In seiner Geschichtsphilosophie, insbesondere der „Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht" (1784) erforscht Kant die Geschichte nicht in der bunten Fülle der Geschehnisse. Diese Aufgabe überlässt er der „eigentlichen bloß empirisch abgefassten Historie". Er betrachtet die Geschichte vielmehr, insoweit sie für den Menschen als praktisches Vernunftwesen von Interesse ist. Dabei wahrt er den Zusammenhang mit der transzendentalen Vernunftkritik und fragt, unter welchen erfahrungsunabhängigen Bedingungen der Gang der Geschichte als vernünftig, als sinnvoll erscheint. So wirft Kant jene Sinnfrage auf, (...) die von den empirischen Geschichtswissenschaften weder gestellt noch beantwortet wird. Für die 2. Auflage anlässlich des 300. Jubiläums Immanuel Kants wurden die einzelnen Beiträge komplett überarbeitet und auf den neuesten Forschungsstand gebracht. Mit Beiträgen von: Karl Ameriks, Reinhard Brandt, Volker Gerhardt, Otfried Höffe, Christoph Horn, Patrick Kain, Pauline Kleingeld, Jane Kneller, Dieter Langewiesche, Jean-Michel Muglioni, Alessandro Pinzani und Wolfgang M. Schröder. (shrink)

Philosophical thinking is interrupted by the finitude of what cannot be named, on the one hand, and that within which it is subsumed as one of multiple modes of sense-making, on the other. Sense and Singularity elaborates Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical project as an inquiry into the limits or finitude of philosophy itself, where it is interrupted, and as a practice of critical intervention where philosophy serves to interrupt otherwise unquestioned ways of thinking. Nancy’s interruption of philosophy, Van Den Abbeele argues, (...) reveals the limits of what philosophy is and what it can do, its apocalyptic end and its endless renewal, its Sisyphean interruption between the bounds of infinitely replicating sense and the conceptual vanishing point that is singularity. In examinations of Nancy’s foundational rereading of Descartes's cogito as iterative, his formal experimentations with the genres of philosophical writing, the account of “retreat” in understanding the political, and the interruptive play of sense and singularity in writings on the body, sexuality, and aesthetics, Van Den Abbeele offers a fresh account of one of our major thinkers as well as a provocative inquiry into what philosophy can do. (shrink)

One interesting aspect of the Hwang-case has been the way in which this affair was assessed by academic journals such as Nature. Initially, Hwang’s success was regarded as evidence for the detrimental effects of research ethics, slowing down the pace of research in Western countries. Eventually, however, Hwang’s debacle was seen as evidence for the importance of ethics in the life sciences. Ironically, it was concluded that the West maintains its prominence in science (as a global endeavour) precisely because it (...) has its ethics in place. Bioethics was now seen as an indispensable part of quality control. In this article, I will claim that the Hwang case rather reveals that there is no reason for complacency and that there are substantial challenges awaiting us. They have to do with major transformations in the way knowledge is produced and research in the life sciences is conducted (such as the increase in pace and scale, globalisation and the growing importance of ICT and bioinformation). These transformations call for a different kind of bioethics. The focus must shift from duties of autonomous researchers concerning visible research subjects (“micro-ethics”) to responsibilities of institutionalised research networks in managing and processing large amounts of bioinformation (“macro-ethics”). Concepts such as transparency, reliability and benefit-sharing will become more important than concepts such as informed consent. Basically, it is a resurgence of the tension between the Kantian and the Hegelian view of ethics. The contours of macro-ethics will be elaborated notably as it is emerging in bioethical debates over biobanking and genetic databanks. (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda lo que se considera que son algunas de las deficiencias de la teoría contemporánea de la sociedad civil. Para ello pasa brevemente revista a la evolución histórica del concepto, y se presenta una selección de sus definiciones contemporáneas. Todas ellas manifiestan una cierta imposibilidad para contemplar la política si no es desde una polarización dualista Estado-Sociedad, que trata de superarse abriéndose el concepto de sociedad civil a una mayor interrelación entre estos dos polos. Asimismo, se afirma (...) que el recurso a la «sociedad civil» sirve para recomponer en el ámbito de la teoría y resolver de un solo golpe dos de las grandes deficiencias que asolan a las relaciones entre sistema político y sociedad: la ausencia de un sujeto unitario claramente delimitado y el déficit de integración normativa. (shrink)

