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The Language of Morals

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (1952)

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  1. The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
  • Temas em filosofia contemporânea II.Becker Arenhart Jonas Rafael, Conte Jaimir & Mortari Cezar Augusto - 2016 - Florianópolis, SC, Brasil: NEL/UFSC - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina.
    Sumário: 1. El caso del método científico, Alberto Oliva; 2. Un capítulo de la prehistoria de las ciencias humanas: la defensa por Vico de la tópica, Jorge Alberto Molina; 3. La figura de lo cognoscible y los mundos, Pablo Vélez León; 4. Lebenswelt de Husserl y las neurociencias, Vanessa Fontana; 5. El uso estético del concepto de mundos posibles, Jairo Dias Carvalho; 6. Realismo normativo no naturalista y mundos morales imposibles, Alcino Eduardo Bonella; 7. En la lógica de pragmatismo, Hércules (...)
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  • A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming.Garry Young - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):91-102.
    The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-player gamespace continues to be debated and, to date, a consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual interaction ‘is morally wrong’. In response, I present constructive (...)
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  • VI-BayesianExpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.
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  • ‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.
    Despite increasing prominence, ‘ought’-contextualism is regarded with suspicion by most metaethicists. As I’ll argue, however, contextualism is a very weak claim, that every metaethicist can sign up to. The real controversy concerns how contextualism is developed. I then draw an oft-overlooked distinction between “parochial” contextualism—on which the contextually-relevant standards are those that the speaker, or others in her environment, subscribe to—and “aspirational” contextualism—on which the contextually-relevant standards are the objective standards for the relevant domain. However, I argue that neither view (...)
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  • Giving up Hume's Guillotine.Aaron Wolf - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):109-125.
    The appealing principle that you can't get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, sometimes called Hume's Guillotine , faces a well-known challenge: it must give a clear account of the distinction between normative and descriptive sentences while dodging counter-examples. I argue in this paper that recent efforts to answer this challenge fail because the distinction between normative and descriptive sentences cannot be described well enough to be of any help. As a result, no version of the principle is both true and (...)
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  • Normative Reference Magnets.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (1):41-71.
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  • Advice for Noncognitivists.Malte Willer - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):174–207.
    Metaethical noncognitivists have trouble arriving at a respectable semantic theory for moral language. The goal of this article is to make substantial progress toward demonstrating that these problems may be overcome. Replacing the predominant expressivist semantic agenda in metaethics with a dynamic perspective on meaning and communication allows noncognitivists to provide a satisfying analysis of negation and other constructions that have been argued to be problematic for metaethical noncognitivism, including disjunctions. The resulting proposal preserves some of the key insights from (...)
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  • Elements of the Philosophy of ‘Right’.Jonathan Westphal - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (4):430-437.
    In the following paper, I discuss the adjectival uses of the English word ‘right’, in ethical and nonethical settings. I distinguish four distinct but related uses. In the central use, which includes the typical ethical applications, what is right is what conforms to a norm, or rule. The emphasis can be on the norm itself, or on the conforming to the norm. The view I offer is not original. It is to be found in the works of T.M. Scanlon, T.H. (...)
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  • Normative concepts and the return to Eden.Preston J. Werner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2259-2283.
    Imagine coming across an alternative community such that, while they have normative terms like 'ought' with the same action-guiding roles and relationships to each other, their normative terms come to pick out different properties. When we come across such a community, or even just imagine it, those of us who strive to be moral and rational want to ask something like the following: Further Question: Which set of concepts ought we use—theirs or ours? The problem, first raised by Eklund, is (...)
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  • Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better, Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie. Oxford University Press, 2013, ix + 196 pages. [REVIEW]Naftali Weinberger - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):113-120.
  • Schroeder on expressivism: For – or against? [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):117-129.
    This is a critical discussion of Mark Schroeder's book, "Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism" (Oxford University Press, 2008).
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  • Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.
    I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law’s (Relig Stud 46(3):353–373, 2010) evil god challenge.
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  • Moral inferentialism and the Frege-Geach problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic role (...)
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  • Against Formal Causation in Non-conscious Nature.Arthur Ward - 2011 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 14 (1):170-184.
    The problem of natural teleology in biology has traditionally focused on reconciling Aristotle’s efficient and final causation. In this paper, however, I emphasize the importance of formal causation in natural teleological explanations and suggest that undermining its legitimacy is a backdoor route to undermining natural teleology itself. Formal causation, I argue, represents the “phenotype” of an object, to use a familiar word from genetics. This means that formal causes specify not only intrinsic “genotypic” qualities of an object but also a (...)
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  • The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1615-1630.
    The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer purports to describe a scenario in which a subject has a justified belief, indeed knowledge, despite the fact that their belief is not causally or counterfactually sustained by any good reasons for it. The case has proven controversial. While some agree with Lehrer’s assessment of the case, others disagree, leading to a schism among accounts of the basing relation. In this paper I aim to reconcile these camps and put simple causal and counterfactual accounts (...)
