The periodic table may be seen as the most successful example of inquiry in the history of science, both in terms of practical application and theoretic understanding. As such, it serves as a model for truth as it emerges from inquiry. This paper offers a sketch of a central moment in the history of chemistry that illustrates an intuitive metamathematical construction, a model of emerging truth. The MET, reflecting the structure the surrounds the periodic table, attempts to capture the salient (...) epistemological elements that warrant truth claims based on sets of models that are progressive in light of both empirical and theoretical advance seen over time. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the value of self-doubt in moral inquiry and in moral education. Using John Patrick Shanley’s play, Doubt: A parable, as illustration, it shows how self-doubt initiates and extends moral inquiry, highlights one’s epistemic fallibility and connects the inquirer to the virtue of humility. The essay draws on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Hullett, Nussbaum, Thayer-Bacon and Elbow to support the idea that the question ‘Am I wrong?’ is important for moral inquiry and for moral education.

What do Social Networking Sites (SNS) ‘do to us’: are they a damning threat or an emancipating force? Recent publications on the impact of “Web 2.0” proclaim very opposite evaluative positions. With the aim of finding a middle ground, this paper develops a pragmatist approach to SNS based on the work of Richard Rorty. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, we analyze SNS as conversational practices. Second, we outline, in the form of an imaginary conversation between Rorty and Heidegger, (...) a positive and negative ‘conversational’ view on SNS. Third, we deploy a reflection, again using Rortian notions, on that evaluation, starting from the concept of ‘self-reflectivity.’ Finally, the relations between these three steps are more detailedly investigated. By way of the sketched technique, we can interrelate the two opposing sides of the recent debates—hope and threat—and judge SNS in all their ambiguity. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to shed light on the ontological puzzle pertaining to models and to contribute to a better understanding of what models are. Our suggestion is that models should be regarded as a specific kind of signs according to the sign theory put forward by Charles S. Peirce, and, more precisely, as icons, i.e. as signs which are characterized by a similarity relation between sign (model) and object (original). We argue for this (1) by analyzing from a (...) semiotic point of view the representational relation which is characteristic of models. We then corroborate our hypothesis (2) by discussing the conceptual differences between icons, i.e. models, and indexical and symbolic signs and (3) by putting forward a general classification of all icons into three functional subclasses (images, diagrams, and metaphors). Subsequently, we (4) integratively refine our results by resorting to two influential and, as can be shown, complementary philosophy of science approaches to models. This yields the following result: models are determined by a semiotic structure in which a subject intentionally uses an object, i.e. the model, as a sign for another object, i.e. the original, in the context of a chosen theory or language in order to attain a specific end by instituting a representational relation in which the syntactic structure of the model, i.e. its attributes and relations, represents by way of a mapping the properties of the original, which hence are regarded as similar in a relevant manner. (shrink)

I argue that the debates over which norm constitutes assertion can be abandoned by challenging the three main motivations for a constitutive norm. The first motivation is the alleged analogy between language and games. The second motivation is the intuition that some assertions are worthy of criticism. The third is the discursive responsibilities incurred by asserting. I demonstrate that none of these offer good reasons to believe in a constitutive norm of assertion, as such a norm is understood in the (...) literature. Others who have made similar arguments conclude that assertion does not exist at all—that there is no such thing as assertion. I disagree: we do not have to relinquish the category of assertion just because it is not normatively constituted. There are alternative ways to understand and individuate assertion that do not rely on a constitutive norm. (shrink)

In ordinary circumstances, we can assess the worth of evidence well enough without benefit of any theory; but when evidence is especially complex, ambiguous, or emotionally disturbing—as it often is in legal contexts—epistemological theory may be helpful. A legal fact-finder is asked to determine whether the proposition that the defendant is guilty, or is liable, is established to the required degree of proof by the [admissible] evidence presented; i.e., to make an epistemological appraisal. The foundherentist theory developed in Evidence and (...) Inquiry can help us understand what this means; and reveals that degrees of proof cannot be construed as mathematical probabilities: a point illustrated by comparing the advantages of a foundherentist analysis with the disadvantages of probabilistic analyses of the evidence in the Sacco and Vanzetti case (1921), and of the role of the statistical evidence in Collins (1968). (shrink)

After a brief sketch of the history of philosophical pragmatism generally, and of legal pragmatism specifically (section 1), this paper develops a new, neo-classical legal pragmatism: a theory of law drawing in part on Holmes, but also on ideas from the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy. Main themes are the "pluralistic universe" of law (section 2); the evolution of legal systems (section 3); the place of logic in the law (section 4); and the relation of law and morality (section 5).

