adhered to different (and indeed contradictory) understandings of this claim. While Hountondji explicitly recognizes the dual influence of Husserl and Althusser on his conception of philosophy as a theory of science, he does not attempt to resolve the contradictions between Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science and Althusser’s conception of that relationship. By examining Hountondji’s relatively neglected later writings on scientific dependency, it becomes clear that his emphasis on the significance of the history and sociology of science points toward an Althusserian conception of philosophy qua theory of science rather than a Husserlian conception of what it is for philosophy to be a Wissenschaftslehre. (shrink)

Offers a revised understanding of human subjectivity that avoids the extremes of both traditional humanism and cultural relativism.“Acknowledging the importance of the ‘middle voice’ of rhetoric is a worthwhile endeavor. For this, Vivian’s goals are to be applauded.” — Rhetoric and Public Affairs.

با تأمل در فلسفۀ ملاصدرا می‌توان دریافت که انسان موجودی است دارای استعدادهای نامحدود که با به فعلیت رسیدن در این عالم معنا پیدا می‌کند و چون به عنوان موجودی محدود تعلق وجودی به وجود لایتناهی دارد، تلاش می‌کند وجود خود را تحقق و معنا بخشد. لذا باتوجه به وجود تعلقی انسان و نقش عالم در معنا بخشی به وجود او، می‌توان به نسبت انسان با عالم و حرکت به سوی حق‌تعالی که غایت همۀ حرکت های اوست، پی برد. اما (...) وقتی دکارت «من» را در جایگاه «سوژه» و عالم را به عنوان«ابژه» در برابر آن بنا نهاد، «سوبژکتیویسم» و تقابل بین انسان با عالم به عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین آثار آن در فلسفۀ غرب پدید آمد. در این مقاله هدف تبیین نسبت انسان و عالم است با التفات به حیثیت وجود تعلقی او در فلسفۀ صدرایی در مقابل ثنویت انسان و عالم که از آثار اجتناب ناپذیر «سوبژکتیویسم» است و بالاخره رسیدن به اینکه تعلق و وابستگی انسان به خداوند در حرکت جوهری و به تبع آن فقر جوهری است که انسان صدرایی را از سوبژکتیویسم و هر نوع تفکر خودبنیادی امتیاز می‌بخشد. (shrink)

Socrates famously compares himself to a midwife in Plato'sTheaetetus. Much less well known is the developed metaphor of pregnancy at the centre of the initiation ritual that begins Brahmanical education. In this ritual, calledUpanayana, the teacher is presented as becoming pregnant with the student. TheArthavavedastates:The teacher leads the student towards himself, makes him an embryo within; he bears him in his belly three nights.

It has often been noted that Leo Strauss developed his understanding of political philosophy through a critical engagement with Heidegger. Yet most analyses focus on Strauss’s American works while neglecting his earlier response during the crisis years of the Weimar Republic. The article seeks to overcome this limitation by ‘deconstructing’ Strauss’s American definitions of political philosophy in light of both his Weimar understanding of politische Wissenschaft and his 1922 discovery of Heidegger’s Aristotle. I argue that Strauss’s conception of political philosophy (...) originated in Heidegger’s subversion of the traditional distinction between theory and praxis. I thus propose a way to read Strauss from the start following his own changing views of that distinction. (shrink)

The article explores the idea that according to Spinoza finite thought and substantial thought represent reality in different ways. It challenges “acosmic” readings of Spinoza's metaphysics, put forth by readers like Hegel, according to which only an infinite, undifferentiated substance genuinely exists, and all representations of finite things are illusory. Such representations essentially involve negation with respect to a more general kind. The article shows that several common responses to the charge of acosmism fail. It then argues that we must (...) distinguish the well-founded ideality of representations of finite things from mere illusoriness, insofar as for Spinoza we can have true knowledge of what is known only abstractly. Finite things can be seen as well-founded beings of reason. The article also proposes that within Spinoza's framework it is possible to represent a finite thing without drawing on representations of mind-dependent entities. (shrink)

