Between 1795 and 1796 Novalis produces a vast group of fragments on Fichte’s philosophy, the posthumously entitled “Fichte-Studien”. Among the topics therein approached, one of the most important is that of the _original action of the I _, and _the possible or impossible union of the opposites which model human life and thought_, feeling and reflection. The aim of this article is to inquire Novalis’ view of this problem of paramount importance for a philosophy of the I; namely, to investigate (...) the contours of Novalis’ circular conception of the problem, and its differences regarding Fichte; to expound the dilemma of the necessity and yet impossibility of a union between opposites; and to show how the young philosopher considers this problem both in its real and in its ideal prism, thereby proposing, as a solution, a _union in disunion_, an _possible union between opposites_, which Novalis affirms as a new conception of the circular study of the I and as the foundation for a new philosophizing. (shrink)

In a series of lectures from 1804–05, Johann Gottlieb Fichte sets out a conception of enlightenment whose basic structure is, I argue, to some extent reproduced in two more famous accounts of enlightenment found in post-Kantian German philosophy: Hegel’s account of the Enlightenment’s struggle with faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the conception of enlightenment rationality presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. The narrative I offer serves to highlight, moreover, the critical role played by the notion of (...) an unconditional good in Fichte’s and Hegel’s critiques of enlightenment. The lack of an explicit appeal to, and account of, this notion in Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of enlightenment will be shown to raise questions concerning how successful their critique of enlightenment can really be thought to be. (shrink)

O objetivo último deste artigo é demostrar a atualidade da crítica de Hegel ao irracionalismo. A hipótese interpretativa a ser demonstrada é que o conceito moderno de irracional, cuja origem se encontra na linguagem matemática, está diretamente relacionado com o problema do infinito. Para melhor desenvolver essa questão, pretendo mostrar o diálogo de Hegel com Schelling, cujo diagnóstico sobre o problema da oposição entre finito e infinito nos sistemas filosóficos até sua época muito influenciou a própria concepção de filosofia e (...) de razão do jovem Hegel. (shrink)

This paper proposes a transversal lecture of the Phenomenology of Mind from Hegel by following in the text the idea of death. To show the different figures of the death in the book, the author uses three lecture`s key: a) the death as natural end of the life, b) the fear of the death as regulative idea by the constitution the society, c) overcoming death through one kind of rational way of survival.

The article is devoted to the genesis of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It shows us that the formation of the natural philosophical views of the German philosopher took place not only in a speculative way, in the critical reception of Schelling’s works, but, first of all and for the most part, was predetermined by Hegel’s own interest in natural science and acquaintance with some prominent scientists of that time. The focus of the paper is on the evolution of the first (...) part of Hegel’s natural philosophy: the doctrine of space and time as it presented in some excerpts from two revised lecture notes on the philosophy of nature, read by Hegel in the winter semester of 1821/1822 at the University of Berlin and published as an appendix to the article by Bonzipen. In his article, Bonzipen provides historical information on the fate of these texts, raises the question of their authorship, gives a general outline of Hegel’s thought, and also compares both texts with the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. From his point of view, the revised notes allow partly to illustrate, partly to fill in some gaps in the dialectic of two forms of abstract appearance known on the basis of the Encyclopedia. Bonzipen notes that Hegel’s speculative consideration of space and time is complemented by a discussion with the history of philosophy and the history of mathematics. While reproaching traditional mathematics for being fixed on the quantitative aspect of reality, which does not allow to fully resolve the contradiction between space and time, Hegel at the same time refuses to attempt to build philosophical mathematics that focuses on the consideration of the qualitative certainty of the moments of space and time, declaring that although it is solvable, it is an extremely time-consuming task. This refusal becomes a turning point in the further development of the dialectical doctrine of space and time. (shrink)

The dissertation faces the problem of the meaning and the function of contradiction within Hegelian logical system. The dissertation is made of six chapters. The first one highlights the ambiguity of the contradiction within Hegel’s logic. Contradiction has three main meanings: first, the metaphorical meaning (contradiction denotes a strong but not contradictory opposition); second, contradiction has a critical-negative value and corresponds to the mistake of Understanding; third, contradiction is characterized by a properly contradictory structure and, at the same time, it (...) has an ontological value. The last value represents the most important and the specifically hegelian meaning of the concept of contradiction, i.e. the meaning of the contradiction as regula veri. In the second chapter negation, namely the constitutive structure of contradiction, is analyzed. In particular, its ontological and self-referential character is underlined. The third chapter is focused on the comparison between the hegelian concept of contradiction and the different ways contradiction is conceived in formal logic and philosophy of language: the semantic definition, the syntactic one, the pragmatic definition and finally the ontological one. On the basis of these considerations a general explicative model of the contradiction is outlined. This model is applied in the analysis developed in the second part of the dissertation, dedicated to the specific meaning contradiction assumes in the different sections of Hegelian logical system. The fourth chapter examines the way contradiction is conceived in the Doctrine of Being. The becoming sheds light on the contradictory nature of being and nothing; in the finite the contradictory nature of the determinate being turns out to be concretely developed. The fifth chapter is focused on the analysis of the determinations of reflection, in order to show the contradictory structure of essence and explain the real meaning of the Hegelian claim: “all things are inherently contradictory”. The topic of sixth chapter is the role of contradiction in the Doctrine of the Concept and, more specifically, in the dialectic of the universal, particular, and individual concept and on the way this dialectic has a further development within the logical idea of life. The dissertation ends with some final considerations resuming the main results of the research and the constitutive role of contradiction in Hegelian logic: contradiction is not only one of the many determinations of the logical system, because it turns out to has a trans-categorical value according to which it represents an internal and determining structure of all the logical determinations. The contradiction is their principle of determination, the structure in which every logical category realizes its own truth. (shrink)

O presente texto, de que se dá em seguida a tradução portuguesa, consiste numa selecção da correspondência entre F. W. J Schelling, J. C. F. Hölderlin e G. W. F. Hegel, três colegas e amigos do Stift de Tübingen, três vértices de uma das mais interessantes e importantes unidades teóricas do idealismo alemão e, por conseguinte, três elementos cujos anos de aprendizagem filosófica se revelam hoje essenciais para a boa compreensão da génese da sua época.