Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against (...) her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law. (shrink)

Uncontrolled access to information on the Internet has many advantages, but it also leads to the phenomenon of fake news. Fake news is dangerous in many spheres, including that of health. For example, we are facing an increase in the amount of vaccine hesitancy. This has been w considered by the World Health Organization in 2019 as one of the greatest threats to public health. This specific phenomenon is linked with the spread of information on the Internet around that issue. (...) In this paper, I discuss a proposition of new crime, which has the aim of fighting medical fake news by stopping its spread. This proposition should be considered only if other non-criminal measures are inefficient. The proposal is “Whoever publicly disseminates information evidently discrepant with medical knowledge is subject to a penalty.”. (shrink)

Philip Pettit’s conception of freedom as nondomination is modally robust in that it requires not simply reducing the probability of uncontrolled interference by others but entirely eliminating that possibility. In this article, I consider whether freedom as nondomination provides an attractive analysis of official discretion, particularly in the context of the criminal law, an area of recurring interest for Pettit. I argue that not only does the modally robust character of freedom as nondomination have some rather unattractive implications in the (...) criminal law, but that it sits poorly with Pettit’s more general ambitions to provide a consequentialist framework for the evaluation of social institutions. Drawing on recent work by Niko Kolodny, I develop an ‘anti-deference’ interpretation of nondomination and contrast it to Pettit’s modally robust conception. (shrink)