У статті здійснено аналіз досвіду античної Греції у напрацюваннях Платона та Арістотеля щодо державної, а спочатку громадянської, цензури щодо виробів мистецтва, а також роль чуттєвого сприйняття, образу, суспільного ідеалу, цілісності оформлення свідомості людини на спосіб її існування у суспільстві. У статті показані дві основні тенденції щодо первинності чи вторинності мистецького виховання в державі. Розглянуто теоретичне осмислення ролі образної чуттєвості в побудові свідомості народу, яке було зроблено Г. Лессінгом в аналізі меж між мистецтвом скульптури та поезії. Як висновок, ми маємо узагальнення (...) у вигляді чуттєвості, образу, мислення відносно індивіда, а також досвіду, мистецтва, науки відносно становлення культури взагалі як суспільних форм діяльності індивідів. У зв’язку з нерівномірністю складу самого суспільства, поглибленням розподілу праці у ньому, ми маємо і розчленованість, різноманітність чуттєвості, образності мислення в різних прошарках суспільства, що і призводить до появи інституцій цензури як зовнішнього закону стосовно громадян. Ця проблематика дає нам змогу виявити суспільну сутність чуттєвості індивіда, а цензуру – як спробу зовнішнього утримання цілісності світобачення індивіда всередині держави. (shrink)

What is the relationship between knowledge and ethics? Does what we know and the reason that secures knowledge determine ethical responsibility, or might ethical responsibility itself awaken and animate the enterprise of knowing? The dissertation affirms the priority of ethics by juxtaposing two accounts of the relationship between truth and goodness. It critiques Hegel's systematic conception of absolute knowing by showing that this knowing elides the anarchical ethical demand arising from the other person. Hegel's dialectic reconciles the problem of the (...) relation with the other by transposing it to the plane of cognition where it becomes spirit's self-knowing. However, Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological reduction of the structures of knowing exposes an ethical level of experience that both inspires and interrupts this adventure of knowing. ;After the introduction of this problematic, Chapter 1 examines the challenge that Levinas poses to Hegel, discovering in experience and subjectivity a ground where real dialogue can take place. Chapter 2 traces the reconception of subjectivity by which Hegel brings all exteriority within the experience of self-consciousness and compares this with Levinas's notion of "lived experience." In Chapter 3, I show how Levinas's account of sensibility and enjoyment resists incorporation into Hegel's notion of self-consciousness. Chapter 4 examines the encounter with the other person and explicates why Hegel's and Levinas's accounts cannot be reconciled or made to complement one another, for the non-allergic responsibility incurred in the face to face relation is inassimilable to the antagonism of the same and the other experienced as self-consciousness. Then, in Chapter 5, I trace Hegel's pursuit of a more authentic recognition of otherness through the development of the concept of spirit, paying special attention to the role of language. The ultimate accomplishment of spiritual recognition in Hegel's account is again challenged by Levinas's notion of responsibility, which signifies as an ethical "saying" apart from the "said." Finally, I contest the absoluteness of knowing without denying the dialectic that animates it by suggesting that philosophy can be maintained as a human enterprise, a pursuit of knowing that is ever subject to and interrupted by the face of the other. (shrink)

Proceedings of the Sixth Argumentor Conference held in Oradea/Nagyvárad, Romania, 11–12 September 2020.

When Western science was introduced to modern China, more translated words were used to express fundamental concepts and terms than borrowed words. The process of academic translation, commensuration, and communication between Western and Chinese philosophy is a process of comparative philosophical research. Nowadays, however, it seems that Chinese philosophy is evaluated by a Western Hegelian criterion. This leads to the debate over whether or not China has philosophy. But it is meaningless to argue about whether or not China has the (...) name of philosophy. The key issue is whether or not China has the actuality of philosophy. Looking at the history of Western philosophy, it seems that the Hegelian definition of philosophy was the only one that existed in Europe. However, during the last 200 years after Hegel that the two main philosophical trends of positivism (scientism) and irrationalism developed from anti-Hegelianism or “Spurning Metaphysics.” As metaphysics is being reconstructed, the ghost of Hegel has reappeared. It is clear that in the future, philosophy will evolve from the development of human metaphysics or cultural philosophy. It is a process of the “negation of negation”: from traditional metaphysics to the spurning of metaphysics, and then to human metaphysics. (shrink)