The iconic and diagrammatic features of abduction, as expressed in Peirce’s works after 1890, allow one to re-read the Kantian concept of schema. By means of this new reading, it is possible to consider the dynamics between legality and creative acts, which, according to Emilio Garroni, keep cultures alive. This process can be analysed by a semiotic theory that could combine the features of Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment (as an answer to schema’s problems) and Peirce’s last theory of abduction. In this (...) way, it becomes possible to go beyond the simple subsumption, through Reflective Judgment, of sensible intuitions under a concept. Thus, creativity becomes the process, both mental and cultural, whereby a new regularity come from the background of the previous one as a result of the free play of our faculties (Musement), which sets links between universes of experience apparently very distant one from another. (shrink)

Charles Peirce provided a few, but interesting we believe, remarks about metaphor. Aristotle on the other hand developed a theory of metaphor that, to this day has been, and still is, influential (even though his theory, especially within recent years, also has been heavily criticized, e.g., by Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press). Factor, Lance R. 1996. Peirce’s definition of metaphor and its consequences. In Vincent Colapietro & Thomas Olshewsky (eds.), Peirce’s doctrine (...) of signs: Theory, applications, and connections, 229–235. Berlin/new York: Mouton De Gruyter, as one of very few scholars, makes a comparison between Peirce and Aristotle. Factor claims that Peirce’s definition of metaphor and its consequences undermine and overturn Aristotle’s theory. We do not believe that Factor is right; and this is due to Factor’s misinterpretation of key elements within Aristotle’s theory. We rather believe that Peirce and Aristotle, in fact, have central ideas in common concerning metaphor; perhaps, in particular, when it comes to the function of metaphor. Hence, both see, for example, metaphor as a cognitive mechanism. The article tries to develop this argument. (shrink)

Prerequisite to memory is a past distinct from present. Because wave evolution is both continuous and time-reversible, the undisturbed quantum system lacks a distinct past and therefore the possibility of memory. With the quantum transition, a reversibly evolving superposition of values yields to an irreversible emergence of definite values in a distinct and transient moment of time. The succession of such moments generates an irretrievable past and thus the possibility of memory. Bohm’s notion of implicate and explicate order provides a (...) conceptual basis for memory as a general feature of nature akin to gravity and electromagnetism. I propose that natural memory is an outcome of the continuity of implicate time in the context of discontinuous explicate time. Among the ramifications of natural memory are that laws of nature can propagate through time much like habits and that personal memory does not require neural information storage. (shrink)

Having shown previously how a culture type can be given a unitary description in terms of a semiotic “lens” constrained by one of the Peircean Categories (“Shamanic” culture, by Firstness), we apply this methodology to a more “fine-grained” level of analysis, by comparing the Tamil and Sinhalese cultures under the assumption that one of them (Sinhalese) is in fact a “hybrid” culture-sign. Having shown in previous work that the greater South Asian microculture may be characterized as a Firstness of Thirdness (...) (13), in this paper we provide evidence from a variety of semiotic contexts, including language, art, and religion, that the novel or “intrusive” sign in Sinhalese culture is Firstness of Secondness (12), resulting in a hybrid culture sign that may be described as 12 × 13. (shrink)

One of the claims made for C. S. Peirce's existential graphs has been that they are a deductively complete formulation of first-order logic with identity. As Peirce presented them, this is true only for certain versions of first-order logic :those which do not include terms for individuals. I amend Peirce's rules here, showing, in particular, how they are capable of demonstrating that, for instance, ?Jack is in the kitchen? contradicts ?Jack is not in the kitchen?