This paper tries to explain against the backdrop of the history of German criminal theory why and in which way the fault elements are seen differently in Germany and in Anglo-American countries. It shows how Feuerbach’s psychological model of guilt convinced Feuerbach’s German contemporaries in the 19th century that the suppression of the actual will to violate a criminal prohibition must be the reason for punishment. For such deterrence theory, direct intention is the central criterion of imputation. There is no (...) room for extensions like indirect intention. The resulting gap was filled by representatives of the will theory who created dolus eventualis as a criterion of imputation. The paper then concentrates on the gradual change which dolus eventualis has undergone due to the development of a ‘normative’ concept of guilt, i.e. a perception of guilt as a failure to live up to certain expected standards. It is outlined how the normative concept of guilt has facilitated Welzel’s decision to transplant dolus from the guilt level to the level of definitional elements. Transferring dolus to the definitional level led to a further change from a primarily voluntative to a cognitive content of the notion. It became appropriate to view dolus eventualis as acceptance of the prohibited state of affairs. For reasons of clarification the terms dolus eventualis and recklessness are compared in an annex to the paper. (shrink)

Abstract: Hegel's theory of tragedy is often considered to be primarily a theory of the objective powers involved in tragic conflicts—for Hegel, these are paradigmatically competing ethical notions—and of the rationality which underlies and drives such conflicts. Such a view follows naturally from a close reading of Hegel's discussion of classical Greek tragedy in his Lectures on Aesthetics. However, this view gives rise to the question of whether Hegel's theory of tragedy can account for the significance of tragic experience, in (...) particular the experience of tragic suffering; it has been argued repeatedly that it cannot. In contrast, I want to suggest in this paper that a theory of tragic experience can be derived from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. This Hegelian theory of tragic experience, I argue, should be understood as complementing rather than challenging Hegel's theory of objective tragic conflict. (shrink)

In the following article, we propose an analytical framework for the analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Standards based on the paradigmatic nexus of voice and entitlement. We follow the theory of decentration and present the concept of Transnational Norm-Building Networks (TNNs), which — as we argue — comprise a new nexus of voice and entitlement beyond the nation—state level. Furthermore, we apply the analytical framework to the ISO 26000 initiative and the Global Compact. We conclude the article with remarks (...) on the legitimacy and the effectiveness of norms generated by TNNs. Through this, we aim to contribute a new theoretical foundation to the analysis of CSR standards, which enables us to undertake a more differentiated description of TNN structures which have hitherto been ignored in academic literature. Secondly, we will contribute to the practical debate on ISO 26000 and the Global Compact by proposing new perspectives on the conditions of their legitimacy and effectiveness based on the voice-entitlement nexus. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the conceptual foundations of sovereignty in Hegel’s Philosophy of Law in order to provide an answer to this question and thus be able to evaluate the scope of contemporary sovereignty and the adequacy of its claims. As will be seen, Hegel constructs his own position in critical dialogue with Hobbes’ and Kant’s approaches, with more or less explicit references. The development of this article is divided into three parts. In the first, the Hegelian conception of (...) sovereignty is presented in the framework of his organicist understanding of the state, taking into account both its internal and external aspects. The second, analyses Hegel’s theoretical foundations of war and his position in international relations. Finally, the scope of sovereignty today is discussed in the light of Hegelian thought. (shrink)

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

Hegel is one of the few philosophers to devote systematic attention to phenomena that can be called pathologies of juridicism. Hegel claims that the law fundamentally contaminates the way in which we relate to ourselves, to others and to the world so that our (inter-) subjectivity becomes ethically deformed, distorted, or deficient. I outline this notion and reconstruct its development in the work of the young Hegel. I reconstruct Hegel’s critique of juridical forms of normativity as developed in his Spirit (...) of Christianity with reference to the example of Judaism and sketch his idea of a non-juridical intersubjectivity. I will make apparent the considerable problems lurking in Hegel’s account of love, which turns out to be a form of social integration potentially just as violent as the law. I argue that Hegel himself became aware of this problem and modified his original model by assigning to both love and law a legitimate place within an overarching system of Sittlichkeit, as I demonstrate with reference to Hegel’s Jena article ‘Natural Law ’. In the end I briefly explain why I still find this strategy unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Exploring the concept of citizenship from the history of political philosophy provides suggestions about what corporate citizenship could mean. The metaphor of corporate citizenship suggests an institutional approach to corporate social responsibility. Citizenship is a social role, characterized by an orientation towards the social contract, collective and active responsibility, as well as a positive attitude towards the juridical state. By analogy, corporate citizenship is a social role, characterized by the social contract of business, a participatory ethics of business, the precautionary (...) principle and the promotion of just international institutions. It is considered that corporate citizenship depends on a number of interacting institutional conditions that hold society partly responsible for the social performance of their companies. Finally, the problem of the dissolution of corporate social responsibility is reviewed in an institutional environment where everyone is considered responsible. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEine Entscheidungspflicht fordert, dass jeder Bürger die Frage nach der Organspende mit Ja oder Nein beantworten muss. Der Aufsatz prüft, ob sich eine solche Verbindlichkeit ethisch rechtfertigen lässt. Betrachtet werden mehrere Begründungsversuche: die Berufung auf das Prinzip der Hilfeleistung, die Vereinbarkeit mit dem Selbstbestimmungsprinzip, ein Konsistenzargument sowie die Frage, ob die gegenwärtige Belastung der Angehörigen für eine solche Verpflichtung spricht. Zusätzlich wird eine im Organspendediskurs verbreitete Begriffskonfusion zwischen Wollen und Wünschen untersucht. Alle Argumente für eine Erklärungspflicht erweisen sich im Vergleich (...) mit der bestehenden gesetzlichen Regelung als nicht überzeugend. (shrink)