Confucius’ religious thought summarized and utilized existing historical and cultural achievements. He strove to bring problems concerning traditional religious ideas such as destiny, the spirits, ritual propriety and faith into the realm of the rational. He sought to unearth the elements of human reason contained within these and to highlight the sublime and sacred in actual human society. He established a system of religious humanism that incorporated views on edification, faith, destiny, the ghosts and spirits and self-cultivation. Using a dialectic (...) based on the mean, he established a spiritual mindset comprising rational faith, a this-worldly transcendence and a sacredness grounded in the human that led ancient Chinese religious thinking in a unique direction. (shrink)

Universalism can be defined as the belief in the universal application of certain knowledge, world-views and value-views. Universalism has often been confused with Occident-centrism, due to the fact that the latter was used to justify the former, which confused the content of a thought with the social condition that gave rise to the thought. For many years, clarifications of this confusion have been made in sociology of knowledge, relativism and skepticism. Yet, the particularistic conclusion thus reached has led to more (...) confusion, namely, that between the intrinsic criterion for truth and the practical application of thought. China, with its long tradition of Sino-centrism, has recently shown a movement towards particularism, characterized by a search for national and cultural superiority by “returning to the source”. In today’s academic circles, some particularist themes are taken for granted, and believed to be true, but cannot be proved with rational examination. The particularistic claims to the “self grounded”, “self-featured” and “self-located” tradition of Chinese culture jointed with the post-modernism, neo-leftist movement of anti-globalization in the West, are not only harmful in practice, but also impotent in theory. The propaganda against the hegemony of Western discourse should be analyzed with questioning which hegemony and whose discourse. (shrink)

Every philosophical mode has a unique conceptual system. Qi has consistently been a fundamental part of ancient Chinese philosophy, and its significance is obvious. Guided by the idea of re-evaluating all values, Yan Fu, who was deeply influenced by Western philosophy and logic, used reverse analogical interpretation to present a new explanation of the traditional Chinese concept of qi. Qi thus evolved into basic physical particles. Yan’s philosophical effort has great significance: The logical ambiguity that had haunted qi was overcome. (...) However, qi gradually evolved into a particular existence as it was Westernized. It completely lost its internal flavor as indigenous Chinese philosophy. Its previous philosophical abstraction and universality diminished and at the same time it was not Westernized into the pure concept of Hegel’s philosophy. (shrink)

The articles considers philosophy as an educational project. The institutionalization of philosophy is connected with the process of formation and development of the classical university as well as with the transformation of its socio-cultural status. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the essential ambivalence of philosophy and its influence to the basic priorities of philosophical education. It is emphasized that the tasks of reforming and modernizing academic philosophical programs initiate the development of variable models and technologies for teaching (...) philosophy in modern universities. It this regard, of particular interest is the Belarusian experience in reforming philosophical education in its two aspects: general philosophy course and special academic programs. The article analyzes the model of teaching philosophy at various stages and levels of higher education, which has been used at the Belarusian State University over the past 15 years. The author describes both the innovative nature of this model and its connection with the previous organization schemes and teaching priorities. Within the framework of this model, there are three levels of teaching philosophy and its various modifications. At the first level, which is focused on the preparation of bachelors, the basic course “Philosophy” is taught, which suggests an acquaintance with world classical philosophical tradition. At the second level, the course “Philosophy in the Modern World” is offered, which, taking into account the specfics of the academic preparation of graduate students, reproduces the basic ideas and concepts of modern philosophy. At the third level, in the course “Philosophy and Methodology of Science”, the main attention is paid to the issues of logic, methodology, sociology of science and education. The article considers some stages, problems and contradictions of this reform process as well as its consequences in the context of recent events in the socioeconomic and political life of Belarus. The author argues that modern converging technologies of social and humanitarian education, which are based on formal and instrumental-pragmatic criteria, have significantly influenced the processes of reforming the system of teaching the humanities and social sciences in Belarusian universities. (shrink)

