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  1. A case of shared consciousness.Tom Cochrane - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1019-1037.
    If we were to connect two individuals’ brains together, how would this affect the individuals’ conscious experiences? In particular, it is possible for two people to share any of their conscious experiences; to simultaneously enjoy some token experiences while remaining distinct subjects? The case of the Hogan twins—craniopagus conjoined twins whose brains are connected at the thalamus—seems to show that this can happen. I argue that while practical empirical methods cannot tell us directly whether or not the twins share conscious (...)
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  • Mirror Neurons, Prediction and Hemispheric Coordination: The Prioritizing of Intersubjectivity Over ‘Intrasubjectivity’.Richard Shillcock, James Thomas & Rachael Bailes - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (2):139-153.
    We observe that approaches to intersubjectivity, involving mirror neurons and involving emulation and prediction, have eclipsed discussion of those same mechanisms for achieving coordination between the two hemispheres of the human brain. We explore some of the implications of the suggestion that the mutual modelling of the two situated hemispheres is a productive place to start in understanding the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of cognition and of intersubjectivity.
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  • Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 114–132.
    To the question whether Hume believed in mind-independent physical objects (or as he would put it, bodies), the answer is Yes and No. It is Yes when Hume writes “We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but ’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.” However the answer is No after inquiring into the causes of (...)
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  • Experiencing things together: What is the problem?Peter Baumann - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):9 - 26.
    Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
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  • Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness.Eric LaRock - 2006 - Behavior and Philosophy 34:39-58.
    A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So (...)
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