In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I argue that for the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. The history of philosophy is not the whole of philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it indispensable (...) to substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely advantageous (pragmatic historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy are inevitably anachronistic I argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to substantive issues and in a critical spirit (contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed, such an analytic approach makes not just for better philosophy but also for better history. (shrink)

Hegel´s social and political thought has been often been interpreted as a defense of authoritarian statism against modern individualism. In this paper I claim, on the contrary, that the value and dignity of the individual is the conclusion of Hegel´s philosophical anthropology and, thus, the principle and foundation of his entire political philosophy. The value and dignity of the individual rely, more precisely, on her freedom of selfdetermination. The different forms of personal interaction that Hegel develops in his philosophy of (...) Right are thus those that offer the condition of possibility for the exercise of the freedom of self-determination of each individual. Freedom as the capacity to determine oneself does not imply, however, that the goal of human action should be that each individual does whatever she wants. Common good is not the necessary result of the sum of all the actions of the individuals in order to obtain their private well-being; precisely because that is not the case, the common good must be a goal in itself and there must exist a specific organization that takes it as its own goal, namely the State. Indeed, the whole meaning of the State is for Hegel to guarantee that all individuals in society become effectively autonomous agents and can exert their capacity of selfdetermination. (shrink)

In den neueren Forschungen zur marxschen Werttheorie wird einhellig und mit besonderem Nachdruck darauf hingewiesen, dass abstrakte Arbeit eine gesellschaftliche Eigenschaft der Arbeitsprodukte ist. Häufi g verstehen die Autoren unter dem mehrdeutigen Adjektiv jedoch Verschiedenes. Im folgenden Beitrag zeige ich, dass schon Marx zu unterscheidende Sachverhalte im Sinn hatte, als er die gesellschaftliche Dimension der Wertsubstanz hervorhob: ihren Bezug zur gesellschaftlich notwendigen Durchschnittsarbeitszeit, ihren Bezug zum gesellschaftlichen Bedarf und die Geschichtlichkeit der warenproduzierenden Gesellschaft. Ich denke, wir müssen auf der Linie (...) von Marx einen Schritt weiterdenken. Die Hauptthese des Beitrags ist, dass die marxsche Werttheorie an Überzeugungskraft gewinnt, sobald den drei Bedeutungen des Adjektivs gesellschaftlich eine weitere zur Seite gestellt wird: die gesellschaftliche Wertschätzung. Inwiefern sich diese These durch anderweitige anerkennungstheoretische Überlegungen im Kapital untermauern lässt, wird abschließend diskutiert. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: As Smith freed moral philosophy from former control bodies (the Church, the state), the Scottish philosopher opened the field for a scientific political economy. In his Adam Smith. Philosophie et Should then one wonder that his [Smith Mathiots reception in France. Mathiot sought to understand better the using a new character whom he claimed Smith was implicitly sketching, and whom he called . To Mathiots own philosophy.

The universalism of rights is a corollary to the individualistic semantics of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Paradoxically, the grounds of universalism were those legal and political concepts that theoretically describe the 19th century nation-state (such as sovereignty of the people, citizenship, rights, and the like). All these concepts of the liberal tradition construct the nation-state on the presupposition of a highly homogeneous political community of rational subjects, whose homogeneity consists in the very social, economic, political and sexual conditions (...) of their rationality. This kind of legal and political semantics is no longer adequate to characterize contemporary society which is a multicultural, highly in-homogeneous world-society. It no longer incorporates an ethic which is able to enforce universal leading values for human action. (shrink)