This article introduces the little-studied figure of Saigusa Hiroto, a twentieth century Marxist philosopher who reconstructed the history of technical thought in Japan. The article focuses on Saigusa’s thought between 1939 and 1942, contextualizes his thinking in relation to the technology controversy of the 1930s and presents his critique of the dualism between spiritual and technological culture. Saigusa defines technology as a “means as a process” and not a skill or system of things. The author argues that Saigusa’s notion of (...) “means as a process” dislocates the idea of Western technology as superior to Eastern technology, paving the way for current debates in the field of post-European philosophies of technology. (shrink)

Hegel famously criticizes Kant’s resolution of the antinomies. According to Sedgwick, Hegel primarily chastises Kant’s resolution for presupposing that concepts are ‘one-sided’, rather than identical to their opposites. If Kant had accepted the dialectical nature of concepts, then (according to Sedgwick) Kant would not have needed to resolve the antinomies. However, as Ameriks has noted, any such interpretation faces a serious challenge. Namely, Kant’s first antinomy concerns the universe’s physical dimensions. Even if we grant that the concept of the finite (...) is necessarily related to that of the infinite, the physical universe cannot both have and lack a temporal beginning. I argue that Hegel neither adopts Sedgwick’s view that Kant’s antinomies require no resolution nor absurdly accepts that the physical universe both has and lacks a temporal beginning. Instead, Hegel proposes a sophisticated resolution of Kant’s first antinomy (including its physical aspect) that depends on Hegel’s theory of the Absolute. (shrink)

There is no question that Fichte's theory of conscience is central to his system of ethics. Yet his descriptions of its role in practical deliberation appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. Many scholars have claimed that for Fichte conscience plays a material role by providing the content of our moral obligations—the Material Function View. Some have denied this, however, claiming that conscience only plays a formal role by testing our moral convictions in any given case—the Formal Function View. My aim in (...) this paper is to offer a new contribution to this debate. I begin by supplying further evidence in support of the view that conscience only plays a formal function in Fichte's ethics. Then I call attention to a deeper problem this view faces, namely, that it invites an infinite regress by making one's conviction a matter of higher-order reflection. The key to overcoming this threat, I argue, lies in Fichte's doctrine of feeling, whereby the criterion of one's conviction lies, not in a cognitive state, but in an affective state. In closing, I discuss the relevance of Fichte's theory for current debates over the nature of moral error and moral deference. (shrink)

This article has a hermeneutical interpretation of 'heng', one key word in the Laozi. The term 'heng' was not known until 1973 when the two silk manuscripts of the Laozi were unearthed in China. On the base of a reintroduction of heng into the text and of my philosophical reading of the Laozi's concept of 'heng', I argue for an alternative interpretation of dao as heng dao. I suggest that heng dao is neither a metaphysical substance nor mystical nothingness. It (...) is rather the differentiated appropriation of nature and life itself as experienced in the everyday. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 4 Seiten: 76-105.

Although Hegel'sLectures on the History of Philosophywas teaching material intended for students and published posthumously, it would be wrong to regard this work as irrelevant to his philosophical project. In his introduction to theLectures, Hegel emphasised that the history of philosophy should not be treated as a mere accumulation of opinions, or as a random collection of correct and incorrect views according to some later standards. The history of philosophy, just like art, religion andRecht, reflects the necessary logical determinations of (...) the Idea, and in this sense it should be studied with the intent of revealing those determinations. Hegel, of course, intended his project to be sufficiently established through thePhenomenologyand theLogicwithout the need to resort to any historical manifestations of culture. However, his interpretation of the history of philosophy does reveal his own philosophical agenda more straightforwardly than the ahistorical complex accounts of his other major works.Hegel's intention was to present the development of the history of philosophy as a reflection of the development of the Idea. Therefore, one would assume that the further we go back in time, we would find philosophers whose doctrines were less mature and more distant from Hegel's own conception of philosophy. However, Hegel seems to have singled out a few favourite philosophers, to whom he did not hesitate to attribute insights that could not possibly have been developed at the time, according to his pre-conceived pattern of development. One famous example was Aristotle, whom he credited with the conception of a Reason that becomes its own object, i.e., Reason which is ‘in and for-itself.’ A philosopher belonging to the ‘objective’ stage of the spirit could not normally have achieved such a conception. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se estudia el lugar que ocupa Ralph Cudworth en la historia de la filosofía. El objetivo es mostrar que este autor no es parte del canon de la filosofía del siglo XVII y que, sin embargo, es un representante del período moderno en las primeras historias de la filosofía. Para ello, primero se introduce al autor y luego se expone la presentación que se realiza del inglés en las obras de Jacob Brucker, Wilhelm Tennemann, Taddä Rixner (...) y Joseph Marie Degérando, para terminar en las Lecciones sobre historia de la filosofía de Georg Hegel. En un segundo momento se exponen algunas reflexiones en torno a Cudworth, que se originan a partir de la lectura de la bibliografía actualizada sobre dicho autor. Las conclusiones muestran la importancia de estudiar este tipo de pensadores, que no forman parte del canon de la filosofía pero son parte de la conformación del mismo. (shrink)

