- Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.details
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Beautiful red squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.details
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Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness.Michael Tye - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:19-40.details
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Color realism and color illusions.Dejan Todorovic - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.details
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Vehicle-representationalism and hallucination.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1727-1749.details
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Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.details
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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An account of color without a subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.details
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The Representational vs. the Relational View of Visual Experience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:239-262.details
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Clarifying the problem of color realism.Barry Maund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):40-41.details
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Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.details
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Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.details
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Setting Things before the Mind: M.G.F. Martin.M. G. F. Martin - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:157-179.details
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Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214.details
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Surface color perception in constrained environments.Laurence T. Maloney - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.details
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Color as a material, not an optical, property.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):37-38.details
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Physicalism and the Intrinsic Nature of Consciousness.Patrick Lewtas - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (2):203-228.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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Olive green or chestnut brown?Rolf G. Kuehni - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):35-36.details
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Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.details
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Color and content.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-34.details
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In favor of an ecological account of color.Scott Huettel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):33-33.details
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Byrne and Hilbert's chromatic ether.C. L. Hardin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):32-33.details
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Parallels between hearing and seeing support physicalism.Stephen Handel & Molly L. Erickson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):31-32.details
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Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.details
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Imprecise color constancy versus color realism.Brian V. Funt - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):29-30.details
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Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.details
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Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.details
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True color only exists in the eye of the observer.Frans W. Cornelissen, Eli Brenner & Jeroen Smeets - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):26-27.details
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Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26.details
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Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking.Michael H. Brill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):23-24.details
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Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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Perceptual variation and access to colors.Edward Wilson Averill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22.details
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