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  • Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism.Edmund Wall - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):233-248.
    I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive- natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the logical analysis (...)
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  • Objectionable thick concepts in denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
    So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also briefly considers contextualist, (...)
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  • Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse.Pekka Vayrynen - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).
    Many normative judgments play a practical role in our thought. This paper concerns how their practical role is reflected in language. It is natural to wonder whether the phenomenon is semantic or pragmatic. The standard assumption in moral philosophy is that at least terms which can be used to express “thin” normative concepts – such as 'good', 'right', and 'ought' – are associated with certain practical roles somehow as a matter of meaning. But this view is rarely given explicit defense (...)
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  • New foundations for imperative logic I: Logical connectives, consistency, and quantifiers.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):529-572.
    Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...)
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  • New Foundations for Imperative Logic Iii: A General Definition of Argument Validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2012 - Manuscript in Preparation.
    Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives (“if you sinned, repent; you sinned; so repent”), and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives (“you must repent; so repent”) or vice versa (“repent; so you can repent”). I propose a general definition of argument (...)
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  • New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1703-1753.
    Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives, and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives, there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives, and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives or vice versa. I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors (...)
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  • In Defense of Imperative Inference.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):59 - 71.
    "Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight" is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, "since surrender" or "it follows that surrender or fight", and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (...)
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  • Negotiating “women”: metalinguistic negotiations across languages.Knoll Viktoria - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.
    The metalinguistic approach to conceptual engineering construes disputes between linguistic reformers and linguistic conservatives as metalinguistic disagreements on how best to use particular expressions. As the present paper argues, this approach has various merits. However, it was recently criticised in Cappelen’s seminal Fixing Language. Cappelen raises an important objection against the metalinguistic picture. According to this objection – the Babel objection, as I shall call it – the metalinguistic account cannot accommodate the intuition of disagreement between linguistic conservatives and reformers (...)
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  • Moore’s Open Question Phenomenon Explained—Naturalistically.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):241-256.
    G.E. Moore’s open question arguments have been targeted by unsympathetic philosophers for close to a century. Perhaps the most serious criticism directed towards Moore’s OQAs is that they be...
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  • Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):91-117.
    §13 of Principia Ethica contains G. E. Moore’s most famous open question arguments. Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended various forms of metaethical nonnaturalism—a doctrine Moore himself endorsed—by appeal to OQAs. Some contemporary cognitivists embrace the force of Moore’s OQAs against metaethical naturalism. And those who posit noncognitivist meaning components of ethical terms have traditionally used OQAs to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs. Despite this influence, Moore’s OQAs have been ridiculed in recent decades. Their deployment has been (...)
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  • Shapelessness in Context.Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):573-593.
    Many philosophers believe that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren’t unified under non-evaluative similarity relations and that this “shapelessness thesis” (ST) has significant metaethical implications regarding non-cognitivism, ethical naturalism, moral particularism, thick concepts and more. ST is typically offered as an explanation of why evaluative classifications appear to “outrun” classifications specifiable in independently intelligible non-evaluative terms. This paper argues that both ST and the outrunning point used to motivate it can be explained on the basis of more general (...)
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  • Towards a New Analytical Framework for Legal Communication.Hanneke van Schooten - 2014 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 27 (3):425-461.
    This article develops a model first proposed in my book Jurisprudence and communication [67]. It takes as its starting point the generally conception that legal rules are valid norms, involving a normative content and expressing themselves in reality through observable conduct. This dualistic character of law is central. Law is both fiction and factual, ideal and real. But the viewpoint that a legal rule is a manifestation of validity in reality, through empirical acts, raises the question how rules as (valid) (...)
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  • Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. [REVIEW]Mark Van Roojen - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):283-286.
    Over the course of the twentieth century, the logical space available to metaethics has been rather thoroughly mapped out. We now have a pretty good idea of the inhabitable terrain, and each bit of that terrain appears to be occupied by able defenders. So it comes as a surprise when Mark Timmons stakes out previously undiscovered and unclaimed territory. He defends a view that he labels “ethical contextualism,” a position that is at once naturalistic, nonreductive, nonrelativist, irrealist, nondescriptivist, and cognitivist. (...)
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  • Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
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  • Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.
    I argue that Jonas Olson’s argument from irreducible normativity is not a secure basis for an argument for error theory and that a better basis is provided by the argument from supervenience, which has more bite against non-naturalist moral realism than Olson is willing to allow. I suggest there may be a view which can allow for the existence of irreducibly normative facts while remaining unaffected by the kinds of arguments that work against non-naturalist realism. This view is expressivism. Interestingly, (...)
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  • Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.
    I explore the prospects of capturing and explaining, within a non-cognitivist framework, the enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires of N that, if N believes that she herself ought to perform an action, φ, N intends to φ. Capturing this principle involves making sense of both the possibility and irrationality of akrasia – of failing to intend in accordance with one’s ought thought. In the first section, I argue that the existing non-cognitivist treatments of enkrasia/akrasia by Allan (...)