This article puts forward a revisionary reading of Hegel's reception in Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century, in suggesting that the stance of the British Hegelians is very close to the sort of non-metaphysical or category theory interpretations that have been in vogue amongst contemporary commentators. It is shown that the British Hegelians arrived at this position as a way of responding to the hostile existentialist reaction to Hegel begun by Schelling in the 1840s, which led them to (...) abandon the standard Neoplatonic reading of his idealism, and arrive at the sort of non- metaphysical account which is most fully developed by J M E McTaggart in his interpretation of Hegel's Logic. (shrink)

This paper considers the relation between the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and the German idealist G. W. F. Hegel . While Peirce engaged with Hegel’s thought quite extensively, his often critical comments on the latter have made it hard to see any genuine common ground between the two; recent ways of reading Hegel, however, suggest how this might be possible, where the connections between their respective metaphysical positions and views of the categories are explored here. Issues relating to their (...) epistemology and philosophies of languages are considered in a companion article. (shrink)

In this paper, which is the second in a series, I continue to consider the relation between the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and the German idealist G. W. F. Hegel. This article focuses on their views of epistemology and inquiry, and their accounts of the relation between language and thought. As with the earlier paper, it is argued that fruitful similarities between their positions on these issues can be found.

The article is devoted to the interpretation of the ontological argument as a theoretical construction that is connected with understanding of the reflexive relationship of thinking and existence. The author concludes that the consistent implementation of this approach requires an appeal to the historically transitory forms of the ontological argument which reconstructs the logic of the evolution of reflexive systems. The ontological argument is considered as a developing theoretical construct. Therefore, theoretical constructs conceptualized as non-classical versions of the ontological argument (...) will constantly re-emerge. Emergence of the first non-classical version of the ontological argument is related to need of overcoming apriority of introduction of the idea of the absolute being which is typical for Cartesianism. This issue was realized in the Kantian doctrine of transcendental ideas, which presented mind as an independent essence that creates its own content. Thus, the metaphysical construction, conditionally referred to as “the moral proof of the existence of God,” is revealed in the paper as a non-classical variant of the ontological argument. However, while Kant could be content with faith in reality of other subjectivity as an object of moral action, Fichte’s scientific doctrine demanded a proof of objective reality of the concept of the other I. This issue was identical to a basic problem of an ontological argument. “The ontological argument of the other I” offered by Fichte was devoid of mysticism as it is indissolubly connected with the disclosure of the social nature of the human subjectivity. The last step in formation of the concept “non-classical version of the ontological argument” was taken in Hegelian philosophy, where the reflexive relations between the multitude of I’s were transformed to reflexive interconnection between God and man. The versions of ontological argument are considered in the paper as necessary stages which any theoretical model of reflexive systems has to pass in its formation. (shrink)

