Nietzsche’s “drive theory”, as it is referred to in the secondary literature, is a rich, unique and fascinating articulation of the human condition. In broad brushstrokes, Nietzsche appears to contend that all human psychology is either directly reducible to animal drives (e.g. sex, aggression) or indirectly explicable to the historical transformations thereof (e.g. ressentiment). Moreover, Nietzsche’s initial elucidation of drive theory in On the Genealogy of Morals (and elsewhere) is well-complemented with a fecund, profound, and clear elucidation of the concept (...) in the secondary literature. -/- Yet, there remains a glaring lacuna for all the discussion of drive theory in the scholarship. The secondary literature is delinquent in explaining how animal drives became incorporated to form the human psyche. Nietzsche’s account to elucidate how drives became “digested” or in his words “inpsychated” is called the Internalization Hypothesis. However, as it appears in GM: II, 16, the hypothesis is grossly inchoate. The result of this undertheorization is manifold; its deleterious effects resonate along many axes of Nietzsche’s philosophy. -/- The present book, Internalized Valuation: A Genealogical Analysis of Nietzschean Drive Theory, offers an original and fruitful interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology. First, it clarifies what drives are. Second, it provides a new way of thinking about Nietzsche’s genealogical methods and then applies these insights to The Genealogy itself. What follows is a work that not only sheds much-needed light on Nietzsche’s philosophy of mind in general and his theory of emotions in particular, but also informs and illuminates problematic passages of Nietzsche’s Genealogy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay examines a particular rhetorical strategy Nietzsche uses to supply prima facie epistemic justification: appeals to intuition. I first investigate what Nietzsche thinks intuitions are, given that he never uses the term ‘intuition’ as we do in contemporary philosophy. I then examine how Nietzsche can simultaneously endorse naturalism and intuitive appeals. I finish by looking at why and how Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition to further his philosophical agenda. Answering these questions should provide a new and deeper understanding (...) of how Nietzsche does philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I sketch out a new interpretation of the Second Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality by showing that its seemingly meandering character conceals a highly cogent structure. In contrast to the prevalent scholarly trend, I argue that the ideal of sovereignty Nietzsche introduces in the essay’s opening sections plays an integral and crucial role in his account of the emergence of the feeling of moral guilt. In contrast to another common trend in the scholarship, I also (...) argue that Nietzsche’s account is very different from the account Freud proposes in Civilization and Its Discontents, with which it is often compared. Specifically, I show that guilt is not, for Nietzsche, a form of fear, nor simply the product of raw aggression turned inward when it can no longer be vented outward. (shrink)

Amidst a crowded field of contenders, the Scopes trial retains a powerful claim to the title Trial of the Past Century, with repercussions that have already extended well into the next. As an acutely divisive event in American scientific, legal, political, educational and religious life, the Scopes trial has persistently attracted commentators intent on mapping the dense network of persons and interests forcefully drawn together in Dayton, Tennessee in the often hotly contentious proceedings of July 10–21, 1925. These commentators have (...) been keen to explore both the foundations and the far-reaching consequences of courtroom polemics, sometimes with their own polemical intentions laid bare: from journalist H. L. .. (shrink)

This paper identifies and offers commentary upon a previously un-remarked consonance between Nietzsche and Weil when it comes to the idea of a universal love of the world. The discussion focuses on five features of the Nietzschean account of affirmation, which are as follows: that the possibility of affirmation has the form of a fundamental question at the heart of human life, which has an all-or-nothing character ; that genuine affirmation is rare, difficult or traumatic in an existentially revealing way, (...) primarily because affirmation means facing up to the lack of finality in the world, and in particular the problem of meaningless suffering, which means that affirmation is tied up with a fundamental revaluation. The first half of the paper outlines the parallels between Nietzschean affirmation and Weilian ‘consent to necessity’ in relation to the first three of these, which are also the most general. The second half of the paper explores the fourth and fifth, so as to suggest a way of reading the underlying similarity between these two projects: both are attempts to rediscover the possibility of an all-embracing affirmation of reality in the absence of any existential teleology, and when eschatology has been presumed to be impossible. In other words, both Nietzsche and Weil are compelled to find a way of achieving a transfigured perspective on ‘the whole’ in the absence of any transformation of ‘the whole’. (shrink)

The Internalization Hypothesis (I.H.), as expressed in GM II 16 of On the Genealogy of Morals, is the essential albeit under-theorized principle of Nietzsche’s psychology. In the following essay, I investigate the purpose I.H. serves concerning Nietzsche’s theory of drives as well as the Hypothesis’s epistemic warrant. I demonstrate that I.H. needs a Neo-Darwinian underpinning for two reasons: 1) to answer the Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation, and 2) in order to render it coherent with Nietzsche’s physiological determinism as articulated in (...) Twilight of the Idols. My re-examination of I.H., then, serves to underwrite the Hypothesis on solid empirical footing. In addition, my analysis provides further evidence to think that Brian Leiter’s initial (but naïve) type-fact reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy of psychology is accurate, deterministic warts and all. (shrink)

Prior to the third essay of his Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche affixes a fragment from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The purpose of the fragment seems explicit in the Genealogy’s preface where Nietzsche tells us that the essay is a commentary on an aphorism. However, the relationship of the fragment to the third essay is unclear. In response, several commentators have offered a solution: namely, to disregard the fragment from Zarathustra and to read the first section of the third essay as the (...) object of Nietzsche’s commentary. Since this reading, the puzzle concerning Nietzsche’s aphorism has been considered solved. In this thesis, I make a case for why we should revive this debate, why we should restore the most natural reading of the preface, which makes the fragment from Zarathustra the aphorism Nietzsche refers to there, and how we can make sense of its connection to the third essay. (shrink)