When Hegel first addresses moral responsibility in the Philosophy of Right, he presupposes that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do, but appears to offer little, if any, justification for this assumption. In this essay, I claim that the first part of the Philosophy of Right, “Abstract Right”, contains an implicit argument that legal or external responsibility (blame for what we have done) is conceptually dependent on moral responsibility proper (blame for what we have intended). This overlooked (...) argument satisfies the first half of a thesis Hegel applies to action in the Encyclopaedia Logic, namely, that the outer must be inner, and thus provides a necessary complement for his more explicit treatment of the second half of that thesis, that the inner must be outer. The claim that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do might appear, at first, to risk conflating legal and moral responsibility and to lack the necessary means to deal with the phenomenon of moral luck, but I argue that if it is properly situated within the whole of Hegel's philosophy of action it can be saved from both of these consequences and so take its place as an essential component of Hegel's full theory of moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I seek to explain G.W.F. Hegel’s view that human accessible conceptual content can provide knowledge about the nature or essence of things. I call this view “Conceptual Transparency.” It finds its historical antecedent in the views of eighteenth century German rationalists, which were strongly criticized by Immanuel Kant. I argue that Hegel explains Conceptual Transparency in such a way that preserves many implications of German rationalism, but in a form that is largely compatible with Kant’s criticisms of (...) the original rationalist version. After providing background on Hegel’s relationship to the traditional rationalist theory of concepts and Kant’s challenge to it, I claim that Hegel’s central task is to provide a theory of conceptual content that allows a relationship to the objective world without being dependent on the specifically sensory aspect of the world, which Kant’s theory of concepts required. Since many interpreters deny that Hegel’s use of the term “concept” is comparable to other historical philosophers (or our own), I first show that Hegel’s critique of standard conceptions of concepts presupposes an agreement of subject matter. I then show how Hegel’s account of the “formal concept” provides the skeleton for a view of conceptual content that relies on negative relations between terms, rather than a relation to sensibility, to provide content. Hegel’s account of conceptual content is completed when he shows how a universal term is further specified so that it can determine singular objects. This occurs in its adequate form in a teleological process. I argue that Hegel’s account of teleology in the Science of Logic is an attempt to explain how and where Conceptual Transparency obtains. A teleological process is one in which a concept constitutes an object, and this means that a concept is perfectly adequate to express that thing’s nature and not merely to represent it. However, in the final chapter, I show that Hegel’s concept of teleology is meant paradigmatically to illuminate how human purposive processes have constituted a social world that is conceptually accessible to us. In this way, the primary “province” of Hegel’s rationalism is the human constructed world. (shrink)

Desde los trabajos de Catriona McKinnon se ha empezado a hablar del crimen de postericidio. Este crimen es entendido como aquella conducta intencional o imprudente capaz de provocar la casi extinción de la humanidad. En este trabajo mostraré por qué el principio de daño (intergeneracional e internacional) puede aportar buenas razones en favor de la justificación moral de la criminalización del postericidio. Argumentaré que ni el problema de la no-identidad ni el de los daños por acumulación hablan en contra de (...) considerar que la criminalización del postericidio está moralmente justificada. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------- -/- The discussion on the crime of postericide has acquired a considerable boost since Catriona McKinnon’s writings. The crime of postericide is understood as an intentional or reckless conduct fit to bring about the near extinction of humanity. In this paper, I will show why the harm principle (intergenerational and international) is able to provide good reasons in favour of the moral justification of the criminalization of the postericide. I will argue that neither the non-identity problem nor the problem of the accumulative harms speak against considering the criminalization of the postericide morally justifiable. (shrink)

Due to great importance in the construction of theories it is imperative to analyze the nature of time and space and their use by scholars, societies and subjects. This text is the product of such analysis. My claim is that the validity of an argument depends on the spatial and temporal conditions that it is produced in. Moreover, I posit that time and space have been used in order to impose regimes of oppression over different collectives. My intention, however, is (...) not only denounced these uses because the oppression of the societies, to present the lack of such arguments. In other words, arguments based on universality of time and space have been the cornerstone of modern knowledge. This knowledge justifies regimes of oppression in different parts of the world. However, the intention of this analysis is not to denounce the lack of humanism in this knowledge, but to present the falsehood or incompleteness of this knowledge. It is not only wrong because its lack of humanity which justifies the inhuman regimes of oppression. It is also wrong, since its premises are false. (shrink)

El despliegue de las capacidades técnicas humanas actuales puede producir un ecocidio a escala planetaria. Es conveniente fundamentar teóricamente por qué el ecocidio ha ser considerado un crimen que afecta a la humanidad entera. El concepto de ecocidio surgió en el contexto de la ecología y de la teoría del derecho de guerra. Desde entonces, el concepto se traslada al lenguaje común y, más recientemente, a la filosofía ambiental y al derecho. El ecocidio tiene tanto aspectos de homicidio como de (...) suicidio ambiental y nos remite a la teoría del darse voluntariamente la muerte o exponerse al riesgo de muerte, no de un individuo, sino de la humanidad. (shrink)

What does it mean to ‘make love?’ Or, rather, what are we doing when we ‘make love?’ This expression makes of love a praxis on which the history of philosophy, rather modest, has said little. Philosophy has certainly evoked love, but always as a passion, an emotion, a feeling, and rarely as an action, exercise or even as a test. It is this aspect of the issue that it is important to study in order to determine it. At bottom, only (...) a definition will be in question. (shrink)