In one of the unpublished parts of his manuscript titled the Spicilegia, Arthur Schopenhauer presents an uncharacteristically sympathetic reading of an Aristotelian text. The text in question, De anima III. 5, happens to include the only occurrence of arguably the most controversial idea in Aristotle, namely the distinction between active and passive nous. Schopenhauer interprets these two notions as corresponding to his own notions of the ?will? and the ?intellect? or ?subject of knowledge?, respectively. The result is a unique interpretation, (...) according to which Aristotle's active nous is in fact non-intellectual: it is devoid of any interaction with intelligible objects, and hence lacks any intellectual activity. I show that this interpretation, though counterintuitive, is tenable, and that it may contribute to our understanding of Aristotle even if we do not adopt Schopenhauer's metaphysics. (shrink)

The article analyzes Wilhelm Windelband’s views on the problem of the relation of philosophy to its history. Windelband’s essay “History of philosophy” (1905) is put as a starting point. The main motive for this research is the idea that the history of philosophy is an organon and a component of philosophy. The article critically examines Windelband’s interpretation of (1) Hegel’s conception of the history of philosophy, (2) the question about the grounds of philosophers’ interest in the history of philosophy, (3) (...) the problem of development of the history of philosophy as a science (Wissenschaft). The author assesses Windelband’s role in the development of the history of philosophy as a science is important, despite some accusations of partisanship. The main merit of Windelband, according to the author, is (1) a critique of Psychologism and Historical Relativism and (2) the justification of the history of philosophy’s main role in education as a whole and in the philosophical education in particular. (shrink)

This article mounts a defense of my and Slavoj Žižek’s co-edited anthology, Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism, against the two main criticisms of it made throughout Graham Harman’s article “The Battle of Objects and Subjects”: (1) that we and our fellow contributors are guilty of gross overgeneralization when we classify thinkers from various schools of thought – among them New Materialism, object-oriented ontology, speculative realism, and actor–network theory – under the broad rubric of the “new materialisms”; (...) and (2) that despite our pretensions to the mantle of materialism, our Lacano-Hegelian position is actually a full-blown idealism. In responding to and attempting to refute these criticisms, I make the case that our Lacano-Hegelian model of dialectical materialism is an “extimate materialism.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that retrieving insights from the ancient Stoic philosophers for Christian ethics is much more difficult than is often assumed and, further, that the “ethics of retrieval” is itself something worth prolonged reflection. The central problem is that in their ancient sense both Christianity and Stoicism are practically dense patterns of reasoning and mutually incompatible forms of life. Coming to see this clearly requires the realization that the encounter between Stoicism and Christianity is a conflict of lived traditions. (...) Precisely because we cannot simply extract Stoic insights from the lives in which they belong, the task of determining how Stoicism is useful for Christianity is exceptionally challenging. Indeed, doing justice to the Stoics has more to do with facing an alternative to Christianity than it does with appropriating insights for our own use. These points are developed in conversation with Elizabeth Agnew Cochran's recent article on the Stoic influence upon Jonathan Edwards. (shrink)

This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every simple as (...) representational power and of the metaphysics of unity and activity in which that construal is rooted. (shrink)

In trying to reach some view regarding the philosophical exchanges that went on between F. H. Bradley and William James at the turn of the century, it is in some respects tempting to endorse Bradley's view that ‘our differences may perhaps on the whole be small when compared with the extent of our agreement’. Indeed, in most of the articles, letters and books in which the debate between these two men was carried on, one finds the protagonists claiming to be (...) mystified as to the grounds of the dispute, and to see no great distinction in their respective outlooks. (shrink)

This paper examines Hegel’s accounts of the nature of judgements and inferences in the ‘subjective logic’ of the Science of Logic, and does so in light of the history of the tradition of formal logic to his time. It is argued that, contrary to the attitude often displayed by interpreters of Hegel’s logic, it is important to understand the positive role played by formal logic, ‘logic commonly so called’, in Hegel’s own conception of logic. It is argued that Hegel’s own (...) scientific presentation [Darstellung] of logic relies on a dialectic working through the tradition of formal logic from Aristotle to Leibniz. The positions within the dialectic are most easily brought into focus in terms of the distinction between Aristotelian and Stoic logic, but they can also be seen as internal to Aristotelian logic. The logical tradition can be regarded as presenting a type of reductio ad absurdum, and a science of logic must examine what it was about Aristotle’s original project that brought it to this fate. (shrink)