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  • A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):347-357.
    If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral realist claims, then we can also explain why—and we need not deny that—strong internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because of any belief in any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, as Mackie argued, but because we do not allow that anyone has ‘accepted’ a normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it.
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  • Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere.Folke Tersman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):55-72.
    According to a traditional argument against moral realism, the existence of objective moral facts is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical disagreement over moral issues. An increasingly popular response to this argument is to insist that it generalizes too easily. Thus, it has been argued that if one rejects moral realism on the basis of disagreement then one is committed to similar views about epistemology and meta-ethics itself, since the disagreements that arise in those areas are just as (...)
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  • Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social Change.Michael Taylor - 1989 - Politics and Society 17 (2):115-162.
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  • Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression.Steven Swartzer - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-16.
    Several prominent philosophers have argued that the fact that depressed agents sometimes make moral judgments without being appropriately motivated supports Humean externalism – the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are distinct from or “external” to an agent’s motivationally inert moral judgments. This essay argues that such motivational failures do not, in fact, provide evidence for this view. I argue that, if the externalist argument from depression is to undermine a philo-sophically important version of (...)
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  • A challenge for Humean externalism.Steven Swartzer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):23-44.
    Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires (...)
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  • What overarching ethical principle should a superintelligent AI follow?Atle Ottesen Søvik - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (4):1505-1518.
    What is the best overarching ethical principle to give a possible future superintelligent machine, given that we do not know what the best ethics are today or in the future? Eliezer Yudkowsky has suggested that a superintelligent AI should have as its goal to carry out the coherent extrapolated volition of humanity (CEV), the most coherent way of combining human goals. The article discusses some problems with this proposal and some alternatives suggested by Nick Bostrom. A slightly different proposal is (...)
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  • The tasty, the bold, and the beautiful.Tim Sundell - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (6):793-818.
    I call into question a pair of closely related assumptions that are almost universally shared in the literature on predicates of taste. The assumptions are, first, that predicates of taste – words like ‘tasty’ – are semantically evaluative. In other words, that it is part of the meaning of a word like ‘tasty’ to describe an object as in some sense good, or to say that it is pleasing. And second, that the meaning of predicates of taste is in some (...)
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  • Disagreement, Error, and an Alternative to Reference Magnetism.Timothy Sundell - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):743-759.
    Lewisian reference magnetism about linguistic content determination [Lewis 1983 has been defended in recent work by Weatherson [2003] and Sider [2009], among others. Two advantages claimed for the view are its capacity to make sense of systematic error in speakers' use of their words, and its capacity to distinguish between verbal and substantive disagreements. Our understanding of both error and disagreement is linked to the role of usage and first order intuitions in semantics and in linguistic theory more generally. I (...)
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  • Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.
    This chapter offers an introduction to naturalist views in contemporary metaethics. Such views attempt to find a place for normative properties (such as goodness and rightness) in the concrete physical world as it is understood by both science and common sense. The chapter begins by introducing simple naturalist conceptual analyses of normative terms. It then explains how these analyses were rejected in the beginning of the 20th Century due to G.E. Moore’s influential Open Question Argument. After this, the chapter considers (...)
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  • Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503.
    Judgment internalism about evaluative judgments is the view that there is a necessary internal connection between evaluative judgments and motivation understood as desires. The debate about judgment internalism has reached a standoff some time ago. In this paper, I outline a new argument for judgment internalism. This argument does not rely on intuitions about cases, but rather it has the form of an inference to the best explanation. I argue that the best philosophical explanations of how we know what we (...)
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  • Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds.Jussi Suikkanen - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 47-69.
    According to contextualist theories in metaethics, when you use a moral term in a context, the context plays an ineliminable part in determining what natural property will be the semantic value of the term. Furthermore, on subjectivist and relativist versions of these views, it is either the speaker's own moral code or her moral community's moral code that constitutes the reference-fixing context. One standard objection to views of this type is that they fail to enable us to disagree in ordinary (...)
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  • Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist?Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2008 - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 513–528.
    This chapter contains section titled: Morality Not a Matter of Fact? No Ought from an Is Morality an Object of Feeling A Problem Morality an Active Principle Conclusion References.
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  • The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
    One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view according to which (...)
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  • A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
    It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as “φing is wrong,” conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, (...)
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  • A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
    Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the (...)
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  • Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset (...)
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  • Against essential normativity of the mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
    A number of authors have recently developed and defended various versions of ‘normative essentialism’ about the mental, i.e. the claim that propositional attitudes are constitutively or essentially governed by normative principles. I present two arguments to the effect that this claim cannot be right. First, if propositional attitudes were essentially normative, propositional attitude ascriptions would require non-normative justification, but since this is not a requirement of folk-psychology, propositional attitudes cannot be essentially normative. Second, if propositional attitudes were essentially normative, propositional (...)
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  • Realism about the Nature of Law.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (4).
    Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non-cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti-metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non-cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the (...)
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