I begin by examining three factors which enable the term ‘political correctness’ (hereafter PC) itself to feed into the hands of its opponents: namely, the trivialization of the actual issues which are attributed to PC, the villainization of those involved in the PC movement, and the conferring of a sense of legitimacy on the opposition movement.

This paper defends an internalist perspective of selection based on the hypothesis that considers living evolutionary units as Maxwell's demons (MD) or Zurek's Information Gathering and Using Systems (IGUS). Individuals are considered as IGUS that extract work by means of measuring and recording processes. Interactions or measurements convert uncertainty about the environment (Shannon's information, H) into internalized information in the form of a compressed record (Chaitin's algorithmic complexity, K). The requirements of the model and the limitations inherent to its formalization (...) are discussed. This approach offers an alternative view to the causes of evolutionary variations which goes beyond the classical Lamarckian-Darwinian controversy. I argue that random variations only apply near-to-equilibrium at the time organisms have attained structural closure, and that a speed up of mutation rates that facilitates the production of directed variations occurs far-from-equilibrium due to organisms' openness to the surrounding conditions. However, real organisms are located somewhere between the above two cases and thus, operate at an intermediate stage where there is a maximum efficiency of H/K conversion. In consequence, IGUS keep their autonomy and evolving capacity by compromising between external circumstances and inner constraints. This compromise is made possible by closure regulation. Likewise, this model explains why nature has favored the selection of agents capable of selectively recording a partial description of their environment. (shrink)

A pesquisa tem como objeto de estudo as comunidades digitais. O que garante relações efetivas entre os integrantes ou entre os integrantes e as ideias que circulam na comunidade, ou entre tais ideias a ponto de garantir a permanência da comunidade, bem como para o delineamento de tendências para o crescimento dessas ideias na comunidade?, é a pergunta norteadora. A partir dos conceitos de Charles S. Peirce de comunidade, lançamos a hipótese de que a comunidade permanece, pois pode construir uma (...) ambiência movida pelo amor evolutivo ou agapismo, e tende a contribuir para o aumento da razoabilidade concreta. Sendo assim, a pesquisa objetiva contribuir para a compreensão de como o amor evolutivo (ágape) se atualiza em uma comunidade e como a razoabilidade concreta nela se move. Nesse caso, consideramos que os Otaku se constituem como uma réplica para o conceito de comunidade, no sentido peirceano. Da mesma forma, nossos objetivos específicos são: argumentar sobre os vínculos entre amor evolutivo, comunidade e pragmaticismo no interior da arquitetura filosófica peirceana, além da noção de réplica em Peirce; identificar os produtos postos em circulação pela comunidade Otaku; inventariar o potencial de significados de um produto selecionado, ou atentar para o interpretante imediato do produto enquanto signo; identificar interpretantes dinâmicos vinculados ao produto selecionado; desenhar uma tendência para os interpretantes dinâmicos e argumentar sobre pistas que permitam aproximar o grupo dos Otaku com a ideia de comunidade em Peirce. Para tanto, tomamos como corpus seis capítulos publicados do manga One Piece pelo grupo de fãs OPEX, e as mensagens deixadas pelos leitores no mesmo site. As análises seguem um percurso metodológico orientado pelo conceito de interpretante e suas modalidades, proposto por Johanssen e Santaella, a partir da teoria peirceana. Assim, analisamos primeiro o potencial de significados latente no manga; depois os comentários, como efeitos atualizados do manga; e então uma nuvem de pontos formada pelos comentários classificados, para detectar tendências, a presença da ação de uma lei. A partir das análises, concluiuse que os efeitos do manga nos fãs (que dominam o manga) se apresentam nos comentários que sinalizam para interpretantes emocionais, energéticos e lógicos. Além disso, a nuvem de pontos sugere o estabelecimento de um hábito na comunidade, indicando o crescimento da razoabilidade concreta. Isso permite que aproximemos a o grupo de fãs da comunidade de Peirce, como uma réplica do primeiro nível da comunidade, a do amor, confirmando nossa hipótese. A exploração do conceito de comunidade, na perspectiva peirceana, e a proposta e aplicação do método de análise do movimento de ideias na comunidade digital, a partir da teoria dos interpretantes, constituem a relevância da pesquisa para a área. (shrink)

Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.